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Abstract 
The principal goal of this report is to present the experiments of the industrial automation and 
control systems (IACS) component Cybersecurity Certification Framework (ICCF) performed in 2017 
by the national exercise teams (NETs) of several Member States, namely France, Poland and Spain. 
Based on real-life cases of use and simulations of ICCF activities, this report documents the current 
practices of these countries and NET members’ views in relation to IACS products’ cybersecurity 
certification. These studies have led to a series of findings that will be useful for the future of the 
ICCF in the context of the European Cybersecurity Certification Framework. In conclusion, a plan of 
action is proposed for the 2018-2019 period. 
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1 Executive summary 
The ERNCIP IACS Cybersecurity Certification Thematic Group has worked towards fostering IACS 
cybersecurity certification in Europe. To that end, the thematic group has elaborated the IACS 
component Cybersecurity Certification Framework (ICCF). The ICCF has inspired the European 
Cybersecurity Certification Framework (ECCF). 
The ICCF: 
• proposes four IACS cybersecurity certification schemes (ICCS): 
o ICCS-C1 (self-declaration of compliance); 
o ICCS-C2 (independent compliance assessment); 
o ICCS-B (product cyber resilience certification); 
o ICCS-A (full cyber resilience certification); 
• … that involve up to three evaluation activities: 
o compliance assessment (in all four ICCS); 
o cyber resilience testing (ICCS-B and A); 
o development process evaluation (ICCS-A). 
• … that require the guidelines and resources of three pillars: 
o IACS Common Cybersecurity Assessment Requirements (ICCAR); 
o IACS Components Cybersecurity Protection Profiles (ICCPRO); 
o The IACS Cybersecurity Certification Process (ICCP). 
• … and involves a fourth pillar for fostering and disseminating the ICCF: 
o the IACS Cybersecurity Certification EU Register (ICCEUR). 
First, the present report documents existing practices in several EU Member States in relation to the 
ICCF’s evaluation activities and pillars. 
Next, the findings from those studies are presented. They are expected to help to improve the ICCF 
and foster its use in the context of the ECCF. 
Finally, the report draws, from the previous elements, a plan of action that could be implemented in 
the 2018-2019 period in order to turn the ICCF into a fully usable scheme in the context of the ECCF.
    
 
Feedback and inquiries should be communicated to: 
Joint Research Centre 
ERNCIP Office 
jrc-erncip-office@ec.europa.eu 
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2 Introduction 
2.1 The	history	and	work	of	the	ERNCIP	IACS	Thematic	Group	
In 2013, partner directorates-general of the European Commission and the Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) mandated the ERNCIP IACS Thematic Group to undertake a preliminary feasibility study of an 
IACS cybersecurity certification framework. 
The ERNCIP IACS thematic group has gone through three successive phases. 
• 2014 aimed at taking stock of the context, needs and requirements and outlining the 
principles of a European IACS cybersecurity certification framework. 
• 2015 was an intermediate time of reflection, communication with stakeholders and 
planning. 
• 2016 saw the second phase of our thematic group, with a goal to deliver practical 
recommendations to the industrial systems community at large. This second phase delivered 
the IACS components Cybersecurity Certification Framework (ICCF). 
• 2017 marked the third phase of the ERNCIP IACS Thematic Group. During this phase, several 
Member States took part in an experiment aimed at documenting the current practices in 
relation to IACS cybersecurity certification. 
In 2017, each participating Member State created a national exercise team (NET) that involved: 
• its national cybersecurity agency; 
• an IACS vendor; 
• a certification authority; 
• a cybersecurity evaluation laboratory (often called information technology security 
evaluation facility (ITSEF); 
• possibly industry representatives, academics or experts. 
Six NETs were expected to take part in the ICCF phase 3 work plan. 
 
Figure 1: Planned ICCF phase 3 NETs 
• Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands and Poland, and the CEN-Cenelec Cyber Security 
Coordination Group (CSCG). 
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However, only France, Poland and Spain could complete the exercise assigned to their NETs. 
Each NET was due to explore the ICCF activities through the following choice of exercises: 
• E1 — elaboration of a protection profile (PP) and a security profile and reporting on the 
easiness/difficulty of this activity; 
• E2 — simulation of a product compliance assessment, and reporting on the 
easiness/difficulty of this activity; 
• E3 — simulation of testing a product’s cyber resilience, and reporting on the 
easiness/difficulty of this activity; 
• E4 — simulation of the evaluation of a product’s development process, and reporting on the 
easiness/difficulty of this activity; 
• E5 — abandoned, not defined; 
• E6 — study of ICCF governance bodies and processes. 
 
NET CSCG France Germany Netherlands Poland Spain 
INITIALLY 
PLANNED 
EXERCISES 
E6 E1 + E2 + E3 
 
(based on 
French 
CSPN1 
scheme) 
E1 + E3 
 
 
E3 E1 + E3 E1 + E2 + 
E3 
 
(based 
on 
French 
CSPN 
scheme) 
USE CASE 
 
Vendor 
product 
ICCF 
governance 
bodies and 
processes 
Stormshield 
 
SNi40 
industrial 
firewall 
Industrial 
firewall 
(not 
specified) 
Compumatica 
Secure Networks 
BV 
 
MagiCtwin Diode 
for industrial 
environments 
Mikronika 
RTU (v1 and 
v2) 
Polon — 
Alfa CIE 
(control 
indication 
equipment) 
for fire 
detection 
and alarm 
Siemens 
 
SIMATIC 
RTU3030C 
remote 
terminal 
unit (RTU) 
NB: Only French, Polish and Spanish NETs’ results are taken into account in this report. 
2.2 Methodology	of	the	exercises	
Each NET had to perform the following tasks: 
• Select a use case (NB: the Polish NET relied on three use cases), i.e. an IACS component that 
would serve as the material basis of the exercise. 
• Establish its composition under the direction of the country’s national cybersecurity agency 
(where it existed); each NET had to also include representatives of a national certification 
                                                             
1 CSPN is the acronym of “Certification de Sécurité de Premier Niveau”. 
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authority, an evaluation laboratory or ITSEF and the vendor of the chosen IACS product, and 
possibly further members such as experts, academics or user industries. 
• Set up a protocol for simulating the tasks during table-top exercise sessions. In effect, it was 
impossible to actually perform the activities prescribed in the ICCF in the time and resource 
frame of the exercises. 
• Schedule and run the simulation sessions. 
• Document the process, its inputs, process and results. 
Work started early 2017, and NETs had to be finished by the end of November 2017. 
Finally, the NETs gathered for a plenary meeting of the ERNCIP IACS Thematic Group in January 2018 
to draw collective lessons from their exercises. 
2.3 Contents	of	the	report	
The present report documents the exercises performed by the French, Polish and Spanish NETs, their 
findings and a proposal for a plan of action for the next phase of development of the ICCF in the 
context of the European Cybersecurity Certification Framework pursued by DG Communications 
Networks, Content and Technology. 
2.4 The	 ICCF	 and	 support	 to	 the	 European	 Commission’s	 roadmap	 towards	
European	cybersecurity	certification	
In a proposal for a regulation (2) of 13 September 2017 the European Commission published the 
potential directions for the governance and implementation of a European cybersecurity 
certification framework for products and services. The proposal highlights all of the requirements for 
the future establishment of certification schemes within the context of the framework. The ERNCIP 
Thematic Group on IACS, through its work on the feasibility study for the IACS Cybersecurity 
Certification Framework (ICCF), has contributed to the formulation of some articles of the published 
version of the regulation, since a part of the study regarding the assurance levels of the European 
cybersecurity certification schemes was incorporated into the final text of the proposal (Article 46). 
Furthermore, since the proposal has been published, it is worthwhile to perform a quick compliance 
analysis to verify to what extent the ICCF’s feasibility study is already in line with the ‘certification 
package’, therefore making the ICCF a potential candidate certification scheme according to the 
Article 44 of the proposal. 
The analysis took into account the following articles of the published text of the regulation, because 
of their relevance for the compliance analysis: 
• Article 45Security objectives of European cybersecurity certification schemes; 
• Article 46: Assurance levels of European cybersecurity certification schemes; 
• Article 47: Elements of European cybersecurity certification schemes. 
                                                             
(2) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on ENISA, the ‘EU Cybersecurity Agency’, and repealing 
Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity certification (‘Cybersecurity Act’) 
COM(2017) 477 final,  Brussels, 13.9.2017 — 2017/0225 (COD). 
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The text of Article 45 sets out the following security objectives for future cybersecurity certification 
schemes: 
‘(a) protect data stored, transmitted or otherwise processed against accidental or 
unauthorised storage, processing, access or disclosure; 	 
(b) protect data stored, transmitted or otherwise processed against accidental or 
unauthorised destruction, accidental loss or alteration; 	 
(c) ensure that authorised persons, programmes or machines can access exclusively the data, 
services or functions to which their access rights refer; 
(d) record which data, functions or services have been communicated, at what times and by 
whom; 
(e) ensure that it is possible to check which data, services or functions have been accessed or 
used, at what times and by whom; 	 
(f) restore the availability and access to data, services and functions in a timely manner in 
the event of physical or technical incident; 	 
(g) ensure that ICT products and services are provided with up to date software that does 
not contain known vulnerabilities and are provided mechanisms for secure software 
updates.’	 
The aforementioned cybersecurity objectives are at the core of the ICCF’s formulation since the aim 
of the feasibility study on the cybersecurity certification of IACS components is to assure that 
certified devices will have specific features and mechanisms in place so as to cover those objectives. 
The text of Article 46 sets out the following assurance levels for future cybersecurity certification 
schemes: 
‘(a) assurance level basic shall refer to a certificate issued in the context of a European 
cybersecurity certification scheme, which provides a limited degree of confidence in the 
claimed or asserted cybersecurity qualities of an ICT product or service, and is characterised 
with reference to technical specifications, standards and procedures related thereto, 
including technical controls, the purpose of which is to decrease the risk of cybersecurity 
incidents; 
(b) assurance level substantial shall refer to a certificate issued in the context of a European 
cybersecurity certification scheme, which provides a substantial degree of confidence in the 
claimed or asserted cybersecurity qualities of an ICT product or service, and is characterised 
with reference to technical specifications, standards and procedures related thereto, 
including technical controls, the purpose of which is to decrease substantially the risk of 
cybersecurity incidents; 
(c) assurance level high shall refer to a certificate issued in the context of a European 
cybersecurity certification scheme, which provides a higher degree of confidence in the 
claimed or asserted cybersecurity qualities of an ICT product or service than certificates with 
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the assurance level substantial, and is characterised with reference to technical 
specifications, standards and procedures related thereto, including technical controls, the 
purpose of which is to prevent cybersecurity incidents.’ 
Article 46 of the proposal is the one where most of the work performed by the ERNCIP Thematic 
Group has been incorporated with adjustments, since the regulation has to cover many more 
products than the one deployed in industrial environments. Such a condition implies that the 
formulation of the ICCF’s assurance levels matches the ones of the proposal as shown by the 
following figure and table. 
 
Figure 2: The ICCF’s assurance levels (originally named ‘schemes’) 
These schemes would lead to the delivery of self-declarations of compliance, labels and certificates 
as illustrated below. 
 
European Commission proposal’s basic 
assurance level 
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European Commission proposal’s basic 
assurance level 
 
European Commission proposal’s 
substantial/high assurance level 
 
European Commission proposal’s high assurance 
level 
Table 1: Assurance levels in the ICCF vs those in the proposal 
 
Article 47, regarding the ‘elements of European cybersecurity certification schemes’, contains a list 
of features that a scheme should have in order to be formally established as per the proposal. The 
following table contains an assessment of the maturity of the ICCF vs the requirements set out in the 
proposal. 
Elements of cybersecurity certification schemes ICCF features in line with the proposal and 
maturity assessment 
(a) subject-matter and scope of the certification, 
including the type or categories of ICT products 
and services covered 
Yes. See report of phase 2 (3). More work to be 
performed in 2018/2019 to finalise the class of 
products included in the scheme as described in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this report. 
(b) detailed specification of the cybersecurity 
requirements against which the specific ICT 
Yes. See report of phase 2. Evaluation standards 
have been reviewed and identified for the 
                                                             
(3) Available at: https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/JRC102550_introduction-to-iccf_erncip-iacs-tg-
onlineversion.pdf 
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products and services are evaluated, for 
example by reference to Union or international 
standards or technical specifications 
purpose of the scheme. More work to be 
performed in 2018/2019 as described in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this report. 
(c) where applicable, one or more assurance 
levels 
Yes. Four levels of assurance proposed. 
(d) specific evaluation criteria and methods 
used, including types of evaluation, in order to 
demonstrate that the specific objectives 
referred to in Article 45 are achieved 
Yes. More work to be performed in 2018/2019 
as described in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this 
report. 
(e) information to be supplied to the conformity 
assessment bodies by an applicant which is 
necessary for certification 
Yes. More work to be performed in 2018/2019  
as described in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this 
report. 
(f) where the scheme provides for marks or 
labels, the conditions under which such marks or 
labels may be used 
Yes. Self-declaration of compliance, label and 
certificates are proposed and their usage is 
explained. More work to be performed in 
2018/2019  as described in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
of this report. 
(g) where surveillance is part of the scheme, the 
rules for monitoring compliance with the 
requirements of the certificates, including 
mechanisms to demonstrate the continued 
compliance with the specified cybersecurity 
requirements 
Yes. Two factors should allow monitoring of the 
compliance with the scheme. The first factor 
relies on two requirements to be enforced in the 
evaluation phase: (1) the skills of the personnel 
handling the evaluation at the conformity 
assessment body; and (2) the common 
evaluation methodologies to be followed by all 
of the accredited conformity assessment bodies 
throughout the Union. Both of these factors 
should be further discussed in phase 4 of the 
ICCF together with a post-certification 
monitoring procedure such as a peer-review of 
technical evaluation reports. 
(h) conditions for granting, maintaining, 
continuing, extending and reducing the scope of 
certification 
More work to be performed in 2018/2019, as 
described in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this report, 
more specifically on maintenance of already 
issued certificates (e.g. in case of a software 
update to a certified device). 
(i) rules concerning the consequences of non-
conformity of certified ICT products and services 
with the certification requirements 
Not addressed. To be explored in phase 4 of the 
ICCF. 
(j) rules concerning how previously undetected 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities in ICT products and 
services are to be reported and dealt with 
Not addressed. To be explored in phase 4 of the 
ICCF in conjunction with procedures and 
requirements as per the Network and 
Information Security directive (EU) 2016/1148. 
(k) rules concerning the retention of records by 
conformity assessment bodies 
Yes. In the phase 2 report, the online portal 
should help keeping track of the certified 
devices, their technical specification at the 
moment of the evaluation and the certificates 
issued. 
(l) identification of national cybersecurity 
certification schemes covering the same type or 
categories of ICT products and services 
Yes. See Chapter 4 of this report. More 
comparative work to be potentially performed 
in the next phase (2018-2019) of the ICCF. 
(m) the content of the issued certificate Not yet addressed. More work to be potentially 
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performed in phase 4 of the ICCF on this matter. 
Table 2: Analysis of the ICCF against the proposal’s criteria 
2.5 Contributions	
In alphabetical order, the members of the NETs were as follows. 
French NET 
• Thomas GALLIANO and Romain MUGUET, ANSSI - Agence nationale de la sécurité des 
systèmes d'information, national cybersecurity agency and certification body 
• Thierry MIDY, Stormshield (vendor) 
• Robert WAKIM, Stormshield (vendor) 
• Olivier MARY, Oppida (ITSEC, evaluation laboratory) 
• Vincent DIEMUNSCH, RTE France (stakeholder) 
Polish NET 
• Janusz Górski, Gdansk University of Technology (NET-PL leader) 
• Piotr Chojnicki, Telbud, system integrator 
• Paweł Florek, Kacper Karpiński, CNBOP-PIB, certification body 
• Michał Karolak, EY EMEIA Advisory Centre, security compliance testing 
• Izabela Lewandowska-Wiśniewska, PZU LAB, insurance company 
• Krzysztof Politowski, Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji, Department of Digitalisation, government 
• Mariusz Sowiński, Polon-Alfa, vendor 
• Tomasz Szała, Mikronika, vendor 
• Andrzej Wardziński, Gdańsk University of Technology/Argevide, academia and tools support 
(*) which also plans to become a conformity assessment body. 
Spanish NET 
• Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN), national cybersecurity agency and certification body 
• Miguel Garcia-Menendez, CCI, industrial organisation 
• José Ruiz Gualda, Applus+, evaluation laboratory 
• José Alejandro Rivas, Applus+, evaluation laboratory 
• Sergio Gonzalez de Castro, Applus+, evaluation laboratory 
• Hector Puyosa, UPCT, industry user 
• Ignacio Alvarez Vargas, Siemens, vendor 
• José Luis Donoro Ayuso, Siemens, vendor 
JRC — European Commission 
• Alessandro Lazari, JRC, Ispra 
• Georgios Giannopoulos, JRC, Ispra 
• Igor Nai Fovino, JRC, Ispra 
• Gianmarco Baldini, JRC, Ispra 
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3 List of abbreviations 
The following acronyms and terms are used in this report. 
ANSSI = Agence Nationale de Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (France) 
CA  = critical asset 
CRT  = communication robustness testing 
ECCF = European Cybersecurity certification Framework 
IACS  = industrial automation and control systems 
ICCAR  = IACS common cybersecurity assessment requirements 
ICCEUR  = IACS Cybersecurity Certification EU Register 
ICCF  = IACS component Cybersecurity Certification Framework 
ICCP  = IACS Cybersecurity Certification Process 
ICCS  = IACS Cybersecurity Certification Scheme 
ICCS-A  = IACS Cybersecurity Certification Scheme A (full cyber resilience certification) 
ICCS-B  = IACS Cybersecurity Certification Scheme B (product cyber resilience certification) 
ICCS-C2  = IACS Cybersecurity Certification Scheme C1 (independent compliance assessment) 
ICCS-C1  = IACS Cybersecurity Certification Scheme C2 (vendor’s self-declaration of compliance) 
ICPRO  = IACS Components Cybersecurity Protection Profiles 
ICS  = industrial control system 
IGB  = ICCF Governance Board 
JRC  = European Commission Joint Research Centre (located in Ispra, Italy) 
NET  = national exercise team 
PLC  = programmable logic controller 
PP  = protection profile 
RTU  = remote terminal units 
SCADA  = supervisory control and data acquisition 
SDSA  = software development security assessment 
SP  = security profile 
TER = Technology Evaluation Report 
ToE  = target of evaluation 
VPN  = virtual private network 
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4 NETs’ undertakings and analysis 
4.1 French	NET	
4.1.1 Tests	performed	by	the	NET	
The French NET simulated the highlighted ICCF activities. 
E1 Elaboration of a protection profile and a security profile and reporting on the easiness/difficulty of this activity. 
E2 Simulation of a product compliance assessment, and reporting on the easiness/difficulty of this activity. 
E3 Simulation of testing a product’s cyber resilience and reporting on the easiness/difficulty of this activity. 
E4 Simulation of the evaluation of a product’s development process and reporting on the easiness/difficulty of this activity.  
 
4.1.2 Documents	delivered	by	the	French	NET	
The French NET worked on drafting a protection profile, a security profile (called ‘security target’ in 
the NET’s document as the NET referred to the Common Criteria — ISO 15408 — standard) and a 
test plan for a given product. 
The NET also reflected on and documented the method required to draft these documents, and 
specifically to address the difficulties professionals could encounter in the course of these activities. 
The NET’s report documents the steps of the corresponding tasks and provides examples. 
The French NET’s report includes the following documents, all presented in the annex: 
• French NET report: this document presents the overall process of the exercise: composition 
of the NET, methodology, methodology of the elaboration of the protection profile, 
methodology of the elaboration of the security profile, evaluation of the product and 
conclusions; 
• test plan report: this document details the compliance assessment methodology (called 
conformity in the document) and contains a cyber resilience tests report (called resistance in 
the document); 
• protection profile of an industrial firewall: this document presents how to describe the 
product and its usage, the associated critical assets, the threat model, the security objectives 
and how these elements may relate to one another; 
• Stormshield Network Security, Industrial Firewall SNi40 — CSPN Security Target: this 
document gives details of how, for a specific product, its description and associated critical 
assets and threat model are described. NB: it instantiates the protection profile mentioned 
above. 
4.1.3 Analysis	of	French	practices	
Reading these documents helps one to understand current French practices. The following analysis 
can be made. 
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ASPECTS OF THE ICCF NATIONAL PRACTICES DISTANCE TO THE ICCF 
Reference to a 
standard/scheme 
The French CSPN scheme, derived 
from Common Criteria. The CSPN 
methodology was created by ANSSI 
in 2008, and consists in ‘black box’ 
or ‘grey box’ testing under 
constrained time. The CSPN is an 
alternative to Common Criteria 
evaluation, for which the cost and 
the duration can be an obstacle, 
and when the degree of confidence 
aimed at is lower. 
Freedom of choice of a standard is 
the rule in the ICCF. 
The choice of a particular standard 
induces differences in vocabulary, 
such as security target (Common 
Criteria) vs security profile (ICCF). 
• These differences should be 
specifically mentioned in the 
documentation of evaluations. 
Overall process Protection profile => security 
profile => evaluation plan 
=> compliance assessment + cyber 
resilience tests. 
Process documented by Figure 3. 
The relation between evaluation 
and certification is detailed in 
Figure 7. 
Corresponds to ICCS-B. 
Protection profile In the CSPN, it includes: 
• product description; 
• critical assets (4); 
• threat model; 
• security objectives; 
• mappings. 
The CSPN’s threat model does not 
quite match the ICCF PP model (5). 
Threats, expressed in terms of 
attack methods, are not related to 
the protection assumptions present 
in the product description, hence 
making it hard to formally express 
residual threats 6 . Protection 
assumptions should, as per the 
ICCF, help to explain how gross 
threats are mitigated by the 
assumed protections within or 
around the product. In the CSPN 
document, apart from the (data) 
model provided in Section 5.3, 
Methodology, this contribution of 
assumed protections is not 
explained. 
• The CSPN could be more 
explicit. 
Critical assets (CA) in the CSPN are 
                                                             
(4) A critical asset is the conjunction of a part and a security characteristic assigned to that part.  
 NB 1: A critical asset is an assertion of the security of a product’s part. 
 NB 2: Within a product or family of products, there are as many critical assets as there are combinations of parts and security 
characteristics. 
 Each critical asset faces threats that may undermine the security characteristics of a critical asset. 
 NB: Threats are identified through a risk analysis. 
 For each critical asset, the author of the protection profile (PP) formulates zero to several Protection Assumptions resulting from 
typical / generic Operating Conditions and that indicate how a threat against a critical asset is assumed to be reduced under those 
operating conditions. 
 (Definitions provided in the ICCF phase 2 report). 
(5) See ICCF phase 2 report for details of the data model of PPs. 
(6) See ICCF phase 2 report’s section on PPs. 
  
ERNCIP Thematic Group: European IACS Cybersecurity Certification 
IACS Cybersecurity Certification Framework (ICCF): Lessons from the 2017 study of the state of the art 
 
 
European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP Project) 
https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
23 
ASPECTS OF THE ICCF NATIONAL PRACTICES DISTANCE TO THE ICCF 
defined in terms of both 
environmental CAs and the 
product’s CAs: 
• The rationale of this choice is to 
be analysed in order to decide if 
it should be included in the ICCF. 
In the CSPN, mappings (assets vs 
threats and threats vs security 
objectives) are expressed in the 
shape of two tables in the annex. 
The meaning of these tables and 
the consequences to draw from 
them are not explicit. 
• The CSPN could make these 
elements more explicit. 
The CSPN’s security objectives seem 
to be equivalent to the ICCF PP’s 
‘rationale’ of the relation between 
critical assets, residual threats and 
the security functions that should 
be fitted into the product or its 
environment to reduce residual 
threats. Besides, CSPN PPs do not 
include recommended security 
functions as prescribed in ICCF. 
• It is necessary to study this 
point and determine if the CSPN 
should clarify these two points. 
In the CSPN, the definition of a PP 
should be validated by the national 
cybersecurity agency, which is also, 
in France, the certification 
authority. 
• ICCF processes should specify 
clear rules about who should 
elaborate, review and approve 
PPs. 
Security profile (SP) In the CSPN, it includes: 
• product identification; 
• product description; 
• critical assets; 
• threat model; 
• security functions; 
• mapping. 
In the CSPN, product identification 
means designating precisely the 
product, its version and category. 
However, the ‘Stormshield Network 
Security, Industrial Firewall SNi40 — 
CSPN Security Target’ (SP) 
document is not structured as 
indicated in the ‘French NET Report’ 
document and these data are 
indicated on the cover sheet of the 
SP document. The version is also 
detailed in Section 1, Product 
description of the ‘Stormshield 
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ASPECTS OF THE ICCF NATIONAL PRACTICES DISTANCE TO THE ICCF 
Network Security, Industrial Firewall 
SNi40 — CSPN Security Target’ 
document. 
• All evaluation documents 
should comply with common, 
standardised structuring rules. 
• The ICCF should specify these 
document structure rules. 
In the ICCF, and except for the 
product’s ‘parts’, the description of 
the product was not an aspect that 
was specified finely. 
• The ICCF should specify what a 
product’s description should 
include. 
Besides, in the ICCF, ‘parts’ are to 
help specifying critical assets, 
whereas in the CSPN the link 
between parts and critical assets is 
fairly vague: 
• The ICCF should specify more 
finely how evaluation schemes 
should implement its data 
model to make documents more 
formally comparable. 
• In general, the ‘ergonomics’ of 
ICCF documents is an issue to 
study as the readability of 
documents is a prerequisite for 
a shared understanding and 
mutual recognition. 
The object of the evaluation, the 
‘evaluated platform’ in the CSPN SP 
document, includes a Windows 7 
console beside the Stormshield 
product itself; it also includes the 
specification of the product’s 
detailed configuration. 
• The ICCF should require that the 
target of evaluation (ToE) be 
defined in a standard way. This 
includes specifying the elements 
composing and interacting with 
the ToE. 
• The ICCF should also indicate 
the level of precision/detail of 
the specification of the ToE’s 
perimeter and configuration. 
• These data are of utmost 
importance as they specify the 
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ASPECTS OF THE ICCF NATIONAL PRACTICES DISTANCE TO THE ICCF 
scope of the evaluation and of 
the certificate. 
The relation between security 
functions, ToE’s critical assets and 
residual threats is not explicit in the 
CSPN SP document. And security 
mechanisms implementing the 
security functions are not specified 
here. 
 
Note added by the French NET 
during the review of this report: 
However, this information is not 
always detailed in the ST for 
confidential matter. It is shared with 
the ITSEF though, through technical 
documentation the developer has. 
This is especially true for the 
cryptographic specifications, for 
example. They are detailed in 
another document that is not 
publicly released. 
• The recommendations made for 
PPs above apply to SPs. The 
ICCF must specify what data 
must be present in evaluation 
documents and the format of 
those data. 
• Whether security mechanisms 
should be specified in the SP or 
not needs to be studied. If 
current practices do not 
recommend it, the goal of 
mutual recognition of 
certificates may induce it. 
 
Cybersecurity 
requirements 
Cybersecurity requirements are not 
clearly expressed in the 
documentation. There is also no 
reference to a standard’s set of 
such requirements. 
 
Note added by the French NET 
during the review of this report: 
The CSPN does not have this. It 
would be impossible to have a 
document listing the standards a 
product should implement, given 
the wide variety of products we 
have. And furthermore, it is up to 
The ICCF specifies that PPs and SPs 
should make a clear reference to a 
set of cybersecurity requirements 
extracted from the chosen 
standard. These requirements are 
not explicitly documented, even in 
the ‘conformity’ section of the ‘test 
plan report’ document. 
• CSPN PPs and SPs should list 
explicitly those requirements to 
make the evaluation more 
formal and its process less 
variable. References to the 
standard’s requirement 
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ASPECTS OF THE ICCF NATIONAL PRACTICES DISTANCE TO THE ICCF 
the developer to select the 
technology he or she wants to use, 
and up to the evaluator to test if it 
is robust or not. The only 
requirements we have concern 
cryptography and the RGS 
(Règlement Général de Sécurité) 
listing the algorithms that are not 
to be used. We also have a 
document that concerns the TLS 
(Transport Layer Security) cipher 
suites that are not to be used 
either. But it is not mandatory to 
respect this specific document. 
numbers should be explicit for 
the sake of traceability. 
Evaluation goals, plan 
and process 
The CSPN ‘test plan report’ 
document uses standard data 
containers to document the 
assessments to perform. Those 
cartridges include: product 
reference, assessment 
objectives ( 7 ), prerequisites, tools 
to use for the assessment, method 
(called ‘proceedings’ in the French 
document) of the assessment and 
expected result. 
The ICCF has not yet specified these 
aspects. 
• In order to foster mutual 
recognition, the ICCF should 
indicate the ad hoc method and 
format of the data used to 
specify assessments. 
The CSPN raises some questions 
about the definition of the 
objective(s) of an assessment item 
(one only or several), the contents 
of prerequisites (operators, test 
platforms, other related elements), 
the method (should a protocol, or 
standardised protocol, be referred 
to?), tools (is it enough to mention 
a category of tools or should each 
tool be specified finely?) and 
expected results (how to express 
them, should a tolerance be 
indicated?, should the conditions in 
which results are expected be 
specified?, etc.). 
• Further studies are needed to 
answer these questions. 
 
Note added by the French NET 
during the review of this report: 
One has to keep in mind that after 
reading the technical evaluation 
report, the certification body 
(ANSSI) challenges the ITSEF during 
                                                             
(7) Whether multiple objectives should be pursued in a single assessment is debatable. It might be better that one assessment pursues 
one objective only. However, the workload for specifying assessments so finely might exceed reasonable limits of cost and time 
while one of the goals of the CSPN is to run evaluations in a limited frame of time and cost. 
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ASPECTS OF THE ICCF NATIONAL PRACTICES DISTANCE TO THE ICCF 
a face-to-face meeting with the 
evaluators. ANSSI experts are also 
invited to attend this meeting. 
Compliance assessment The CSPN documents do not depict 
the process of compliance 
assessments. 
The ICCF has issued in the phase 2 
report very generic 
recommendations about the 
process of all evaluation activities. 
• Further studies are needed here 
as well to refine the definition of 
the ICCF in order to foster 
mutual recognition and 
dialogue between the actors of 
the evaluation and certification 
process. 
• A standard can solve this issue. 
Cyber resilience tests Idem Idem 
Development process 
evaluation 
Not studied by the French NET. NA 
Evaluation report Not provided by the NET. NA 
 
4.1.4 Overall	process	of	the	CSPN	methodology.	
 
 
Figure 3: Overall process of the CSPN method for ICCS-B 
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4.1.5 Model	of	a	protection	profile	
 
Figure 4: Model of a protection profile 
4.1.6 Table	of	contents	of	a	CSPN	protection	profile	
 
Figure 5: Table of contents of a CSPN protection profile 
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4.1.7 Table	of	contents	of	a	CSPN	security	profile	(named	security	target)	
 
Figure 6: Table of contents of a CSPN security profile 
4.1.8 Relation	between	the	evaluation	process	and	the	certification	process	
 
Figure 7: Relation between evaluation and certification processes 
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4.2 Polish	NET	
4.2.1 Tests	performed	by	the	NET	
The Polish NET simulated the ICCF activities highlighted in green (E1) and brainstormed on those 
highlighted in grey (E2 to E4). 
E1  Elaboration of a protection profile and a security profile and reporting on the 
easiness/difficulty of this activity. 
E2  Simulation of a product compliance assessment and reporting on the easiness/difficulty of 
this activity. 
E3  Simulation of testing a product’s cyber resilience and reporting on the easiness/difficulty of 
this activity. 
E4  Simulation of the evaluation of a product’s development process and reporting on the 
easiness/difficulty of this activity. 
 
4.2.2 Documents	delivered	by	the	Polish	NET	
The Polish NET drafted three protection profiles related to two classes of IACS components — the 
remote telecontrol unit (RTU) (8) and control and indication equipment (CIE) — for test E1. 
Through a questionnaire sent to Polish NET’s participants, a brainstorming exercise was conducted 
for the evaluation activities that were to be simulated in tests E2, E3 and E4. 
The NET’s report documents firstly the way in which protection profiles are written today and 
secondly the opinions of NET-PL’s members about the activities corresponding to tests E1, E2, E3 
and E4. 
The report includes the following documents, all presented in the annex: 
• Report on the results of experiments carried out by the Polish National Exercise Team (NET-PL) 
during phase 3 of ICCF; 
• Appendix 1 of the final report by NET-PL ‘Protection profile of a remote terminal unit (RTU), 
Version 1.0, Mikronika (NET-PL)’; 
• Appendix 2 of the final report by NET-PL ‘Protection profile of fire detection and fire alarm 
systems (FDAS) — Control and indication equipment (CIE) in distributed architecture, Version 
1.0, Polon-Alfa (NET-PL)’; 
• Appendix 3 of the final report by NET-PL ‘Protection profile of a remote terminal unit (RTU), 
Version 2.1, NET-PL: Mikronika, GUT’. 
The first document presents NET-PL’s methodology and the conclusions of its work. The other three 
documents present the contents of protection profiles. 
NB: It is important to state that NET-PL followed the guidelines of ANSSI of France’s CSPN 
methodology to elaborate protection profiles. 
                                                             
(8) The RTU’s protection profile had two versions: Version 1.0 and Version 2.1. If the report states that the version 2.1 PP followed the 
recommendations of IEC 62443-4-2, the difference between the two documents is minimal. 
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The following table summarises the analysis of the NET’s documents. 
ASPECTS OF THE ICCF NATIONAL PRACTICES DISTANCE TO THE ICCF 
Reference to a 
standard/scheme 
NET-PL referred to France’s CSPN 
and IEC624430 (concerning the PP 
contents — see Section 4.2.3). 
Freedom of choice of a standard is 
the rule in the ICCF. 
Overall process Not documented. 
 
Note added by the Polish NET 
during the review of this report: 
NET-PL considerations were with 
reference to the model presently 
adopted for fire-protection devices 
and systems certification (see 
Section 4.2.4). Corresponds to ICCS-
B. 
 
Protection profile It has to be noted that NET-PL 
highlights the fact that creating a 
PP from scratch may be a 
significant effort. For instance, the 
CIE’s PP, elaborated from zero, 
represents a 1- to 2-person-month 
effort. 
Note added by the Polish NET 
during the review of this report: 
The effort reported for the RTU’s PP 
was 2 person-days (for version 1.0) 
and 2 person-weeks (for version 
2.1). It seems that the differences 
result from the differences in the 
scope covered by the effort 
estimates (learning about security, 
learning about the component 
class, defining the PP). 
 
NET-PL highlights the need for a 
cybersecurity protection profile 
standard; specifying the contents 
of PPs would be useful. 
NET-PL recommends that rules be 
defined in relation to PPs’ 
elaboration, storage, distribution 
and updates. 
 
Note added by the Polish NET 
during the review of this report: 
NET-PL stresses the need for a 
comprehensive business model 
underlying the development, 
maintenance and usage of 
protection/security profiles that 
Although they make an explicit 
reference to the same CSPN 
method, the three PPs do not 
display the same table of contents. 
• The ICCF must specify the table 
of contents of PPs and, beyond 
PPs, of all documents involved 
in the evaluation and 
certification process. 
Besides, the correspondence 
between the ToE’s parts and critical 
assets on one hand and the security 
functions on the other hand is not 
clear enough in the CSPN 
methodology, at least as applied by 
NET-PL. Readers may not be clear 
about how to exploit such PP 
documents. 
By reference to the ICCF phase 2 
report’s Section 4.2.6.2.3.1, 
Conceptual model of a protection 
profile, some recommendations can 
be drawn for the future. 
 
• The contents of PPs should 
reflect the conceptual structure 
advocated in this data model. In 
practice, this translates into the 
modification/clarification of 
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ASPECTS OF THE ICCF NATIONAL PRACTICES DISTANCE TO THE ICCF 
would be acceptable for all 
stakeholders. 
CSPN documentation. The 
mapping tables presented in 
PPs’ annexes should document 
the ‘joint’ relations (circles) of 
the ICCF PP conceptual model. 
This would help PP authors by 
guiding them more accurately, 
and would make all PPs similar 
in structure for readers. 
• The ICCF’s PP and SP data 
models should be reviewed in 
order to increase their adequacy 
for stakeholders’ needs. In 
particular, the current link 
between security functions and 
security requirements is not 
explicated in these data models. 
Security profile  Not addressed by NET-PL • A standard should support the 
implementation of the ICCF. 
• Future work on the ICCF should 
include an analysis of target 
workload and delay for 
elaborating PPs in order to 
better frame a recommendation 
of methodology and 
participants. 
Cybersecurity 
requirements 
In all three annexes, tables list the 
IEC 62443-4-2 cybersecurity 
requirements. However: 
• In the Annex 1 document (RTU 
PP v1.0), IEC 62443 
requirements are simply listed 
in its Section 7, with a vague 
link to, and mentioned in the 
text of security functions. 
• In the Annex 2 document (RTU 
PP v2.1), requirements are 
listed in Sections 6 and 7. In 
Section 6, the table establishes 
a broad link between ‘threats’, 
‘protected critical assets’, 
‘security functions’ and 
‘foundational requirements’. In 
Section 7, the table links 
security functions to IEC 
62443-4-2 cybersecurity 
requirements and indicates 
that the rationale between 
these two elements must be 
provided, giving some 
• Similar recommendations as for 
PPs above apply here. 
  
ERNCIP Thematic Group: European IACS Cybersecurity Certification 
IACS Cybersecurity Certification Framework (ICCF): Lessons from the 2017 study of the state of the art 
 
 
European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP Project) 
https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
33 
ASPECTS OF THE ICCF NATIONAL PRACTICES DISTANCE TO THE ICCF 
examples of such a rationale. 
• In the Annex 3 document (CIE 
PP v1.0), cybersecurity 
requirements are presented in 
Section 7 while security 
functions are presented in 
Section 6. Section 6’s table 
links threats to security 
functions but without a 
reference to critical assets. 
Section 7’s table links security 
functions to IEC 62443-4-2 
cybersecurity requirements, 
but without the rationale of 
these links. 
Evaluation goals, plan 
and process 
Not addressed by NET-PL 
 
Note added by the Polish NET 
during the review of this report: 
By analogy to the presently 
implemented evaluation process 
for fire-protection systems and 
components, NET-PL speculated on 
the structure of the cybersecurity 
evaluation goals, activities and 
results. 
As an additional exercise, NET-PL 
considered that the concept of 
conformance template derived 
from the evidence-based 
argumentation theory could be 
used to support evaluation criteria, 
if supported by adequate tools. 
Such a conformance template has 
been created for the RTU’s PP, 
version 2.1 and was represented in 
the NOR-STA tool. 
• Security profiles (SPs) or 
complementary documents 
must specify the evaluation’s 
goals, plan and process(es). 
 
Note added by the Polish NET 
during the review of this report: 
• A clear and comprehensive 
business model (covering the 
perspectives of all stakeholders) 
should support evaluation 
 
Compliance assessment Not simulated by NET-PL, but some 
views about the process and 
certification criteria are expressed, 
stemming from the inquiry 
conducted among Polish NET 
members. 
• A standard should support the 
implementation of the ICCF. 
 
Cyber resilience tests Idem. 
NET-PL highlights the need to make 
rules about the management of 
changes in products vs the issue of 
the validity/significance of tests’ 
results. 
NET-PL’s recommendations include 
• A standard should support the 
implementation of the ICCF. 
This may include testing 
requirements, process and 
tools. 
  
ERNCIP Thematic Group: European IACS Cybersecurity Certification 
IACS Cybersecurity Certification Framework (ICCF): Lessons from the 2017 study of the state of the art 
 
 
European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP Project) 
https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
34 
ASPECTS OF THE ICCF NATIONAL PRACTICES DISTANCE TO THE ICCF 
testing process and tooling 
standardisation in favour of mutual 
recognition of certificates. 
Development process 
evaluation 
Similar outcomes of Polish NET’s 
work. 
This NET highlights the possibility 
to resort on existing standards to 
perform development process 
assessments. 
• Future work on a standard 
supporting the ICCF should 
include possible references to 
ad hoc other standards. 
Evaluation report Not addressed by NET-PL. • A standard should support the 
implementation of the ICCF. 
 
4.2.3 Protection	profiles	elaborated	by	NET-PL	
While working on PPs, and concerning their structure, NET-PL referred to two sources: 
• the model recommended in the ICCF phase 2 report Section 4.2.6.2.3.1 (conceptual model of a 
PP); 
• selected examples of PPs published on ANSSI’s web portal (the structure recommended by the 
CSPN was followed). 
With regards to the contents of the PPs that were elaborated, the main problem encountered by 
NET-PL related to the selection of the relevant security functions to be included. 
Without having adequate guidance in this domain, the writer of the PP was left uncertain concerning 
the completeness and coverage of his decisions. 
To cope with this problem NET-PL decided to refer to the IEC 62443 standard and to use its concept 
of foundational requirement (FR) and the related checklist (9). 
This resulted in the two different versions of PP of the RTU (Version 1.0 and Version 2.1) elaborated 
by NET-PL. 
The resulting PP structure is presented in the following figure. 
 
                                                             
(9) As suggested in the ICCF phase 2 report. 
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Figure 8: Structure of a protection profile  
 
4.2.4 Certification	process	model	
NET-PL used as a reference the certification process model presently implemented by Centrum 
Naukowo-Badawcze Ochrony Przeciwpożarowej — Państwowy Instytut Badawczy (CNBOP-PIB) for 
certification of fire protection devices and systems shown below: 
Protection 
Profile
About this 
document
Family of 
products 
description
Main features
ToE parts
Assumptions
Critical assets Security characteristics
Critical assets of the environment
ToE characteristics
Threat model Attackers
Threats
Critical assets 
vs threats
Security 
functions
 
Assigning foundational requirements
Selecting security functions
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Figure 9: Model of the certification process referred to by Polish NET 
Applicant – asking for certificate of admittance
Applicant submits to CNBOP-PIB a letter of intent together
the application form and required attachments
CNBOP-PIB  inserts the request into the registry
Initial formal evaluation of the application form
Preparation of test programme and registration of the application form
Signing an agreement with the research laboratory for carrying out tests
according to a test programme sent by the Certification Department
Test report from laboratory
CNBOP-PIB carries out the assessment of technical and
organisational conditions of product manufacturing (audit)
Analysis of product documentation and its evaluation
Preparation of agreement on control and supervision of the
granted admittance certificate and issuing by CNBOP-PIB an
invoice for the admittance process
Signing of agreement on control and supervision of the granted
admittance certificate, paying the invoice and issuing the certificate
Issuing of the certificate of admittance once 
CNBOP-PIB maintains control over the issued certificate of
admittance in accordance with the signed agreement
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4.2.5 Further	details	provided	by	Polish	NET	
NET-PL used a web-based documentation tool, NOR-STA, for two purposes: 
• to support cooperation and communication within NET-PL; 
• to derive from a PP the compliance argumentation template supporting the compliance 
assessment. 
This is documented in the ‘Report on the results of experiments carried out by the Polish National 
Exercise Team (NET-PL) during phase 3 of ICCF’ (see Polish NET annex). 
4.3 Spanish	NET	
4.3.1 Tests	performed	by	the	NET	
The Spanish NET simulated the following highlighted ICCF activities. 
E1  Elaboration of a protection profile and a security profile and reporting on the 
easiness/difficulty of this activity. 
E2  Simulation of a product compliance assessment and reporting on the easiness/difficulty of 
this activity. 
E3  Simulation of testing a product’s cyber resilience and reporting on the easiness/difficulty of 
this activity. 
E4  Simulation of the evaluation of a product’s development process and reporting on the 
easiness/difficulty of this activity. 
 
4.3.2 Documents	delivered	by	the	Spanish	NET	
The Spanish NET drafted a security profile (test E1) for an RTU (test E1) and simulated the activities 
concerned by tests E2 and E3. 
The NET’s report documents the selected IACS product (Siemens’ SIMATIC RTU 3030C) and the 
results of the E1, E2 and E3 tests. 
Its report consists in one document: Spanish NET report on E1 to E3 ICCF tests. 
This report has the following contents: 
o Exercises 1, 2 and 3 goals, assumptions, principles, methodology and results: this 
document presents the overall process of the exercise (composition of the NET, 
methodology of the elaboration of the security profile, methodology of the compliance 
and cyber resilience evaluation of the product and conclusions for each exercise); 
o Security profile for the SIMATIC RTU3030C — V2.0.20 (Annex A): this document presents 
the ToE and its usage, the associated critical assets, the corresponding threat model, the 
security objectives and how these elements may relate to one another 
o ICCF cyber resilience evaluation technical report for the SIMATIC RTU3030C — V2.0.20 
(Annex B): this report includes an example of the contents that a cyber resilience 
evaluation technical report could deliver. 
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NB: The Spanish NET also followed the guidelines of ANSSI of France’s CSPN methodology to 
elaborate the security profile and to serve as a basis for test E3. 
The following table summarises the analysis of the Spanish NET’s document (core part and annexes). 
ASPECTS OF THE 
ICCF 
NATIONAL PRACTICES DISTANCE TO THE ICCF 
Reference to a 
standard/scheme 
French CSPN. 
 
Note added by the Spanish NET during the 
review of this report: 
In the future, the Spanish NET strongly suggests 
defining the standard to be followed within the 
ICCF. This standard could be a new European 
standard for lightweight/basic security 
evaluations based on Member States’ existing 
methodologies (e.g. the French CSPN). 
Freedom of choice of a 
standard is the rule in the 
ICCF. 
Overall process Not addressed specifically by the Spanish NET. 
 
Note added by the Spanish NET during the 
review of this report: 
An evaluation and certification process (PO-005 
Product Certification) is already in place in 
Spain for Common Criteria 
(https://oc.ccn.cni.es/pdf/po-
005_certificacion_en.pdf). This procedure is 
already applicable for other evaluations 
methodologies. Process documented in 
Figure 10. 
• The ICCF’s 
recommendations 
published in the phase 2 
report must be further 
detailed. 
• Creating a standard in 
support of the ICCF would 
help with specifying the 
broad processes that 
should be followed in 
view of the mutual 
recognition of certificates 
despite possible 
differences in the choice 
of the standard of 
reference (see prior point 
in the table). It should 
take account of existing 
evaluation and 
certification processes in 
use across EU Member 
States and fill the gaps 
that might be found in 
them. 
 
Protection profile Not addressed by the Spanish NET. 
 
Note added by the Spanish NET during the 
review of this report: 
Protection profiles should be defined 
collectively by all concerned industry 
stakeholders. 
 
Security profile  The RTU’s SP includes: 
• the product’s commercial name and unique 
• Comments are similar to 
those made for the French 
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ASPECTS OF THE 
ICCF 
NATIONAL PRACTICES DISTANCE TO THE ICCF 
references; 
• an overview containing 
o the product’ expected usage 
o typical users of the product 
o the product’s usage environment; 
• the security problem 
o assumptions 
o assets 
o threats 
o environment security measures; 
• the product’s security functions/ 
mechanisms. 
It is also named a security target. 
The report states that ‘Writing a security profile 
is a task to be done by the developer.’ 
The effort required to establish an SP is 
deemed ‘acceptable’. 
and Polish NETs. 
Cybersecurity 
requirements 
These are not clearly detailed in the ICCF 
security profile. Annex B, Section 4 mentions 
cybersecurity requirements as part of a form of 
test specification. 
 
Note added by the Spanish NET during the 
review of this report: 
Cybersecurity requirements are included in the 
security profile (section on security functions) 
for the ToE. Moreover, Section 7.2, 
Methodology of test E3 provides a draft 
methodology of the cybersecurity requirements 
to be met by a ToE. 
 
Response to the above note: 
Following the note above, we looked for the 
requirements and found the elements 
(selection only here) presented here: 
• ICCF cyber resilience evaluation technical 
report for the SIMATIC RTU3030C — 
V2.0.20 (Annex B), Section 5.3, Security 
functions 
o ‘The following security objectives 
are considered: 
§ Malformed input 
management: The ToE has 
been developed in order to 
correctly handle 
malformed input, in 
particular malformed 
network traffic. 
§ Secure storage of secrets: 
• Idem 
• The Spanish NET’s post-
review note is very 
interesting as it points to 
one of the crucial issues 
revealed by this year’s 
tests of the ICCF, i.e. the 
lack of standardisation of 
the format to be used to 
document cybersecurity 
objectives, cybersecurity 
requirements, 
cybersecurity functions 
and all other aspects of 
security profiles and of 
the evaluation and 
certification process. 
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ASPECTS OF THE 
ICCF 
NATIONAL PRACTICES DISTANCE TO THE ICCF 
User secrets are securely 
stored in the ToE. In 
particular, the compromise 
of a file is not sufficient for 
retrieving them.’ 
Evaluation goals, 
plan and process 
The specification of these aspects is 
approached through the various chapters of 
the report. Annex B, Section 4 mentions some 
cyber resilience test specifications. 
 
Note added by the Spanish NET during the 
review of this report: 
For each exercise (E1 to E3), the goals have 
been defined. The methodology to be used for 
each exercise has been specified. 
• Idem.  
Compliance 
assessment 
The steps of the compliance assessments 
identified by the Spanish NET are (as in 
Section 6.2 of the report): 
1. verification of the consistency of security 
functions with the security problem 
definition; 
2. verification of the vendor’s documentation 
and supporting evidence of how security 
functions and requirements are addressed 
by the ToE. 
In conclusion, the NET indicates that: 
• a standardised, precise evaluation method 
is needed to ensure the repeatability of 
assessments; 
• there is a risk that vendors might not know 
reference standards and/or CSPN method 
with consequent difficulties in specifying 
the cybersecurity requirements 
appropriate to the product, thus implying 
increased work for the evaluation 
laboratory; 
• compliance assessments are seen as 
insufficient and functional tests of the 
product are seen as a necessary 
complement. 
• The ICCF’s 
recommendations 
published in the phase 2 
report must be further 
detailed. 
• Creating a standard 
supporting the 
implementation of the 
ICCF is likely to be the 
best way to work on these 
aspects. 
 
Suggestion added by the 
Spanish NET during the 
review of this report: 
• Including functional 
testing in the compliance 
assessment should be 
considered in an update 
of the ICCF. 
Cyber resilience 
tests 
The CSPN method was adapted (Section 7.2 of 
the report). 
The recommended approach is a ‘tiered 
method’ starting with tests at the physical 
level, up to the logical level, up to the 
environmental level and up to additional 
system interactions (ASI). 
• The ICCF’s 
recommendations 
published in the phase 2 
report must be further 
detailed. 
• Creating a standard 
supporting the 
implementation of the 
ICCF is likely to be the 
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ASPECTS OF THE 
ICCF 
NATIONAL PRACTICES DISTANCE TO THE ICCF 
 
Tests should include for each tier: 
• resistance of security mechanisms; 
• vulnerability analysis; 
• penetration tests; 
• evaluation test report. 
Conclusions drawn by the Spanish NET are as 
follows: 
• The choice of a security reference level 
(SL-C in IEC 62443-4-2) should be 
specified as a basis for framing the 
tests. 
• The main conclusion obtained through 
the NET simulation testing exercise is 
that the evaluation period must have 
an upper boundary on the testing 
effort. The proposed time boundary for 
cyber resilience tests should be set 
between 20 and 40 days. 
• The approach to be followed is slightly 
different to the CSPN [CRITERIA]. Two 
main phases have been defined: 
vulnerability analysis and penetration 
testing. Guidance on how to conduct 
this methodology has been provided. 
(Post-review comment provided by the 
Spanish NET) 
• Some form of collaboration between 
the vendor and the laboratory must be 
envisaged. This is the case for code 
analyses that are deemed a sensitive 
issue for vendors and that could/ 
should be carried out at the vendor’s 
premises. This may cause difficult 
logistic and technical problems with 
regards to the tools required for such 
purpose. 
• Another approach could be to have 
best way to work on these 
aspects. 
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ASPECTS OF THE 
ICCF 
NATIONAL PRACTICES DISTANCE TO THE ICCF 
source code review as a 
module/augmentation to the 
certificate. (Post-review comment 
provided by the Spanish NET) 
• After assessments have been finished, 
the vendor should have a specified 
time period to resolve the issues, 
except for ‘residual vulnerabilities’. 
Development 
process 
evaluation 
Not addressed by the NET’s exercise.  
Evaluation report Annex B includes some examples of the 
contents of a technical evaluation report for 
the cyber resilience test. 
• A template for the 
technical evaluation 
report should be defined 
as part of the ICCF. 
 
4.3.3 Further	details	supplied	by	the	Spanish	NET	
The following further details have been provided regarding the product certification procedure. 
 
Figure 10: Spanish product certification procedure of reference 
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5 Synthesis of NETs’ outcomes: list of recommendations 
for phase 4 
The analysis of the three reports of the Spanish, French and Polish NETs has highlighted a series of 
improvements and needs to be addressed in ICCF phase 4. 
Domains of 
improvement 
Recommendations Suggested improvements 
Standardisation Creating a standard 
supporting the 
implementation of the ICCF 
and, beyond, of the 
European Cybersecurity 
Certification Framework 
(ECCF) 
Definition of the methodology for ICCS-C1, 
ICCS-C2, ICCS-B and ICCS-A, including the 
following elements: 
• Overall evaluation and certification 
process 
o Processes 
o Steps 
o Tasks 
o Methods and tools 
o Participants 
• Documents used for evaluation and 
certification 
o Definition of their ergonomic 
aspect 
o Structuring rules 
o Explanation of correspondence 
with ICCF requirements 
• Protection profile and security profile 
o Table of contents 
o Level of detail and format of 
the description of the ToE, its 
perimeter and configuration 
o Inclusion or not of the 
specification of evaluations 
goals, plan and process 
o Format of PP and SP data 
• Compliance assessment 
o Scope, series and nature of 
assessments 
• Cyber resilience tests 
o Tiered approach and associated 
criteria 
o Series and nature of tests 
o Cooperation with vendors and 
conditions for code 
assessments 
• Product’s development process 
assessment 
o Including references to existing 
standards 
• Evaluation reports 
o Table of contents 
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o Vocabulary correspondences 
between ICCF and selected 
standard of reference; 
o Verification and validation 
processes. 
• Guidelines 
o The set of guidelines providing 
advice on how to implement 
the ICCF standards in practice 
Economy of the 
evaluation and 
certification process 
ICCF recommendations  • Target (or expected?) workload and 
delay not to exceed for evaluations and 
certification 
The ICCF’s 
enhancement 
Conceptual models (PP, SP) • PP and SP data models should be 
reviewed: 
o Definition of critical assets (CAs) 
as product operation 
environment’s CAs and 
product’s CAs 
o Link between residual threats, 
critical assets, security 
functions and cybersecurity 
requirements 
o Link between security functions 
and security requirements 
• Definition and inclusion into the 
conceptual model of: 
o the objective(s) of an 
assessment item (one only or 
several), 
o the contents of prerequisites 
(operators, test platforms, 
other related elements?), 
o the method (should a protocol, 
or standardised protocol be 
referred to?), 
o tools (is it enough to mention a 
category of tools or should each 
tool be specified finely?), 
o expected results (how to 
express them?, should a 
tolerance be indicated?, should 
the conditions in which results 
are expected to be specified?, 
etc.); 
• Choice as to whether security 
mechanisms should be specified in SPs 
or not, and therefore included in the 
conceptual model or not 
• Clarification, improvement and 
alignment (between ICCF and national 
schemes) of conceptual/data models 
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(of processes, criteria, PP/SP, etc.), in 
order to assure that similar information 
be used and produced whatever the 
standard used as a reference in 
evaluation / certification activities 
Verification and 
validation 
Demonstration of the ICCF 
performance in a real life 
context 
• Reflection on the success criteria for 
the ICCF and the related key 
performance indicators (KPIs) 
• Planning for experiments to evaluate 
their values 
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6 Collective findings of the NETs 
Besides the findings from the analysis of each NET’s contribution, the meeting in Paris on 9 January 
2018 allowed NETs to conclude their work by identifying collectively the following issues. 
• Trust in the evaluation process and the cross-recognition of certificates are two main issues that 
imply: 
o a common methodology and process for evaluation and certification; 
o a common methodology for cyber resilience tests; 
o a reference manual (standard) for the review of the results of the tests; 
o a reference manual (standard) for the peer-review of results of the different ICCF 
schemes in the EU; 
o a common vocabulary; 
o a process for the maintenance of the scheme and of the certificates already issued; 
o a common process for the maintenance of PPs and SPs. 
• A pending question is about the possible impacts of the ECCF on the ICCF (see Table 2); 
• Finally, all the participants estimated that the time and budget of an evaluation and of the 
certification process should be limited in order to make the European cybersecurity certification 
endeavour realistic (not too costly, not too long). 
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7 Conclusion: proposed 2018-2019 programme of action 
Based upon the elements reported in previous sections, we articulate here the essential elements 
that could/should organise work in ICCF phase 4. 
7.1 Main	goals	
Goals for ICCF phase 4 works are: 
• to produce a usable scheme for IACS; 
• to give practical support to the ECCF. 
7.2 Further	studies	are	required	
To respond to the practical findings from NETs’ exercises, the ICCF itself should undergo some 
improvements listed in Section 5 above. 
7.3 Focused	projects	should	be	launched	
Seven projects should be launched during phase 4: 
1. To close identified gaps between practices and ICCF guidelines; 
2. To run a pilot project implementing the ICCF requirements (10) under an observable protocol; 
3. To launch a CEN-Cenelec ‘ICCF standard’ new work Item; 
4. To prepare an experimental laboratory that could be run by the JRC in order to maintain and 
share the knowledge, requirements, processes and tools associated with the ICCF and its 
associated standard; 
5. To work with ENISA to support the creation of the expertise needed to accomplish the tasks 
regarding the future European certification framework; 
6. To foster the industry’s engagement in liaison with industry-representation bodies; 
7. To create an exportable ICCF that could promote European high-level standards of security, 
industrial interests and evaluation and certification know-how. 
7.4 NETs	and	partners	to	involve	in	phase	4	
At this stage, the JRC should prepare the ICCF phase 4 works by looking for the support of the 
concerned European Commission directorates-general as well as the support of Member States and 
industrial and academic partners. 
7.5 ICCF	phase	4	governance	
                                                             
(10) It is important to decide, if a real evaluation is to be performed, whether the same product will be the object of all NETs’ work or if 
each NET would work on a product of its own choice. In the first case NETs could all easily exchange information and results could 
be compared fairly easily. In the second case, and without clear guidelines, it would be less easy to follow a common methodology 
and to compare results. 
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The ICCF phase 4 works will become significantly heavier than in previous phases. Multiple projects 
need to be launched and the governance and coordination of initiatives are key to the success of the 
overall endeavour. 
Without being definitive, the following diagram shows the levels of governance and the variety of 
stakeholders to involve in ICCF phase 4 works. 
 
Figure 11: Proposed phase 4 organisation 
This two-level governance and project structure will allow the treatment of ‘technical’ issues and 
more general issues to be addressed separately, as well as an objective and detached control of 
projects’ orientations, conduct and outcome. 
7.6 Setting	goals	for	every	stakeholder	
Through this organisation, each stakeholder can expect specific gains from the seven projects 
mentioned in Section 7.3 such as, but not limited to, those mentioned in the green boxes on the 
right-hand side of the figure below. 
  
ERNCIP Thematic Group: European IACS Cybersecurity Certification 
IACS Cybersecurity Certification Framework (ICCF): Lessons from the 2017 study of the state of the art 
 
 
European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP Project) 
https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
49 
 
Figure 12: ICCF phase 4’s desired outcome 
 
7.7 Coordination	of	ICCF	phase	4	projects	
As an example, the CEN-Cenelec ICCF standard initiative (project 3 in Section 7.3, on the right-hand 
side of the diagram below) could be synchronised with the ICCF pilot project under an observable 
protocol (project 2 in Section 7.3, the process of which is on the left-hand side of the diagram 
below). 
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Figure 13: ICCF phase 4 projects’ synchronisation 
Under this principle, the CEN standardisation team would benefit from the observations of the pilot 
project to elaborate on them the elements of a future supporting standard. 
At the present stage, the protocol of the pilot project needs to be defined and this should be one of 
the first actions to be taken in the course of phase 4 works. 
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ANNEX I – FRENCH National Exercise Team 
The French NET annex includes the following documents: 
• French NET report: this document presents the overall process of the exercise, including composition 
of the NET, methodology, methodology of the elaboration of the protection profile, methodology of 
the elaboration of the security profile, evaluation of the product and conclusions. 
• Test plan report: this document details the compliance assessment methodology (called conformity 
in the document) and reports on cyber resilience tests (called resistance in the document). 
• Protection profile of an industrial firewall: this document prescribes how to describe the product and 
its usage, the associated critical assets, the threat model, the security objectives and how these 
elements may relate to one another. 
• Stormshield Network Security, Industrial Firewall SNi40 — CSPN Security Target: this document 
details how, for a specific product, its description, associated critical assets and threat model are 
described. 
  
 French NET Report 
1 Executive Summary 
The present document is the result of the French NET, which objective was to gather French entities 
to instantiate the JRC’s framework described in [ICCF] document, section 7.2 Proposed plan of action 
for the ERNCIP IACS TG in 2017. Hereafter is how France would implement both “Compliance 
assessment” and “Cyber resilience testing” tasks. 
The work consisted in gathering a developer, an ITSEF, a stakeholder and a certification body, to draft 
a Protection Profile, a Security Target and a Test Plan for a given product. But our goal was not only 
to draft these documents, but also to focus on how to draft these documents, and specifically to 
address the caveats an author could encounter. Therefore, in the present report, for the three 
documents, we detail the different steps with examples on how writing the documentation. 
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4 Introduction 
4.1 French NET 
4.1.1 Composition of the French NET 
To assess JRC’s guidelines defined in the [ICCF] document we have instantiated the various roles as 
follows: 
 Developer: Stormshield 
 ITSEF: Oppida 
 Stakeholder: RTE France 
 Certification Body: ANSSI 
4.1.2 French NET Organization 
The French NET gathered during the following internal meetings: 
 Thursday 27th of July 
 Wednesday 13th of September 
 Thursday 5nd of October 
4.1.3 Assumptions 
As the [ICCF] document does not define a process for the “Compliance assessment”, nor the “Cyber 
resilience testing”, the French NET decided to use the French CSPN methodology ([CSPN]), which 
corresponds to the ICCS-B level defined in [ICCF]. Therefore we are using the CSPN procedure (ANSSI-
CSPN-CER-P-01) and instruction (ANSSI-CSPN-CER-I-02) available on the ANSSI website1. These 
documents define acronyms and technical terms, so the reader might need to refer to them in case 
this document does not fully define them. 
4.2 Methodology 
The CSPN methodology has been created by ANSSI in 2008, and consists in “black box” or “grey box” 
testing under constrained time. The CSPN is an alternative to Common Criteria2 evaluation, for which 
the cost and the duration can be an obstacle, and when the degree of confidence aimed is lower. 
A CSPN evaluation is based on a Security Profile Target, which can also be based on a Protection 
Profile, to carry on the product evaluation strictly speaking. The figure below summarizes what the 
following document details: i.e. the relationship between the Protection Profile, the Security Target 
and the production evaluation (hereafter called test plan for this project). 
                                                          
1 http://ssi.gouv.fr/entreprise/produits-certifies/produits-certifies-cspn/les-procedures-formulaires-et-
methodologies/index.html 
2 http://www.commincriteriaportal.org 
 Figure 1: Relationship between Protection Profile, Security Target and Test Plan 
 
4.2.1 Product Used 
The French NET has based its study on the Stormshield SNi40. It’s an industrial firewall developed by 
Stormshield, a fully-owned subsidiary of Airbus Defence and Space. 
4.2.2 Inputs 
The French NET used the following documents as inputs: 
 Firewall Protection Profile (PP) issued by ANSSI. It can also be found on the ANSSI website3 
 Stormshield SNi40 Security Target4 (ST), which was a previous security target used for an 
evaluation. 
4.3 Tasks 
The French NET decided to perform the three following ERNCIP tasks: 
 E1: Elaborate a protection profile and a security profile and report on the easiness/difficulty 
of this 
 E2: Simulate a product compliance assessment, document and report on easiness and 
difficulty 
 E3: Simulate a product cyber resilience test, document and report on easiness and difficulty 
                                                          
3 http://ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2015/03/20150713_NP_ANSSI_SDE_firewall_short_term_v1.0-en.pdf 
4 http://ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2016/08/sn_ase_cible_cspnv1.3.pdf 
 5 Drafting a Protection Profile 
 
Input Output Actors 
 Threats related to the field 
 Security requirements for 
the field 
 Use cases 
 Regulations (National, 
European, linked to the 
field, etc.) 
 PP  Developer community 
 Final user / integrator 
 ITSEF 
 Stakeholder 
 Certification Body 
 
5.1 Stakes 
A Protection Profile is a way for all the involved actors to agree on the security definition. That is 
defining the assets, threats and security objectives for a given set of products. A PP is indeed made 
for each category of product such as: firewalls, Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), VPN, 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) server, etc. 
It is also a way for a costumer to easily compare products. If several products have been evaluated 
using the same PP, a costumer can be sure they have at least a minimum set of security functions in 
common, and he can therefore focus on the functions that are not in common. 
5.2 Goal of a PP 
 A PP is to be used as a template for many different Security Targets, which in turn are to be used in 
different evaluations. 
5.3 Methodology 
The following figure details the model used to draft a PP. 
Figure 2: Conceptual model of a Protection Profile 
 
  
Involved Roles 
 PP author 
 PP approving 
 Steering committee 
(Developer community, 
Final user / integrator, 
ITSEF, Stakeholder, 
Certification Body) 
 
5.3.1 Drafting the PP 
All actors need to achieve a common understanding about the product and its field of use. The way is 
to come up with questions about the product (users, assets, threats, security objectives, etc.) and 
have them answered inside the PP. 
A PP shall have a general structure which is independent of the product, as the [ICCF] document 
details in section “Conceptual model of a Protection Profile”. The following figure details the general 
sections a PP should have: 
Figure 3: Protection Profile Contents 
 
In order to fill out the general section listed in the above figure we have made the sections 
underneath. The objective is to make the link with the supporting document [PP], therefore to each 
of the following section is appended the actual paragraph in the [PP]. 
 5.3.1.1 Product Description (PP§1.1) 
Multiple products of the same category, for example industrial firewalls, may differ on certain 
aspects of their usage. But it is necessary, as well as important, to concentrate on what they have in 
common and what makes them industrial firewalls. 
Example: They, of course, all have a filtering functionality, but they can also be managed remotely, so 
in such case an authentication on this administration interface is required. 
5.3.1.2 Product usage (PP§1.3) 
This section describes how and where the product is used. 
5.3.1.3 Defining the users (PP§1.4) 
All users interacting with the product shall be listed.  
Warning: A user does not necessarily need to be a human. It can be a remote program interacting 
with the product such as a Logging server, or an administration access. 
5.3.1.4 Defining the assumptions (PP§1.5) 
Assumptions are formulated on the environment and how the product is used. 
5.3.1.5 Defining the critical assets (PP§2) 
The author must make a list of all sensitive assets the product is using. To do this he must identify if 
the product manipulates cryptographic keys, certificates, logins, passwords, firmware, logs, 
configuration files, etc. 
Example: The author must put the product in its environment to understand the assets that could be 
shared, stored or acted upon by the product, but whose origins are external (also called assets of the 
environment). These assets are data, in the broadest sense, coming from a user, such as applications 
for examples, or a process interacting with the product, such as credentials to access a configuration 
server. 
Of course the last step is to define the security criteria for each of the assets. The basic and most 
commonly used security criteria are: availability, confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. If a 
certain field requires a specific criterion it can of course be added. 
5.3.1.6 Defining the threats (PP§3) 
It is important to start by defining the threat agents. By doing so, we define the potential of the 
attacker and its positioning in the environment: 
 Is he in the network? 
 Does he have a physical access to the product? 
 Can he steal the product? 
 What rights does he have on the product? 
 etc. 
The next step is to take all critical assets previously listed and find one or multiple threats an attacker 
can have on them. The objective is to find threats that jeopardize the asset’s security criteria.  
 Example: If a cryptographic key requires confidentiality there needs to be a threat challenging its 
confidentiality. 
5.3.1.7 Defining security objectives (PP§4) 
A security objective is here to counter a threat. Expressed in natural language, a security objective 
can counter one or multiple threats. The only rule is that all threats listed at section 5.3.1.6 must be 
countered by a security objective. 
Again, this is a PP, so a security objective mustn’t be specific, but rather generic. It will be the 
developer’s goal to instantiate them when drafting the security target. 
Example: Malformed input management: The Target of Evaluation has been developed in order to 
handle correctly malformed input, in particular malformed network traffic. 
 
Warning: An assumption can reduce a threat, but it is mandatory that an objective of security covers 
this given threat. In other words, no threat can be covered only by an assumption. 
5.3.1.8 Mapping (PP§Annex A and B) 
Listing the mapping assets/threats and threats/security objectives is also important. It allows 
checking that nothing has been forgotten. 
5.3.2 PP Verification 
The Certification Body needs to verify the PP is not incoherent. Also writing a PP is an iterative 
process so several iterations might be needed to finalize the PP. 
 6 Drafting a Security Target 
 
Input Output Actors 
 PP 
 Product documentation: 
user guide, sales offer, data 
sheet, whitepaper, website, 
etc. 
 Product specification 
 ST  Developer  
 Final user/integrator 
 ITSEF 
 
Warning: We wanted to highlight the information added to the Protection Profile in order to 
instantiate it as a Security Target. Therefore we chose to put in blue this additional information, 
which is of course not part of the PP. 
 
6.1 Stakes 
A Security Target defines the perimeter, the context of use of the product but also how the product 
is evaluated. That is, a product can have a dedicated configuration, where additional security 
measures are added or only a subpart of the cryptographic algorithm are taken into account for 
example. Therefore is it important for the final user to initialize the product with this specific 
configuration. Also, it is important to keep in mind that the ITSEF will evaluate the product with this 
given configuration. 
From a final customer point of view, the security target also allows him to understand what the ITSEF 
evaluates. 
6.2 Goal of a ST 
A security target must answer a security need. This is done by detailing the product’s assets, threats 
and security functions. 
6.3 Methodology 
 
Involved Roles 
 ST author 
Can be the developer or 
ITSEF 
 ST approving 
Can be the developer or 
the Certification Body 
 
 6.3.1 Drafting the ST 
The PP is only a framework, a template, as seen in section 5.2; the ST author needs to instantiate this 
framework with the actual data from the product. To do so he uses the developer’s documentation 
to retrieve the product description, usage, assets, users and threats. The general idea is to instantiate 
the information listed in the PP with the developer’s product. 
Since the ST used here is based on PP it therefore follows the same structure. This structure is 
defined hereafter, which is roughly the one also described in section “Conceptual model of a Security 
Profile” of the [ICCF] document. 
Figure 4: Security Target Contents 
 
 
6.3.1.1 Product identification (ST§1) 
The product identification shall also at least identify: 
 Product's commercial name 
 Product version 
 Product category 
It is important the ST details the product in terms of version. This is especially true when a product is 
composed of multiple bricks such as an Operating System (OS), libraries, configuration files, etc. So 
this particular version of the product will be linked to the version of the implemented bricks. 
 Example: If the version 1.2 of a given evaluated product is based on the Linux kernel 4.12, uses 
OpenSSL 1.1.0f and the Apache HTTP Server 2.4, then this freezes the version and it will therefore be 
the evaluated configuration and the certified configuration, if the certification occurs. 
6.3.1.2 Evaluated platform (ST§1.6) 
The product needs to be positioned inside its environment of use. This helps understanding how the 
product works, what interactions it has with its close environment and the possible human 
interactions. 
Warning: This section is only present in the ST. This is due to the fact that the PP is generic; therefore 
it is up to the ST author to add this section. 
Also, if a product is not autonomous and needs a connection to a remote server, or specific software 
needs to be used to interact with it, then theses dependencies need to be detailed in this section. 
It is important for the ITSEF to have such information in order to be able to set up the platform and 
run the tests. 
6.3.1.3 Product configuration (ST§1.7) 
A configuration has to be defined. This configuration will be the one evaluated. 
To do so, it may be possible to deactivate or change certain parameters in order to comply with the 
PP and its security objectives. More generally the author needs to think about the following: 
 Are there multiple use cases of the product? If so, he will have to list them. 
 Are there any unused services, for the ST perimeter? Is so, it may be useful to deactivate 
them, so the ITSEF will not be able to take advantage of them. 
 Is there a service, that is out of scope and potentially vulnerable and still activated? 
 Does the product have any dependencies with other components (configuration server, 
authentication server, etc.)? If so, take into account these connections (generally it requires 
the need for a security function such as “Secured communications”). 
6.3.1.4 Adding assets and/or threats (ST§2 and 3) 
It is possible to add assets and/or threats in the Security Target to those defined in the Protection 
Profile, If the product contains more assets or is subject to more threats. 
By adding threats, the ST author may have to add security functions if the one in the PP do not cover 
the new threats. 
Warning: The ST author has to bear in mind that is not possible to delete any assets, threats or even 
security functions coming from the PP. 
6.3.1.5 Security functions (ST§4) 
The goal is to take the security objectives from the PP and instantiate them by using the product 
documentation. It is important to list for each function what it does: 
 Does it perform encryption? 
 If so, what algorithm? 
 With which key? 
  Where is stored the key? 
 How is this key protected? 
 etc. 
Warning: The author then needs to be sure the security functions implemented by the product do 
indeed meet the security objectives. For example, if the PP mandates the secure storage of 
confidential data but is not implemented by the product then a reimplementation of the product will 
of course be needed. 
6.3.1.6 Mapping (ST§Annex A and B) 
The mapping listed in the PP must be updated with the possible assets, threats and security functions 
added in the ST. 
6.3.2 ST Verification 
The Certification Body needs to verify that the ST is not misleading or incoherent with the PP. 
 7 Evaluation 
 
Input Output Actors 
 PP 
 ST 
 Product documentation: 
user guide, cryptographic 
specification, source code, 
etc. 
 Tools 
 Evaluation Technical Report 
(see Remark) 
 ITSEF 
 Certification Body 
 Developer 
 
Remark: the output is normally an Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) but for this project we only 
provide a test plan (see [TPR]). 
 
7.1 Goal of the Evaluation 
The goal of the evaluation is twofold. The first one is to verify that the product performs its functions 
as described in the security target. This task is called the conformity assessment (see section 7.2.1). 
The second, the most important, is then to verify how resistant the product is. This task is called the 
resistance assessment (see section 7.2.2). 
Both tasks are performed solely by the ITSEF. As mentioned is section 4.2, the evaluation is 
performed under constrained time. Therefore the ITSEF’s previous knowledge is important here. The 
ITSEF evaluators decide what strategy to apply in order to fully evaluate the product. But they have 
to verify the conformity and assess the resistance of all security functions listed in the security target. 
How to perform the tests, in which order, in which depth, which attack path to use, etc. is up to 
them. The ITSEF can also rely on the developer in case he needs more information on the product, or 
needs help in its configuration for example. 
Warning: At the end of the evaluation, all the evaluation information is put in the Evaluation 
Technical Report. This document is shared with the Certification Body, who then performs an 
analysis. If the CB decides the coverage is not complete for example, the ITSEF shall then perform 
additional tests. 
7.2 Methodology 
The following figure details the methodology used for a product evaluation under the CSPN scheme. 
 Figure 5: Evaluation Methodology 
 
Involved Roles 
 ITSEF 
 Certification Body 
 Developer 
 
Warning: the evaluator that participated in the drafting of the ST cannot participate in the evaluation 
of the product. 
7.2.1 Conformity 
The objective of this phase is twofold, that is: 
 First of all, to verify that the product conforms to its security specifications: all the non-
conformities discovered must be traced and stated in the ETR 
 Secondly, to enable the evaluator to fully understand the product in its entirety, so as to be 
relevant in the effectiveness analysis. 
By doing so, the evaluator fills the “Compliance assessment” activity described in [ICCF]. 
Hereafter is a brief general-type list of what an evaluator has to verify: 
 Is the platform the developer handed over to the ITSEF the one listed in the ST? 
o Version number? 
o Firmware version? 
o etc. 
 Do all assets exist? 
 Can all users described in the ST interact with the product? 
  Do all security functions exist? 
o Do they conform to their description in the ST? 
 Are all assumptions listed in the ST in line with how the product is used? 
 Is the configuration defined in the ST easily applicable to the product? 
o Is this configuration defined inside the product’s guides? 
o Is it easy to configure the product? Can the user be misled during the configuration? 
o Is the configuration listed in the ST already applied to the product when initialized? 
 If not, what are the differences with the configuration listed in the ST? 
 Is the ST consistent with the PP? 
 
The evaluator of course has to perform the conformity of all security functions. We have listed in 
section 7.2.3 the security functions and the type of conformity tests he could perform. 
 
7.2.2 Resistance 
Based on the ITSEF’s knowledge on the type of product and the state of the art attacks, the 
evaluator’s goal is to assess the following: 
 The effectiveness of the security functions (also called pentesting) 
 The impact of the product on the host system's security 
By doing so, the evaluator fills the “Cyber resilience testing” activity described in [ICCF]. 
Concerning the effectiveness analysis the evaluator shall: 
 Rate the resistance of the security functions and mechanisms and, where applicable, the 
cryptographic mechanisms 
 Identify the vulnerabilities 
 Provide an opinion on the risks of improper use 
 Provide an expert opinion on the product's effectiveness 
 Potentially, propose a configuration and a usage environment which limit the exploitability of 
the vulnerabilities and, in this case, give a second expert opinion on the product's 
effectiveness in its new usage environment. 
 
Warning: One shall keep in mind that the ITSEF will use all available interfaces, all binary, any 
protocol flaw to take advantage of the product. Even if these flaws are not in the scope of the 
evaluation. 
For example, if an administrator web interface is accessible, with an easily guessable login and 
password, he can use it to attack the product, even if this interface is not part of the evaluation 
scope. This can also be the case for physical interfaces, where a debug port can be forgotten by the 
developer, the evaluator can use it to retrieve critical assets. 
 The evaluator of course has to perform the resistance of all security functions. We have listed in 
section 7.2.3 the security functions and the type of tests he could perform. 
 7.2.3 Test Samples 
Security Function Example of conformity test Example of resistance test 
Malformed input 
management 
Where does this input management take 
place? 
 
What policy is already in place? 
 
Is the policy really applied? 
Focus on the fields that could potentially 
be used to inject data, or bypass 
authentications. Fuzzing techniques 
could be used to see how the product 
handles malformed data. 
 
Also the evaluator could try to send a 
large amount of malformed data to see 
how the product handles this amount of 
data. 
Filtering policy 
enforcement 
On what type of data is such filtering 
applied? 
 
Depending on the policy already in place 
does the filtering really apply? 
 
Does the filtering apply on all type of 
data? 
For all the protocols the product filters, 
is it possible to try to send maliciously 
crafted data to see the robustness of 
such filter? 
 
Is it possible for example to bypass a 
filter? 
Protocol conformity 
analysis 
What protocols does the product filter 
(the ones described in the security 
target)? 
 
Does the product really filter these 
protocols? 
If a flaw is detected in the protocol 
specification, is it also present in the 
implementation of the product? 
 
Is it possible to fuzz the protocol to find 
flaws? 
Secure storage of 
secrets 
What are the assets the product stores? 
 
Verify these assets are not stored in 
clear on the filesystem. 
What are the secrets the product stores? 
 
What type of memory does the product 
have? 
 
Where could the data be stored on such 
memory? 
Secure 
authentication on 
administration 
interface 
How is this interface accessed? Does it 
take advantage of cryptography (HTTPS 
for example)? 
Is the mechanism used to authenticate 
the administrator robust enough to 
prevent brute force attacks? 
 
Does the authentication mechanism use 
certificates; if so is it resistant against 
attacks based on modified certificates? 
Access control 
policy 
When the policy is applied, are the 
defined roles really implemented? 
 
Is all administration actions logged by 
the product? 
Can a role have more privilege 
operations than the one defined? 
 
Given the roles, is an escalation 
possible? 
 
Is It is possible to bypass the policy? 
 Firmware signature Is a valid firmware accepted by the 
product? 
 
Is an invalid firmware rejected by the 
product? 
 
Is a revoked firmware rejected by the 
product? 
Depending on how the firmware 
structure is made, can a modification to 
the signature still allow a crafted 
firmware to be installed? 
 
Is it possible to take advantage of the 
parser that will find and compute the 
signature and the header of the file to 
make the product install a crafted 
firmware? 
Configuration 
confidentiality and 
integrity 
What assets shall be kept confidential 
and must not be modified? 
 
Verify that such assets are indeed 
protected in confidentiality and integrity. 
What is the mechanism used to keep the 
confidentiality and integrity? 
 
How resistant is it against an attacker 
who has a logical access to the 
filesystem? 
 
7.2.4 Validation 
When the evaluation is over, the ITSEF and CB initiate a discussion over the report. This discussion 
will cover the tests the ITSEF has performed, focusing on the following points: 
 Have all security functions been tested in conformity and resistance? 
 Do the tests performed fully cover the security functions or should more tests be performed? 
 Are the conclusions correct? 
 Are the attack rating correct? 
 Etc. 
Warning: It is very important for the Certification Body to have enough technical background in order 
to challenge the ITSEF on the technical field. By doing it, the CB can be sure the ITSEF is as much as 
possible up-to-date concerning the attack state-of-the-art. 
If the certifier agrees with what the ITSEF has made, then the report is validated and the CB can then 
certify the product. 
 8 Conclusion 
Our goal was to instantiate the ICCF process with a product, roles and a methodology in order to see 
how the framework fits in a real situation. The product has been chosen only when all roles were 
filed in. It seemed important for the group to have a stakeholder - as it is not always the case in 
certification projects - to get their input on the way they will use the product and therefore the 
security functions it will need to implement and of course the environment in which it will have to fit 
in. 
We then needed to rely on a developer for the product. Having Stormshield in the group allowed us 
to have access to a variety of products and especially industrial-type products. 
The group then focused on the PP. To do so we took the one already published, but focused on trying 
to see if it required an update. When done, the second task was the ST. The entire NET was gathered 
to discuss on what the product does and how the instantiation shall be done. We also took the [ICCF] 
document to check if the ST was compliant. The result is the accompanying [ST]. Also, to show how 
the instantiation is done, we decided to highlight it by using another color for the font. Therefore the 
blue one is specifically here for this matter. 
Finally the step was to create a test plan. The usual report an ITSEF provides the ANSSI is an 
Evaluation Technical Report, as mentioned in Remark, but here only a test plan could be handed over 
to the project. The objective of this test plan is to provide a general idea on the conformity and 
resistance tests an ITSEF performs to assess a product’s security. 
8.1 Impacts on the framework (ICCF) 
8.1.1 Process 
As mentioned in the introduction, the [ICCF] document does not yet define how to perform both the 
“Compliance assessment” and the “Cyber resilience testing”. This is where this works fits in. Its goal 
is to provide a test case, with an actual product, and try to supply a methodology. We tried as much 
as possible to describe what the French NET has done in term of process, for it to be reused by the 
ERNCIP as much as possible. 
8.1.2 Methodology 
No evaluation methodology is defined in the [ICCF] document. This is the reason why the French NET 
decided to use the [CSPN], as it is for us the best answer to both “Cyber resilience testing” and 
“Compliance assessment”. 
8.2 Open discussion 
We have listed the following points as open for the ERNCIP group to discuss: 
 Next step is to perform a full evaluation, conformity and resistance, of a product. It could be 
really interesting to perform a full analysis of a product. Should this product be the same for 
all NETs?  
 Need for a common methodology? We find it interesting to share with the other NETs the 
methodology we used and the results we have, and initiate discussions over the ones they 
 used. This brings up the question: does a common methodology need to be worked on? And 
more broadly, how would a certification authority be able to certify a product that hasn’t 
been assessed with a common methodology? 
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2. Methodology 
The following security functions are listed in the ST: 
 Malformed input management 
 Filtering policy enforcement 
 Protocol conformity analysis 
 Secure storage of secrets 
 Secure authentication on administration interface 
 Access control policy 
 Firmware signature 
 Configuration confidentiality and integrity 
The evaluator shall therefore first verify the conformity of these security functions and after 
test their resistance. The actual tests an evaluator would perform are enclosed in a test case 
where the following items are detailed: 
 Reference: unique name of the test 
 Objectives: what is to be performed 
 Prerequisite: what is needed to perform the test 
 Tools: tools used by the evaluator to perform the test 
 Proceedings: high level steps the evaluator will put in place 
 Expected result 
 
3. Conformity 
As mentioned in the lead document, the French NET Report ([FNR]), the conformity is mainly 
here to verify that the product delivered to the evaluator is compliant to what is mentioned 
in the security target (ST). 
3.1 Product Identification 
Product Identification 
Reference T.Product_ID 
Objectives Identify the product, as well as its version. 
Prerequisite Web administration interface to access the product. 
Tools Browser 
Proceedings The evaluator shall use the web administration interface to retrieve the 
product name and its version. 
Expected result The product shall be the SNi40 and the version 3.3.1. 
 
3.2 Asset Identification 
Asset Identification 
Reference T.Asset_ID 
Objectives Identify all the assets listed in the ST to verify that all are implemented by 
the product. 
Prerequisite Logical access to the product, in order to browse the filesystem. 
Tools SSH 
Proceedings After logging into the product, the evaluator shall identify all assets listed in 
the ST. 
Expected result All assets listed in the ST shall be implemented by the product. 
 
3.3 Malformed input management 
 
3.4 Filtering policy enforcement 
 
Filtering policy enforcement 
Reference T.CONF_FILTER 
Objectives The goal of the tests is to verify that the filtering policy is enforced by the 
product. 
Prerequisite Fully functional product. 
Tools Python, scapy 
Proceedings Through the configuration interface, the evaluator shall verify that a policy 
can be implemented. 
When the policy is implemented and the filtering activated, by sending 
traffic, he shall verify the effect of such filtering policy. 
Malformed input management 
Reference T.CONF_INPUT 
Objectives The goal of the tests is to verify the input management is implemented by 
the product. 
Prerequisite Fully functional product. 
Tools Python, scapy 
Proceedings Tools making it possible to simulate traffic or a previously captured traffic 
on which the fuzzing is applied. 
Expected result The product should have malformed input management in place. 
Expected result The product should have a filtering policy enforced. 
 
3.5 Protocol conformity analysis 
 
Protocol conformity analysis 
Reference T.CONF_PROTOCOL 
Objectives The goal of the tests is to verify that the product does indeed rely on the 
protocols listed in the security target. 
Prerequisite Protocol specification 
Tools Python, scapy, wireshark 
Proceedings The evaluator shall monitor the incoming and outgoing traffic and verify 
that the protocols listed in the security target are indeed implemented by 
the product. 
Expected result The product shall implement the protocols listed in the security target. 
 
3.6 Secure storage of secrets 
 
Secure storage of secrets 
Reference T.CONF_SECRETS 
Objectives The goal of the tests is to verify that the product does handle secrets. 
Prerequisite Fully functional product. 
Tools Browser 
Proceedings Through the configuration interface, the evaluator shall verify that the 
product can handle secrets such as passwords. 
Expected result The product shall implement the secure storage of secrets. 
 
3.7 Secure authentication on administration 
interface 
 
Secure authentication on administration interface 
Reference T.CONF_AUTH 
Objectives The goal of the tests is to verify that the product implements a secure 
authentication on the administration interface. 
Prerequisite Fully functional product. 
Tools Browser 
Proceedings The evaluator shall verify the settings of such function. When activated, he 
shall verify that an authentication is indeed activated for the administrator. 
Expected result A secure authentication shall be implemented by the product. 
 
3.8 Access control policy 
 
Access control policy 
Reference T.CONF_ACCESS 
Objectives The goal of the tests is to verify that the access control policy is enforced by 
the product. 
Prerequisite Fully functional product. 
Tools Browser 
Proceedings Through the configuration interface, the evaluator shall verify that an access 
control policy can be implemented. 
When the policy implemented and the filtering activated, the evaluator shall 
verify that is indeed in place. 
Expected result The product should have an access control policy enforced. 
 
3.9 Firmware signature 
 
Firmware signature 
Reference T.CONF_ 
Objectives The goal of the tests is to verify that the product implements firmware 
signature. 
Prerequisite Fully functional product with a set of valid firmwares and unsigned ones. 
Tools Browser 
Proceedings The evaluator shall verify the settings of such function. When activated, he 
shall verify that only signed firmwares are accepted by the product, 
unsigned firmware shall be rejected. 
Expected result The product shall verify and accept only signed firmwares. 
 
 
3.10 Configuration confidentiality and integrity 
 
Configuration confidentiality and integrity 
Reference T.CONF_ 
Objectives The goal of the tests is to verify that the filtering policy is enforced by the 
product. 
Prerequisite Fully functional product. 
Tools Browser 
Proceedings Through the configuration interface, the evaluator shall verify that the 
setting to protect the confidentiality and integrity is set. 
Expected result The product shall implement a confidentiality and integrity protection for 
the configuration. 
 
4. Resistance 
 
4.1 Malformed input management 
 
Malformed input management 
Reference T.STRESS 
Objectives The objective of these tests is to identify if the product has a different 
behavior when it is subject to strong external stimulus. 
Prerequisite Fully functional product. 
Tools Python, scapy, wireshark, hping3 
Malformed input management 
Reference T.FUZZING 
Objectives The objective of the tests is to see how the product reacts when malformed 
packets are sent. Fuzzing is generally used to discover vulnerabilities. 
Prerequisite Fully functional product. 
Tools Python, scapy, isic, tcpsic 
Proceedings Tools making it possible to simulate traffic or a previously captured traffic 
on which the fuzzing is applied. 
Expected result The behavior should not be different, even when the product is subject to 
malformed packets. 
Proceedings Tools making it possible to simulate an intense stress on the firewall are 
used. 
In parallel the evaluator tries to send an application package to the PLC 
which uses a writing function of Modbus. 
Expected result The behavior should not be different, even when the product is subject to 
strong external stimulus. 
 
4.2 Filtering policy enforcement 
 
Filtering policy enforcement 
Reference T.EVADE_TCPIP 
Objectives The objective of these tests is to verify if it’s possible to bypass the protocol 
detection carried out by the filtering module, with the intention to check if 
policy prohibited application packets can pass through, while exploiting 
TCP/IP sessions. 
Prerequisite The product has a filtering policy in place, which filters out the writing 
functions of Modbus. 
Tools Python, scapy, wireshark, hping3 
Proceedings The evaluator tries to send an application package to the PLC which uses a 
writing function of Modbus. 
Expected result The application packet shall be dropped by the product and shall not go to 
the PLC. 
 
Filtering policy enforcement 
Reference T.EVADE_MODBUS 
Objectives The objective of these tests is to verify if it’s possible to bypass the protocol 
detection carried out by the filtering module, with the intention to check if a 
Modbus prohibited application packets can pass through. 
Prerequisite The product has a filtering policy in place, which filters out the writing 
functions of Modbus. 
Tools Mbtget, python, scapy, wireshark 
Proceedings The evaluator tries to send an application package to the PLC which uses a 
writing function of Modbus. 
Expected result The application packet shall be dropped by the product and shall not go to 
the PLC. 
 
Filtering policy enforcement 
Reference T.EVADE_104 
Objectives The objective of these tests is to verify if it’s possible to bypass the protocol 
detection carried out by the filtering module, with the intention to check if 
an IEC 104 prohibited application packets can pass through. 
Prerequisite The product has a filtering policy in place, which filters out the STOPDT 
function. 
Tools Python, scapy, wireshark 
Proceedings The evaluator tries to send a STOPDT IEC 104 packet to the PLC  
Expected result The STOPDT IEC 104 packet shall be dropped by the product and shall not 
go to the PLC. 
 
Filtering policy enforcement 
Reference T.EVADE_S7 
Objectives The objective of these tests is to verify if it’s possible to bypass the protocol 
detection carried out by the filtering module, with the intention to check if a 
S7 prohibited packets can pass through. 
Prerequisite The product has a filtering policy in place, which filters the S7 protocol. 
Tools Python, scapy, wireshark 
Proceedings The evaluator tries to send an application package using the S7 protocol to 
the PLC which uses a writing function. 
Expected result The application packet shall be dropped by the product and shall not go to 
the PLC. 
 
4.3 Protocol conformity analysis 
 
Protocol conformity analysis 
Reference T.PROTOCOL 
Objectives The objective of these tests is to verify if the protocol conforms to the 
specification. 
Prerequisite Protocol specification 
Tools Python, scapy, wireshark 
Proceedings The evaluator tries to send packets that are slightly modified compared to 
the one of the protocol to see how the product handles them. 
Expected result The product shall drop packets that do not conform to the specification. 
 
4.4 Secure storage of secrets 
The conformity analysis has shown that two different dataset could be used to store the 
passwords. Therefore the evaluator has to check which one is actually the correct one. 
Secure storage of secrets 
Reference T.PASSWD 
Objectives The goal of the tests is to understand if the secure storage uses passwd. 
Prerequisite Logical access to the product, in order to browse the filesystem. 
Tools SSH 
Proceedings Use passwd to change password and see if any changes occur on passwd 
file. 
Expected result The user password should change. 
 
Secure storage of secrets 
Reference T.PASSWD2 
Objectives The goal of the tests is to understand if the secure storage uses pwd.db 
and/or spwd.db. 
Prerequisite Logical access to the product, in order to browse the filesystem. 
Tools SSH 
Proceedings Use passwd to change password and see if any changes occur on passwd 
file. 
Expected result The user password should change. 
 
4.5 Secure authentication on administration 
interface 
 
Secure authentication on administration interface 
Reference T.BRUTFORCE 
Objectives Check if a mechanism used to prevent brute force attacks on the 
authentication page is implemented 
Prerequisite Connected to the administration network and have access to the 
administration Web interface. 
Tools Web browser, Burp Proxy Suite Pro (version 1.6.30) 
Proceedings Send several authentication requests to the server with invalid credentials. 
Expected result Mechanism against brute force or dictionary attacks is properly and 
efficiently implemented. 
 
Secure authentication on administration interface 
Reference T.FAKECERTIF 
Objectives Check if the authentication process is achieved when a client certificate 
signed by a certificate chain, which is not registered in the PKI of the TOE, is 
used. 
Prerequisite x Connected to the administration network and have access to the 
administration Web interface. 
x A certificate authority for the authentication, signed by the root 
certificate authority, installed in the TOE. 
A client certificate correctly signed by the authentication certificate 
authority and associated to an administration profile in the LDAP database. 
Tools OpenSSL 
Proceedings x Replicate a certificate chain (root certificate authority, authentication 
certificate authority and client certificate) outside the TOE but with the 
same information. 
x Install this chain on the web browser and submit the client certificate 
to the TOE during the authentication process. 
Expected result Authentication should fail indicating that Certificate is not allowed 
 
Secure authentication on administration interface 
Reference T.AUTOCOMPLETEPWD 
Objectives Check if the password field of the authentication formulary is properly 
configured to not store the password. 
Prerequisite Connected to the administration network and have access to the 
administration Web interface. 
Tools Web browser, Burp Proxy Suite Pro (version 1.6.30) 
Proceedings Perform an authentication request with valid credentials 
Expected result Authentication formulary should not auto complete password 
 
4.6 Access control policy 
 
Access control policy 
Reference T.ACP_CONFIG 
Objectives The goal of the tests is to find where the access control policy is configured. 
Prerequisite Web administration interface to access the product. 
Logical access to the product, in order to browse the filesystem. 
Tools SSH, browser 
Proceedings Through the administration interface the evaluator can change the different 
access control settings and then see the impact it has on the filesystem. 
Expected result The access control policy should be stored in files. 
 
Access control policy 
Reference T.ACP_BYPASS 
Objectives The goal is to find if it is possible to bypass the policy in place. The evaluator 
wants to verify if a race condition or TOCTOU attacks could be used here. 
Prerequisite Web administration interface to access the product. 
Logical access to the product, in order to browse the filesystem. 
Tools SSH, browser 
Proceedings The evaluator needs to verify if the policy is applied instantly or not. 
Expected result Access control policy should not be bypassed. 
 
4.7 Firmware signature 
 
Firmware signature 
Reference T.MALFORMED_UPDATE 
Objectives The goal is to test whether the product protects itself against malformed 
updates (incorrect signature, no signature, etc.). 
Prerequisite Web administration interface to access the product. 
Tools  
Proceedings The evaluator tries to force an update of the firmware with a malformed 
update. 
Expected result The product should not install the update. 
 
4.8 Configuration confidentiality and integrity 
 
Configuration confidentiality and integrity 
Reference T.FILESYSTEM 
Objectives The goal is to verify the rights of the configuration files on the filesystem 
and estimate if they are well protected. 
Prerequisite Logical access to the product, in order to browse the filesystem. 
Tools SSH 
Proceedings Browse the filesystem to retrieve the rights of the configuration files. 
Expected result Files should only be accessible to “admin” user. 
 
Configuration confidentiality and integrity 
Reference T.CSRF 
Objectives A vulnerability was previously known on the administration interface. The 
goal is to check if this CSRF vulnerability is still here. 
Prerequisite The product is in place and has the administration interface available. 
Tools Browser, burp 
Proceedings The evaluator tries to take advantage of the CSRF vulnerability in the 
administration interface. 
Expected result The vulnerability should be present in the administration interface. 
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Preface
In the whole document, the acronym ToE (Target of Evaluation) designates the component being
evaluated.
Text in red differs from the mid-term version of the protection profile.
1 Product description
1.1 General description
In this protection profile, the ToE is an industrial firewall. It is designed for running in hostile
environments where classical firewalls could not run properly due to heat, humidity or dust, for
instance.
From a functional perspective, this firewall allows to interconnect an industrial network that
has to be protected with another network with at least one of the following characteristics:
• a lesser control or a lesser level of trust;
• specific applications which do not interact with the industrial network;
• another industrial network with different functionalities;
• another domain of responsibility.
Depending on the architecture, this firewall can act as an IP router, a TCP proxy or an
Ethernet bridge (stealth mode) for non-IP protocols. The firewall controls and filters the flows and
can rewrites protocols from the layer 2 up to the applicative layer depending on supported and
inspected protocols.
1.2 Features
The ToE includes the following features:
• Network filtering: The ToE supports dynamic filtering at layers 3 and 4 (stateful firewall).
It also supports filtering at the layer 2 when the ToE is in stealth mode.
• Protocol analysis: The ToE checks that input packets are conform to the protocol specifi-
cations. This feature is not necessarily supported by all devices and the user should check
that the right protocol is supported when they chose a device.
• Administration functions: The ToE includes administration functions in order to configure,
or program the other functionalities of the ToE. Several administration interfaces are
possible:
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– thick-clients (sometimes also called, depending on the context, administration console,
programming workstation. . . );
– web-clients;
– removable devices (USB drives, SD memory cards, etc.).
• Local logging: The ToE supports the configuration of a local logging policy. It is possible,
in particular, to log security and administration events.
• Remote logging: The ToE supports the definition of a remote logging policy. In particular,
it is possible to log security and administration events.
1.3 Product usage
In accordance with the recommendations of ANSSI guide1, the industrial firewall can be used to
segregate networks of different criticalities (Class 1 and class 2). It can also be used to protect
an Industrial Control System (ICS) from a management information system. Finally, it can be
used for segregating different parts of an ICS. When the avaibility is critical, two firewalls can be
used in redudancy in order to increase the resiliency of the interconnection. The use of a firewall
is depicted on figure 1.
Protected
industrial network
Redundant
ﬁrewall
Untrusted
network
Figure 1: Use case of an industrial firewall
1.4 Users
The users that may interact with the ToE are the following:
• Administrator: user having the permission to modify the configuration of the ToE.
• Auditor: User having the permission to consult logs of the ToE.
• Super-administrator: User having all the privileges on the ToE. He can, in particular,
create, modify or delete user accounts.
• End-device: End device directly or indirectly connected to the ToE.
Remark: A user is not necessary a human being, it may be a device or a third-party software.
Moreover, the same person may own several user accounts corresponding to different profiles.
1.5 Assumptions
Assumptions on the environment and the use case of the ToE are the following:
• Logs checking: We assume that administrators check regularly the local and remote logs
produced by the ToE.
• Administrators: ToE administrators are competent, trained and trustworthy.
1The cybersecurity of ICSs: Classification method and main measures, ANSSI, january 2014
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• Super-administrators: Super-administrators are trained for performing the tasks they are
responsible for. They follow instructions and administration manuals of the ToE and they
are not hostile.
• Premises: The ToE is located in secure premises with a restricted access limited to
trustworthy people. In particular, the attacker does not have access to the physical ports of
the ToE.
Since identical products to the ToE may be purchased freely, the attacker may purchase
one in order to research vulnerabilities by any possible mean.
• Filtering policy: We assume that the filtering policy configured in the ToE is adapted to
the use case.
• Dimensioning: We assume the ToE is properly dimensionned for its tasks.
• Authentication servers: When appropriate, the authentication servers used for authenti-
cating users are assumed uncompromised and properly configured.
• Active logging: We assume that local and remote logging are operational and that local
logs are not corrupted.
• Unevaluated services disabled by default: Services of the ToE which are not covered
by the security target are disabled in the default configuration (also named factory default
configuration).
• Security documentation: The ToE is provided with a complete documentation for a secure
usage. In particular, all secrets are listed in order to allow their customization.
All recommendations included in this documentation are applied prior to the evaluation.
2 Critical assets
2.1 Critical assets of the environment
The critical assets of the environment are the following:
• Flows matrix: Thanks to its filtering, the ToE controls the communication between end
devices according to the defined flow matrix. For instance, for a layer 4 filtering, a rule
contains source and destination addresses, the transport protocol (TCP, UDP. . . ) and,
when necessary, source and destination ports.
• Conformity of protocols: The ToE controls the protocol conformity of the flows identified
in its configuration. In addition, the ToE may restrict the functionnalities of some protocols.
The security requirements for the critical assets are the following:
Asset Availability Confidentiality Integrity Authenticity
Flows matrix X X
Conformity of
protocols
X X
X: mandatory (X): optional
2.2 ToE critical assets
The critical assets of the ToE are the following:
• Firmware: In order to work properly, the firmware must be protected both in integrity and
authenticity.
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• Configuration: The configuration of the ToE must be protected in confidentiality and
integrity. The attacker must not be able to discover the configuration of the ToE by other
means than the ToE activity.
• User authentication mechanism: This mechanism can be based on a local database or
on a remote authentication server. In both cases, the ToE must ensure the integrity and
authenticity of the mechanism2.
• User secrets: The user secrets can be passwords, certificates. . . They can be stored in
the ToE or stored in a remote authentication server. In all cases, the ToE must ensure the
integrity and confidentiality of these credentials.
• Access control policy: The policy can be stored locally or remotely on a authentication
server. In both cases, the ToE must ensure the integrity of the access control policy.
The security requirements for the critical assets are the following:
Asset Availability Confidentiality Integrity Authenticity
Firmware X X
Configuration X X
User authentication
mechanism
X X
User secrets X X
Access control
policy
X
X: mandatory (X): optional
3 Threat Model
3.1 Attackers
The following attackers are considered:
• Evil end-device: A device connected to the ToE is controlled by the attacker.
• Evil administration device: A device plugged on the administration network is controlled
by the attacker but the attacker may not have valid credentials on the ToE.
3.2 Threats
The following threats are considered:
• Denial of service: The attacker manages to generate a denial of service on the ToE by
performing an unexpected action or by exploiting a vulnerability (sending a malformed
request, using a corrupted configuration file. . . ). This denial of service can affect the whole
ToE or only some of its functions.
• Filtering policy violation: The attacker manages to violate the filtering policy of the ToE
by performing an illegitimate data transfer or by blocking a legitimate flow.
• Protocol conformity violation: The attacker manages to make non-compliant protocols to
transit through the ToE. The attacker manages to bypass the configured protocol limitations.
• Firmware alteration: The attacker manages to inject and run a corrupted firmware on
the ToE. The code injection may be temporary or permanent and this does include any
unexpected or unauthorized code execution.
2All authentication mechanisms offered by the ToE may not necessarily be part of the security target. However, those
which are not included in the security target must be disabled by default.
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A user may attempt to install that update on the ToE by legitimate means.
Finally, the attacker manages to modify the version of the firmware installed on the ToE
without having the privilege to do so.
• Configuation alteration: The attacker manages to modify, temporary or permanently, the
ToE configuration.
• Configuration compromise: The attacker manages to illegally obtain some parts of the
ToE configuration.
• Credentials theft: The attacker manages to steal user credentials.
• Authentication violation: The attacker succeeds in authenticating himself without creden-
tials.
• Access control violation: The attacker manages to obtain permissions that he does not
normally have.
4 Security objectives
The following security objectives are considered:
• Malformed input management: The ToE has been developped in order to handle correctly
malformed input, in particular malformed network traffic.
• Filtering policy enforcement: The ToE supports filtering between networks allowing to
enforce the security policy of the IT system. Two types of filtering can be distinguished:
Stateless filtering: Filtering decision depends on the packet content only. It can be
performed at level 2 (Ethernet) or level 3 (IP), level 4 (TCP or UDP) and for some
applicative protocols. This security function is available with the ToE redundant or not.
Stateful firewall: After a stateless filtering action, the device can established a context
depending on the flow and the associated protocol. This makes filtering more accurate.
Stateful filtering can be only performed on flows above IP level and can take the
transport protocol (TCP/UDP) into account. In some cases, it can also take applicative
protocol into consideration. This security function is available with the ToE redundant
or not.
• Protocol conformity analysis: The ToE checks the conformity of certain protocols ex-
changes. This analysis is perfomed at the transport layer (TCP, UDP. . . ) and the application
layer (HTTP, SMTP, FTP, Profinet, Modbus, EtherNet/IP. . . ). The final user should check
that the appropriate protocols are supported by the ToE and covered by the security target.
• Secure connection with the authentication server: The ToE supports secure connec-
tion with the authentication server. The secure connection allows authenticating both peers
and protecting the integrity and the authenticity of exchanges. It guarantees also non replay
of exchanges.
• Secure storage of secrets: User secrets are securely stored in the ToE. In particular, the
compromise of a file is not sufficient for retrieving them.
• Secure authentication on administration interface: Session tokens are protected against
hijack and replay. They have a short lifespan. The identity and the permissions of the user
account are systematically checked before any privileged action.
• Access control policy: The access control policy is strictly applied. In particular, the
implementation guarantees the authenticity of privileged operations, i.e. operations that
can alter identified critical assets.
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• Firmware signature: At each update of the firmware, integrity and authenticity of the new
firmware are checked before updating.
• Configuration confidentiality and integrity: The access control prevents any unautho-
rized person to read or modify the configuration of the ToE.
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Denial of service Av I Av I
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Protocol conformity violation I
Firmware alteration I Au
Configuation alteration I
Configuration compromise C C
Credentials theft C I C
Authentication violation I Au
Access control violation I
Av: Availability, I: Integrity, C: Confidentiality, Au: Authenticity
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Malformed input management X
Filtering policy enforcement X
Protocol conformity analysis X
Secure connection with the
authentication server
X
Secure storage of secrets X
Secure authentication on ad-
ministration interface
X X X X
Access control policy X
Firmware signature X
Configuration confidentiality
and integrity
X X
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TERMINOLOGY AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ANSSI Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information 
Filter policy Set of technical rules describing which entities are entitled to set up 
information flows with which entities. 
Trusted network A network is considered trusted if, due to the fact that it is under the 
control of the TOE operator, the internal security policy does not imply 
that there is a need to be protected from information flows originating 
from it, but on the contrary, implies that there is a need to protect 
information flows going to it. 
Uncontrolled network 
 
A network is considered uncontrolled if it is not under the control of the 
TOE operator, meaning that users need to be protected from 
information flows set up with devices from this network (the internet, for 
example).. 
TOE Target of Evaluation 
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 
[PP_IPF] Protection profile of an industrial firewall 
Version 1.0 short-term - GTCSI 
July 13, 2015 
[ANSSI_GUIDE] La cybersécurité des systèmes industriels 
Méthode de classification et mesures principales, 
ANSSI, janvier 2013 
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1 PRODUCT DESCRIPTION 
Editor Stormshield 
Editor’s website www.stormshield.com 
Product name Stormshield Network Security 
Evaluated version Model SNi40 – Software suite version 3.3.1 
Product category Industrial Firewall 
Table 1: Product Identification 
1.1 General description 
Stormshield Network Security UTM / NG-Firewalls is a range of appliances that provide security 
features allowing the interconnection between one or several trusted networks and an uncontrolled 
network, without compromising the level of security of any of the trusted networks.  
It can be split into two groups of features:  
- The firewall feature: filtering, attack detection, bandwidth management, security policy 
management, audit, accountability and strong authentication of administrators,  
- The VPN (Virtual Private Network: encryption and authentication) feature implementing 
[ESP] in IPSec tunnel mode and securing the transmission of confidential data between 
remote sites, partners or mobile salespersons.  
ASQ (Active Security Qualification) is a real-time intrusion prevention technology embedded in all 
Stormshield appliances of the Stormshield Network Security range. Based on a multi-layer 
analysis, ASQ detects and prevents the most sophisticated attacks without affecting the network 
performance and considerably lowers the number of false positives. This technology is backed up 
by alarm features which can be fully customized. 
The ToE submitted to evaluation is an industrial firewall. It is designed for running in hostile 
environments where classical firewalls could not run properly due to heat, humidity or dust, for 
instance.  
From a functional perspective, this firewall allows to interconnect an industrial network that has to 
be protected with another network with at least one of the following characteristics:  
- a lesser control or a lesser level of trust; 
- specific applications which do not interact with the industrial network; 
- another industrial network with different functionalities; 
- another domain of responsibility.  
Depending on the architecture, This firewall can act as an IP router, a TCP proxy or anEthernet 
bridge (stealth mode) for non-IP protocols.  
This firewall can act as an Ethernet bridge or an IP router for IP protocols.  
The firewall controls and filters the flows and can rewrites protocols from the layer 3 2 up to the 
applicative layer depending on supported and inspected protocols.  
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The Evaluation will only consider the following features:  
- dynamic filtering of IP flow, at layer 3 and 4;  
- analysis and inspection of major industrial protocols : Modbus, S7 and IEC 104; 
- local authentication and management of the appliance administrators;  
- The logging component.  
The specific evaluated configuration is provided in section 1.7. 
1.2 Features 
Network filtering 
The ToE supports dynamic filtering at layers 3 and 4 (stateful firewall). It also supports 
filtering at the layer 2 when the ToE is in stealth mode.  
Protocol analysis 
The ToE checks that input packets are conform to the protocol specifications.  
The TOE can check in particular: Modbus, S7 and IEC 104.  
 
Administration functions 
The Stormshield Web Manager administration tool allows, via an intuitive and user-friendly 
graphical interface, the installation and the configuration of the Stormshield appliances, an 
provides simplified monitoring and reporting functionalities.  
In order to have strong administrator authentication, the Stormshield appliance manages a 
user database and provides authentication services against it.  
Local logging:  
The ToE supports the configuration of a local logging policy. It is possible, in particular, to log 
security and administration events.  
Remote logging 
The ToE supports the definition of a remote logging policy. In particular, it is possible to log 
security and administration events. Events are sent in SYSLOG (UDP/TCP/TLS) or via 
SNMP traps. 
1.3 Product usage 
In accordance with the recommendations of [ANSSI_GUIDE], the industrial firewall can be used to 
segregate networks of different criticalities (Class 1 and class 2). It can also be used to protect an 
Industrial Control System (ICS) from a management information system. Finally, it can be used for 
segregating different parts of an ICS. When the availability is critical, two firewalls can be used in 
redundancy in order to increase the resiliency of the interconnection.  
The use of a firewall is depicted on Figure 1. 
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Trusted Network
Industrial facilities, 
Workstations and Servers to protect
Stormshield 
UTa / NG-Firewall
SNi40
Uncontrolled Network
 
Figure 1: Example of use of the TOE 
1.4 Users 
The users that may interact with the ToE are the following: 
Administrator:  User having the permission to modify the configuration of the ToE.  
He can’t modify other administrator accounts. 
Auditor:  User having the permission to consult logs of the ToE. 
Super-administrator: User having all the privileges on the ToE. He can, in particular, create, 
modify or delete user administrator accounts. 
End-device: End device directly or indirectly connected to the ToE. 
Remark: A user is not necessary a human being, it may be a device or a third-party software.  
Moreover, the same person may own several user accounts corresponding to different profiles. 
1.5 Assumptions 
Logs checking 
We assume that administrators check regularly the local and remote logs produced by 
the ToE.  
Administrators 
ToE administrators are competent, trained and trustworthy.  
Super-administrators 
Super-administrators are trained for performing the tasks they are responsible for. They 
follow instructions and administration manuals of the ToE and they are not hostile.  
Premises 
The ToE is located in secure premises with a restricted access limited to trustworthy people. 
In particular, the attacker does not have access to the physical ports of the ToE. Since 
identical products to the ToE may be purchased freely, the attacker may purchase one in 
order to research vulnerabilities by any possible mean.  
Filtering policy 
We assume that the filtering policy configured in the ToE is adapted to the use case.  
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Dimensioning 
We assume the ToE is properly dimensioned for its tasks.  
Authentication servers 
When appropriate, the authentication servers used for authenticating users are assumed 
uncompromised and properly configured.  
Active logging 
We assume that local and remote logging are operational and that local logs are not 
corrupted.  
Unevaluated services disabled by default 
Services of the ToE which are not covered by the security target are disabled in the default 
configuration (also named factory default configuration). 
Most of the available features but out of this security target are disabled in the default 
configuration (also called factory settings). Some, out of the target, needs to be disabled:  
- The IPv4 DHCP server 
- The IPS inspection for out of scope protocols.  
The specific list of not evaluated features is provided in section 2.8.  
Security documentation 
The ToE is provided with a complete documentation for a secure usage. In particular, all 
secrets are listed in order to allow their customization. In particular, the documentation 
highlights to change administrator’s default password.  
All recommendations included in this documentation are applied prior to the evaluation.  
1.6 Evaluated platform 
The evaluated platform includes:  
- A Stormshield SNi40 Firewall. 
- A Windows 7 administration console. 
The selected internet browser is Microsoft Internet Explorer Version 9.  
1.7 Product configuration and use case under evaluation 
The usage mode subject to evaluation has the following characteristics:  
- The local console is not used in production. Only the super-administrator can log on to it, 
and hypothetically, such interventions are performed only when a decision has been made 
to make an exception to the operating context – to conduct a maintenance operation or a 
re-installation.  
- Workstations on which the Stormshield Web Manager will be launched are secured, 
dedicated to such use, and up to date on all patches concerning the respective operating 
systems and the applications installed on them.  
- All administrators are subject to an identification/authentication stage provided by the TOE 
and which may use: login/password authentication in a TLS channel or mutual 
authentication by X.509 certificate in a TLS channel.  
- Certificates and CRLs are distributed manually (importing).  
- The VPN functions of Stormshield appliance are not part of the evaluation 
- When log events are sent via syslog, the server that receives them is not part of the 
evaluation.  
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- When alarms are sent via SNMP, only version v3 is enabled.  
- The usage mode subject to evaluation excludes the fact that the TOE relies on services 
other than PKI, DNS and DHCP servers and proxies. The optional modules provided by 
Stormshield to manage these services are disabled by default and have to stay that way. 
Specifically, these are:  
- modules that allow handling external servers (e.g.: Kerberos, RADIUS, etc),  
- the dynamic routing module,  
- the static multicast routing module,  
- the internal public key infrastructure (PKI),  
- the SSL VPN module (Portal and Tunnel),  
- DNS cache,  
- antivirus engine (ClamAV or Kaspersky),  
- Active Update module,  
- SSH, DHCP, MPD and SNMPD servers,  
- the DHCP client and NTP daemon,  
- the DHCP relay,  
- WIFI connection for equipped devices,  
- The Geo-localization and IP/Host reputation 
- the bypass functionality 
- Any custom IPS patterns 
- FQDN objects (require external DNS services)  
- IPFIX messages 
- The IPV4 DHCP Server shall be stopped after the appliance initialization.  
- Despite being available, the IPv6 routing feature is disabled by default and shall stay 
disabled during the evaluation.  
- Administrators’ credentials are managed through an LDAP database within the Stormshield 
UTM / NG-Firewall firmware and which is part of the TOE. The LDAP access from outside 
the appliance itself is not included in the evaluation.  
- Logs shall be either stored locally or sent to a SYSLOG server.  
- ASQ technology implements contextual analyses at the application level, with the purpose 
of verifying compliance with the RFCs and countering attacks at the application level. 
Application analysis functions that are the focus of the evaluation are those associated with  
- At transport layer: TCP, UDP 
- At application layer:  
• IT protocols: FTP, HTTP, SMTP, DNS, 
• Industrial protocols: Modbus, S7, 104. 
The not evaluated protocols are blocked and kept this way.  
- The ability provided by the filter policy to associate each filter rule with an application 
inspection (HTTP, SMTP, POP3 and FTP proxies) and as is the scheduling feature falls 
outside of the scope of this evaluation and must not be used.  
- The ability provided by the filter policy to associate the “decrypt” action (SSL proxy) with a 
filter rule falls outside the scope of this evaluation and must not be used.  
- The following features may be used, but are not considered as security functions:  
- Address translation (network address translation or NAT);  
- the vulnerability management module;  
- the high availability module;  
- the feature for viewing embedded reports;  
- The cryptographic algorithms implemented are those in the default configuration:  
- Authentication/Integrity: 256-bit SHA-2 
- Key negotiation: Diffie-Hellman group 14 
- Encryption: 256-bit AES in CBC mode 
- PFS (Perfect Forward Secrecy): activated 
Version 2.1 - © STORMSHIELD - 01/12/2017 Reference: SN_ASE_target_CSPN Page 9/15 
 
 CSPN Security Target  
Critical assets 
 
2 CRITICAL ASSETS 
2.1 Critical assets for the environment 
Flows matrix 
Thanks to its filtering, the ToE controls the communication between end devices according to 
the defined flow matrix. For instance, for a layer 4 filtering, a rule contains source and 
destination addresses, the transport protocol (TCP, UDP) and, when necessary, source and 
destination ports. 
Conformity of protocols 
The ToE controls the protocol conformity of the flows identified in its configuration. In 
addition, the ToE may restrict the functionalities of some protocols.  
The security requirements for the critical assets are the following: 
Asset Availability Confidentiality Integrity Authenticity 
Flows matrix ●  ●  
Conformity of 
protocols ●  ●  
Table 2: Security requirements for environment critical assets 
2.2 ToE critical assets 
The critical assets of the ToE are the following:  
Firmware 
In order to work properly, the firmware must be protected both in integrity and authenticity.  
Configuration 
The configuration of the ToE must be protected in confidentiality and integrity. The attacker 
must not be able to discover the configuration of the ToE by other means than the ToE 
activity.  
User authentication mechanism 
This mechanism is based on a local database.  
This mechanism can be based on a local database or on a remote authentication server. In 
both cases, The ToE must ensure the integrity and authenticity of the mechanism.  
User secrets 
The user secrets can be passwords, certificates. . . They can be stored in the ToE or stored 
in a remote authentication server. In all cases, The ToE must ensure the integrity and 
confidentiality of these the appliance administrators’ credentials.  
Access control policy 
The policy can be stored locally or remotely on an authentication server. In both cases, the 
ToE must ensure the integrity of the access control policy.  
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The security requirements for the critical assets are the following:  
Asset Availability Confidentiality Integrity Authenticity 
Firmware   ● ● 
Configuration  ● ●  
User authentication 
Mechanism   ● ● 
User secrets  ● ●  
Access control policy   ●  
Table 3: Security requirements for TOE critical assets 
 
3 THREAT MODEL 
3.1 Attackers 
The following attackers are considered:  
Evil end-device 
A device connected to the ToE is controlled by the attacker.  
Evil administration device 
A device plugged on the administration network is controlled by the attacker but the attacker 
may not have valid credentials on the ToE.  
3.2 Threats 
The following threats are considered:  
Denial of service 
The attacker manages to generate a denial of service on the ToE by performing an 
unexpected action or by exploiting a vulnerability (sending a malformed request, using a 
corrupted configuration file. . . ). This denial of service can affect the whole ToE or only some 
of its functions.  
Filtering policy violation 
The attacker manages to violate the filtering policy of the ToE by performing an illegitimate 
data transfer or by blocking a legitimate flow.  
Protocol conformity violation 
The attacker manages to make non-compliant protocols to transit through the ToE. The 
attacker manages to bypass the configured protocol limitations.  
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Firmware alteration 
The attacker manages to inject and run a corrupted firmware on the ToE. The code injection 
may be temporary or permanent and this does include any unexpected or unauthorized code 
execution. A user may attempt to install that update on the ToE by legitimate means. Finally, 
the attacker manages to modify the version of the firmware installed on the ToE without 
having the privilege to do so.  
Configuration alteration 
The attacker manages to modify, temporary or permanently, the ToE configuration.  
Configuration compromise 
The attacker manages to illegally obtain some parts of the ToE configuration.  
Credentials theft 
The attacker manages to steal user credentials.  
Authentication violation 
The attacker succeeds in authenticating himself without credentials.  
Access control violation 
The attacker manages to obtain permissions that he does not normally have.  
4 Security Functions 
The following security objectives are considered: 
Malformed input management 
The ToE has been developed in order to handle correctly malformed input, in particular 
malformed network traffic. 
At the Ethernet or IP level, upon receiving a malformed packet, an alarm will be raised. 
Depending on the trapped issue and the configuration of the alarm, the packet can be 
dropped or accepted 
Example: A zero-size fragment or a Checksum error that could allow a DoS attack will be 
detected. 
Filtering policy enforcement 
The ToE supports filtering between networks allowing to set the security policy of the 
targeted IT system. 
The TOE can do stateful filtering: after a stateless filtering action performed according the 
content of the paquet, the device can established a context depending on the flow and the 
associated protocol. This makes filtering more accurate.  
Such feature allows the TOE to detect a response replay (i.e. receiving two responses for 
one single request). Another use case is being able to properly handle child connection (i.e. 
a connection created with information given by another connection), thus preventing the 
administrator to have to add rules for every single unknown future connection with a low 
level of restrictions. 
Stateful filtering can be only performed on flows above IP level and can take into account the 
transport protocol (TCP/UDP) and applicative protocols (FTP, HTTP, SMTP, DNS, Modbus, 
S7, UMAS).  
For example, the TOE gives the possibility to allow or prevent the use of « function codes » 
for Modbus, UMAS and S7. This offers: 
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o The possibility to forbid every modification commands (writes) sent to the protected 
device 
o The possibility to forbid every maintenance commands (stop, updates) sent to the 
protected device. 
This security function is available with the ToE redundant or not.  
Protocol conformity analysis 
The ToE checks the conformity of certain protocols exchanges. This analysis is perfomed: 
o at the transport layer: TCP, UDP; 
o and the application layer: HTTP, SMTP, FTP, DNS, Modbus, EtherNet/IP, S7, IEC 104. 
This analysis is usually called stateless analysis, its goal is to check that every field of the 
packet is correct accordingly of its description in the specification and against the rest of the 
packet. For example the announce length against the effective length, or that the announce 
length is within the specified values. 
As an attack example reading outside the allowed registers values that could lead to a crash 
of the device and therefore a DoS. 
Secure storage of secrets 
User secrets (Administrator’s credential) are securely stored in the ToE. In particular, the 
compromise of a file doesn’t allow their retrieval.  
Secure authentication on administration interface 
Session tokens are protected against hijack and replay. They have a short lifespan. The 
identity and the permissions of the user account are systematically checked before any 
privileged action. 
Any log in event is logged. 
Access control policy 
The access control policy is strictly applied.  
In particular, the implementation guarantees the authenticity of privileged operations, i.e. 
operations that can alter identified critical assets. 
For each and every administration action, the TOE controls that the user is allowed to 
perform it, according to five pre-defined roles: System, Network, User management, Filtering 
policy and monitoring. 
Every administration action is logged. 
Firmware signature 
Firmware is digitally signed by accredited people within Stormshield. The signature 
certificate is factory installed. 
For each update of the firmware, integrity and authenticity of the new firmware are checked 
before updating. 
Installation is done by an administrator with the “system” role. 
Every firmware update request action is logged. 
Configuration confidentiality and integrity 
Each administrator can have: no access, read only or full access permission on each of the 
five roles mentioned above.  
Therefore, the access control prevents any unauthorized person to read or modify the TOE’s 
configuration. 
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Denial of service  Av I Av I      
Filtering policy violation  I       
Protocol conformity violation   I      
Firmware alteration    I Au     
Configuration alteration     I    
Configuration compromise     C    
Credentials theft       C I  
Authentication violation     I Au   
Access control violation       I 
Av: Availability, I: Integrity, C: Confidentiality, Au: Authenticity 
Table 4: Critical assets vs threats 
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Malformed input 
management ●         
Filtering policy 
enforcement  ●        
Protocol conformity 
analysis   ●       
Secure connection with the 
authentication server        ●  
Secure storage of secrets       ●   
Secure authentication on 
administration interface     ● ● ● ●  
Access control policy         ● 
Firmware signature    ●      
Configuration 
confidentiality and integrity     ● ●    
Table 5: Threats vs security objectives 
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ANNEX II – POLISH National Exercise Team 
The Polish NET annex includes the following documents: 
• Report on the results of experiments carried out by the Polish National Exercise Team (NET-PL) during 
phase 3 of ICCF. 
• Appendix 1 of the final report by NET-PL: protection profile of a remote terminal unit (RTU), Version 
1.0, Mikronika (NET-PL). 
• Appendix 2 to the final report by NET-PL: protection profile of fire detection and fire alarm systems 
(FDAS) — Control and indication equipment (CIE) in distributed architecture, Version 1.0, Polon-Alfa 
(NET-PL). 
• Appendix 3 to the final report by NET-PL: protection profile of a remote terminal unit (RTU), Version 
2.1, NET-PL: Mikronika, GUT. 
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1 The European IACS components Cybersecurity Certification Framework (ICCF) proposed by ERNCIP (European 
Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection) Project  
About this document 
This document presents the results of experiments carried out during Phase 3 of ICCF by the Polish 
National Exercise Team of Poland (NET-PL). 
I. Way of work 
 
II.1 Composition of NET-PL 
The following viewpoints were represented in NET-PL during the experiments:  
- governmental agency,  
- certification body,  
- component producer,  
- compliance testing,  
- insurance,  
- system integrator,  
- industrial user. 
 
II.2 The process 
The process of carrying the experiments consisted of the following steps. 
• Step 1. Constitution of NET-PL 
– During this step NET-PL has been constituted and an initial (virtual) meeting was 
carried out to discuss the objectives and the way forward, and to agree on the 
infrastructure supporting the further work 
– Duration: end of June- beginning of July 2017 
• Step 2. Implementing the supporting infrastructure and working on Protection Profiles 
– During this step the following actions were undertaken 
§ Implementation of the NET-PL Knowledge Base – this has been implemented 
in the NOR-STA system and made accessible to each NET-PL participant 
• The Knowledge Base contains all ICCF relevant documents, meetings 
minutes, relevant standards (IEC 62443 series), and NET-PL work 
products 
§ Development of three Protection Profiles for two component classes offered 
by Mikronika and Polon-Alfa 
• Two Protection Profiles for class RTU (Remote Terminal Unit)  
• One protection Profile for class CIE (Control and Indication 
Equipment)  
– Duration: July-October 2017 
• Step 3: Experiments 
– During this step, a Questionnaire for collecting data related to the ICCF experiments, 
E1, E2, E3 and E4 has been designed and distributed to the NET-PL participants. 
– While filling the Questionnaire, the NET-PL participants were asked to observe the 
following rules: 
§ Responding from the perspective represented by own institution 
§ Not feeling obliged to give responses to all questions – responding to only 
these questions were one feels competent 
§ Remembering that this is not an official statement by the own institution 
(expressing more the personal opinion that the official position of the 
institution) 
– The received responses were processed and then sent back to all participants for 
their approval 
The approved answers were included to the NET-PL report submitted to ICCF 
• Step 4: Additional exercise 
– During this step, the conformance argumentation template has been derived from 
the Protection Profile for RTU version 2.1 (See the Appendix 3) 
– The template is represented in the NOR-STA tool supporting development, 
maintenance and assessment of evidence based arguments 
 
II. The results 
The results achieved by NET-PL encompass: 
1. Three Protection Profiles related to two classes of IACS components:  RTU and CIE (for RTU: 
Version 1.0 and Version 2.1, the latter following recommendations of IEC 62443-4-2) 
2. The data collected by means of the Questionnaire covering the scope of experiments E1, E2, 
E3 and E4. 
3. The conformance argumentation template for a selected Protection Profile (PP for RTU 
version 2.1) 
a. The template can be accessed at https://tct.nor-sta.eu/ with the credentials 
i. login: iccf 
ii. password: q7T4miS23e 
 
III. The Questionnaire 
The following text summarizes the opinions of NET-PL participants collected by means of the 
Questionnaire. The Questionnaire has been structured in accordance with the experiments E1, E2, E3 
and E4 foreseen for Phase 3 of ICCF. The opinions of NET-PL are expressed by text given in Italic.  
E1: PP/SP development 
1. Management of component families 
a) Parties involved and their roles  
Selection of component families should be under supervision of the National Cybersecurity 
Authority – NCA (such body is not yet formally existing in Poland). NCA should cooperate with 
the Critical Infrastructure operators and possibly component producers and system integrators 
to collect requests related to new component families and to collect and process the feedback 
related to the existing ones. The approved specification of component families should be 
accessible to the CI operators, system integrators and component producers. 
Distinguishing and agreeing on the functional classes of components and the related 
Protection Profiles should be a process involving different stakeholders and a consensus 
building procedure. It is important to involve all relevant stakeholders in the process of 
identifying component families and defining and approving their Protection Profiles. Agreeing 
on Protection Profiles at the European level is even a bigger challenge and requires 
information exchange, coordination and support from the Member States governments. 
Another concern is that different components, sharing the same functional profile (in terms of 
their purpose and functionality) may be used in different target environments which expose 
the components to different risks. This differentiation of risk profiles could (and should) be 
reflected by having different Protection Profiles for the same functional class of components. 
The notion of “security levels” could be relevant here 
Information on component classes and the related Protection Profiles should be maintained in 
the public domain. However, the information on the components and their Protection Profiles 
selected for a given Critical Infrastructure should be kept confidential and disclosed on the 
need-to-know basis.  
In particular the following parties should be involved in the process:    
– Operators of Critical Infrastructures, System integrators, component producers 
o Defining the needs and selecting component classes 
– IACS component producers 
o Initiating the process of conformance assessment and certification 
– Insurance 
o Communicating on which conditions the insurance would be keen to take over 
the associated risks 
– Governmental and possibly EU level agencies  
o Organizational provisions, legal regulations, accreditation 
General guidance on how to select component classes and to develop the related Protection 
Profiles should be accompanied with additional help (more detailed guidance, best practices 
to follow etc.) 
 
b) Criteria for distinguishing component families  
The following criteria should be considered: 
- Do we really need to distinguish yet another family of components? (what is the 
difference with respect to the already existing component families) 
- What is the scope of cybersecurity risks to be addressed? (associated risk profiles 
related to potential target environments) 
- Is there a sufficient demand for such new family of components? (e.g. the number of 
potentially interested users and suppliers) 
 
2. Protection Profile development effort estimation 
a) effort related to PPs developed by NET-PL  
- Protection Profile for RTU version 1 (Mikronika) – 2 Man-Days (retrospection on a ready 
component) 
- Protection Profile for RTU version 2 (GUT/Mikronika) – 2 Man-Weeks (reorientation of the 
RTU version 1 Protection Profile towards the requirements of IEC 62443-4-2) 
- Protection Profile for CIE (Polon-Alfa) – 1-2 Man-Month (in situation where a 
representative of the class is almost implemented but the related protection profile not yet 
existed) 
b) factors having impact on the effort  
It seems that there is a big difference between the situation where Protection Profile is defined 
retrospectively, from an already existing component (for which risk analysis and other security 
oriented issues have already been covered) and a newly created component//family of 
components where risk analyses, countermeasure selection etc. have to be covered starting 
from scratch. In the latter case the effort to create a Protection Profile would be significantly 
bigger. 
Building Protection Profiles for classes of components that are foreseen for the target 
environments with high cybersecurity risk profiles will need more effort and higher 
competencies. 
Another factor influencing the effort is the skills and competencies of the involved personnel, 
availability of an inventory of good practices, higher management support for this objective 
and others. 
A knowledge base covering the issues relevant to Protection Profile creation and adequate 
tool support could help to reduce the effort and to maintain high and even level of quality. 
3. PP development, maintenance and distribution process 
a) Roles related to PP development  
Protection Profiles should result from a teamwork involving different perspectives at IACS 
components  (regulators, users of components, producers of components, accreditation, 
auditors and certifiers). A common standard of representing Protection Profiles supplemented 
by a guidelines, best practices examples etc. would be very helpful. Tool support could be 
considered too.  
Recommendations of ISO 15408 could provide an initial input. 
b) Storage and maintenance of PPs 
- Rules of PP distribution  
Storing and distribution of Protection Profiles should be governed by agreements between 
interested parties. Technically, Protection Profiles should be accessible through Internet 
following a defined and published access policy respecting the IP rights.  
It is also important that the producers, users and other interested parties adequately 
represent the cyber-security viewpoint in their organizational structure, commit sufficient 
resources and provide continuous management support. 
To provide sufficient supply of competencies, some changes in education, including the 
university curricula can be necessary.  
- Main characteristics for change management process  
Changing a Protection Profile should be a formalized process 
The changes should be endorsed by all relevant stakeholders contributing to the Protection 
Profile 
Users of the Protection Profile should be able to demonstrate that their change 
management processes are able to follow the changes on the Protection Profile side (this 
could be an aspect verified during certification)  
 
4. SP development, maintenance and distribution process 
a) Development, storage and maintenance of Security Profiles   
Security Profiles should reflect more specific requirements which are elated to specific means 
used to implement the (higher level) requirements of the related Protection Profile. In this 
sense Security Profile can be considered as a specialization of the Protection Profile towards a 
more fine groups of components (a single component) belonging to the family of components 
the Protection Profile refers to. 
Storage of Security Profiles should be solved mostly between the producers and users. A user 
selects a specific Protection Profile of interest and (possibly in cooperation with potential 
suppliers/producers) specifies it further towards a complete Security Profile.  
b) SP development effort estimation, main effort factors  
NET-PL does not have practical experience in this respect. 
5. Business model for PP/SP management 
Government – better control over cyber security of critical infrastructures 
Component producers – improvement of market position (meeting the demands for cybersecurity 
certificates by their clients) 
Operators of Critical Infrastructures – possibility to demonstrate that secure (certified) 
components are in use (which can be used to strengthen the argument about infrastructure 
security), self-assurance that security of a given critical infrastructure is being addressed meeting 
the requirements imposed by regulators  
Insurance – mapping certificates on the risk levels would help to activate the market for 
‘cybersecurity insurance certificates’ where higher-level certificates would imply lower insurance 
costs. 
The costs of introducing Protection Profiles/Security Profiles and the related certification schemes 
will be paid mostly by the end users of the components. Depending on the regulatory context this 
may slow down the process of adopting the framework of certification.  
 
E2: Compliance assessment 
 
1. The compliance assessment process model  
a) Main actors involved in compliance assessment  
Component producer – responsible for collecting and submitting the evidence demonstrating 
that the component meets the requirements of the related Security Profile 
The Security Profile together with the evidence should be submitted to the Certifying 
Institution for assessment. The Certifying Institution can arrange for audit visits at the 
component producer’s site to collect the evidence from the production site. The Certifying 
Institution can involve external specialized laboratories ( for instance, testing labs) in the 
assessment process, if necessary.  
The process of achieving conformity (with the requirements of Security Profile) and 
demonstrating conformity should be well understood on both sides (producers and certifiers) 
to avoid misinterpretations of the requirements and misunderstandings related to what 
constitutes a sufficient evidence do demonstrate conformity. 
Responsibility to make sure that the certification processes comply with the expected 
standards is delegated to the Accreditation Body. 
b) Main steps of compliance assessment  
Certifying Institution perspective: 
1. Analysis of the Security Profile and the evidence submitted by the client 
2. Assessment if the submitted evidence gives sufficient support for the Security Profile 
requirements 
3. Possible contact with the client (component producer) if collecting the evidence onsite 
is needed 
4. Issuing the final assessment 
5. Possibly granting a certificate 
6. Monitoring conformity (if repeated assessments are needed to maintain the 
certificate validity) 
Component producer perspective: 
1) Self-assessment of conformity 
2) Applying for a third party assessment and certificate 
3) Cooperating in the assessment process (if onsite visits are necessary) 
4) Receiving the assessment result and possibly a certificate 
Government/Accreditation Body perspective 
1) Issuing the regulations related to certification 
2) Appointing accredited certifying Institutions 
3) Making sure that the certification processes comply with stated quality criteria 
4) Improved monitoring of security maturity of critical infrastructures  
c) Inputs to the process  
For the whole process: 
- The list of accredited certifying institutions 
For an instantiation of the process 
- Identification of the component subjected to certification 
- The criteria to be used during certification (a particular Security Profile) 
- The evidence demonstrating the fulfillment of the requirements of the Security Profile (for 
instance, the design documentation, test results, results of product analyses etc.) 
- Onsite access for the auditors (if requested) 
 
d) Outputs from the process 
Self-declaration (C1) or third party certificate (C2) confirming that the component meets the 
requirements of SP.  
It is desirable that the result of the process gives in addition more detailed information on the 
results of assessing the particular requirements of SP. 
If relevant, the client (component producer) should be also informed about the period of 
validity of the certificate and the requirements to be met if this period is to be extended 
e) Assessment process standardization  
It is highly recommended that there is a common model of the assessment and certification 
process that is communicated to and agreed upon by all interested parties. 
The initiative should be from the government side with early involvement of all relevant 
stakeholders. 
Such standard should be supported by a clear business model for each participant.  
Adequate tools support is necessary to implement certification as a continuous process 
following rapid and often unexpected changes (which is characteristic for the cyber-security 
domain) 
2. Change management  
Requirements on how to manage changes in components with respect to the granted 
certificates should be a part of related regulations (of some help here could be ISO 9000 
standards).   
Certification requirements should have in their scope the assessment of change management 
process at component producer. 
In case of component change, the producer should be obliged to notify the users and the 
Certifying Institution issuing the certificate. 
The decision if and when the introduced change implies the need for re-certification should be 
left to the Certifying Institution. 
3. Business model for compliance assessment 
Accredited Certifying Institutions could offer third party certification services on the 
commercial basis 
However, if certification is not requiring full resilience testing, its value for Critical 
Infrastructure operators can be problematic which will also decrease the value of such 
certificate for producers. 
Together with the system for granting certificates there should be an enforcement mechanism 
protecting against unfair certificates (and even introducing penalization of such cases)  
The certificates, if recognized by the insurers, can have influence on the insurance fees. 
E3: Cyber resilience testing 
1. The cyber resilience testing process model  
a) Main actors involved in cyber resilience testing  
Testing could be performed on request of the producer or the user of the component. It could 
also be ordered by a certifying institution (if the scope of certificate to be issued covers 
resilience testing). 
If producer is involved in the testing process, it can submit sufficiently detailed documentation 
of the component together with the results of the routine tests performed in the production 
process.  
The scope of the tests to be performed should be unambiguously reflected in the Security 
Profile against which the tests are to be performed. 
If needed, the user of the component should provide access to the target environment where 
the component is to be installed and used.  
Insurers would be interested in the results of tests to assess the risks of insuring the systems 
containing such components 
b) Main steps of cyber resilience testing process  
1) Formal request to perform the tests  
2) Analysis of the Security Profile to derive the test cases 
3) Preparation of tests 
4) Execution of tests 
5) Analysis and evaluation of test results 
6) Issuing the formal report from testing 
c) Inputs to the process  
1) Security Profile 
2) The component subjected to tests 
3) component documentation 
4) The results of manufacturer’s tests 
5) C1/C2 level certificate if already granted to the component 
d) Outputs from the process  
1) Formal resilience testing report  
e) Testing process standardization  
Should be an extension of compliance assessment process standardization.  
Possible standardization should cover procedural aspects and tool aspects as well. This is an 
important issue to prevent that different testing procedures and testing environments are 
applied across by different laboratories performing tests   
2. Change management  
For planned component changes (e.g. resulting from its roadmap), the full scope of resilience 
tests should be included into the regression testing suite and performed by the producer 
before releasing a new version of the component.  
An alternative is that while introducing a new version, the producer is obliged to notify the 
testing laboratory and the users of the components possibly requesting a renewal of the 
cyber-security resilience certificate. 
It could be also admitted that the producer has the right to introduce some (insignificant) 
changes without being obliged to renew the certificate but the precise specification of the 
scope of such ‘insignificant’ changes can be very hard.  
An issue requiring special attention are changes of threats and vulnerabilities related to a 
component which are then addressed by component changes (for instance, by releasing new 
patches). Such changes are very difficult to predict and the usual practice is that they are 
being handled on the reactive base. Re-certification after each such change is practically 
infeasible. A solution to this problem could be that certification covers not only a component 
but also the processes of security risk identification (new vulnerabilities, new threats) and 
analysis related to such component and implemented by its producer and the management of 
the related changes of the component.  
 
3. Business model for resilience testing 
Such services could be offered by (accredited) testing laboratories on the commercial basis. 
For component producers and users (Critical Infrastructure operators) the cyber-resilience 
testing certificate can have a business value. 
The testing laboratories could offer their services on a commercial base. 
The certificates, if recognized by the insurers, can have influence on the insurance fees. 
 
E4: Development and manufacturing process 
assessment 
1. The development and manufacturing process assessment model  
a. Main actors involved in development and manufacturing process assessment  
The subject of assessment is the component development/manufacturing process of 
the producer. 
The assessment and the certificate is to be issued by the Certifying Institution 
(possibly accredited) 
Insurers can be interested in in setting criteria for such certificates 
Users (Critical Infrastructure operators) can be also interested to have influence on 
the criteria for such certificates. 
b. Main steps of development process assessment  
1) Formal request issued by the producer or the user to perform the 
development/manufacturing process assessment 
2) Analysis of the Security Profile to derive the requirements to be checked 
i. Assessment of security of the component design process 
ii. Assessment of security of the component manufacturing process 
iii. Assessment of security of the component packaging and shipping process 
iv. Assessment of the quality assurance process of the component 
v. Assessment of the configuration management process related to the 
component 
vi. Assessment of the change management process related to the 
component 
vii. Assessment of security of the personnel involved in 
development/manufacturing 
viii. Assessment of the physical security related to 
development/manufacturing 
3) Analysis and evaluation of the results 
4) Issuing the certificate 
5) Maintaining the certificate validity 
c. Inputs to the process  
Documentation of development and manufacturing processes 
Availability of the people involved in the processes for interviews 
Onsite audit results 
d. Outputs from the process  
1)Development/manufacturing process security certificate 
2)Rules related to the validity of the certificate 
e. Standardization of development process security assessment  
Some standards could provide a starting point in this respect, for instance: 
- Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM), https://www.bsimm.com/ 
- ISO/IEC 27034 series Application security 
http://www.iso27001security.com/html/27034.html 
- IEC 62443-4-1 4-1: Secure product development life-cycle requirements 
- Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL), 
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sdl/ 
 
2. Change management  
This seems to be a very difficult (and potentially costly) problem. Assuring and certifying the 
development/production processes can involve significant costs and effort which will inevitably be 
reflected in component prices.  
3. Business model for development process assessment 
The cost of achieving high security maturity of the development/manufacturing processes can be 
high and difficult to afford by producers 
Components with compliance, resilience and process security certificates can be 
recognized by the Critical Infrastructure operators and therefore can give better business 
chances for their producers 
The certificates, if recognized by the insurers, can have influence on the insurance fees. 
 
IV. Additional Exercise 
The objective of this exercise was to demonstrate that Protection Profile can be used to derive from it 
the argumentation structure about conformity to the security requirements imposed by the 
Protection Profile.  Such argumentation structure is called conformance argument template. It can 
be then reused while demonstrating conformity of the components belonging to the family 
represented by the Protection Profile.  
In this exercise we used the Protection Profile for RTU version 2.1. (see Appendix 3). The 
conformance argument template was developed with the help of the NOR-STA tool developed by 
Gdansk University of Technology.   
Example screenshots of the RTU Protection Profile conformance argumentation template are shown 
below: 
   
 V. General Comments 
1. From the Critical Infrastructures perspective the primary interest is in cyber-security of 
systems; components are of less importance (certified components do not imply a certified 
system).   
2. In practice it often happens that the meaning of a certification depreciates in time and at 
some moment such certificate has no business value (in other words, everyone can have such 
certificate and no one pay attention to it). Therefore the ICCF framework should be supported 
by some mechanisms preventing such depreciation.  
3. In practice it is very difficult (if not impossible) to be ‘standards agnostic’ at the Protection 
Profile level (not mentioning the Security Profile). To illustrate this we have developed two 
versions of Protection Profile for RTU (version 1.0 and version 2.1) and we have found that 
building version 2.1 (which follows the recommendations of IEC 62443-4-2) was more 
appealing. 
4. It is not clear if the certificates C1, C2 and B will be recognized by the Operators of Critical 
Infrastructures. It is likely that they will mostly be interested in the certificate A which covers 
the full scope of cyber-security assessment (compliance, resilience and process security). 
5. It seems sensible that the A certificate be differentiated depending on the security level 
foreseen for the component subjected to certification. 
6. Change management and maintenance of certificates seems to be a real challenge. To cope 
with this problem a solution could be making certification a continuous process instead of 
being it a one-shot activity. This however would require significant changes in current 
certification practices and an extensive tool support would be inevitable. 
7. The rules governing development and maintenance of Protection Profiles and  Security 
Profiles should be imposed by National Cybersecurity Authority 
VI. Appendices 
Three Protection Profiles were elaborated by NET-PL, for two different component families. The 
difference between Protection Profile version 1.0 and Protection Profile version 2.1 is that the latter 
has stronger reference to IEC 62443-4-2.  In particular, the Security Functions of PP RTU version 2.1 
were selected based on the Foundational Requirements defined in IEC 62443-4-2 whereas the 
Security Functions of PP RTU version 1.0 were selected based on the expertise of the authors of this 
Protection Profile. 
 
Appendix 1: Protection Profile of a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), version 1.0 
Appendix 2: Protection Profile of fire detection and fire alarm system (FDAS) – Control and Indication 
Equipment (CIE) in distributed architecture, version 1.0 
Appendix 3: Protection Profile of a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), version 2.1 
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Appendix 1 of the Final Report by NET-PL 
 
Protection Profile 
of a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)  
Version 1.0 
Mikronika (NET-PL) 
15.09.2017 
About this document 
This Protection Profile (PP) specifies an implementation-independent set of security requirements 
associated with a family of products. In the whole document, the acronym FoP (Family of Products) 
designates the type of components that may be evaluated 
This PP is considered during experiments carried out by the Polish National Exercise Team (NET-PL) 
within Task 3: ICCF tests run by National Exercise Teams of the 2017-2018 ICCF Work Plan. For the 
details of the ICCF project see Introduction to the European IACS components Cybersecurity 
Certification Framework (ICCF) [ICCF]:  
(https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/JRC102550_introduction-to-iccf_erncip-iacs-tg-
onlineversion.pdf) 
1 Family of products description  
Family of products:   Remote Terminal  Unit (RTU) 
Component type:  Embedded device (following IEC 62443-4-2 classification) 
1.1 Main features 
RTU monitors and controls instruments in SCADA systems used in industrial and critical infrastructure 
processes, like oil and gas pipelines, electric power generation and transmission, chemical 
manufacturing, physical and technical security systems, water treatment and many others.  
RTU main functions: 
1. collecting measurements from sensors, 
2. execution of logic and control calculations,  
3. user program execution,  
4. issuing control commands that modify a process,  
5. communicating with external applications and other devices, 
6. administration functions to configure or program the other functionalities of the TOE; several 
administration interfaces are possible: 
a) thick-clients (sometimes also called an administration console), 
b) programming workstation, 
c) web-clients, 
d) removable devices (USB drives, SD memory cards, etc.), 
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7. local logging (in particular, to log security and administration events), 
8. remote logging (in particular, to log security and administration events). 
1.2 TOE parts 
RTU communicates with sensors and actuators to control the process and also communicates with the 
supervision system and other RTUs. 
 
Figure 1. TOE in its environment; the diagram shows TOE its interfaces and other relevant objects. 
The parts interfacing RTU to its environment are the following: 
1. Control-command of the process: the interface and process of TOE communication with the 
supervision system which can control TOE configuration (including modifications of user program 
logic) and update firmware.  
2. Data exchange between the TOE and the supervision: the interface and process TOE controls 
and commands controlled processes by reading inputs and sending commands to actuators. 
3. Data exchange between the TOE and other RTUs: the interface and process of connected RTUs 
to exchange data on the controlled processes or for remote logging. 
4. Engineering workstation flow: the interface and process a user or administrator can connect 
directly to TOE to operate it, manage its configuration and update. 
 
TOE
Remote Telecontrol
Unit (RTU)
1. Control-command
of the process
2. Data exchange 
between the TOE
and the supervision
3. Data exchange 
between the TOE
and other RTUs
4. Engineering 
workstation flow
Supervision system
Other RTUs
Administrator
Controlled processes
User
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RTU consists of the following  software/data parts, as presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. RTU structure 
The parts are as follows: 
5. Operating system (kernel): the software controlling the hardware of RTU and providing services 
for firmware 
6. Firmware: the software layer that  manages RTU resources and provides runtime environment 
for users 
7. Configuration: user programs and their data running on RTU 
8. User authentication mechanism: the functionality (software) responsible for authentication of 
RTU users 
9. User secrets: the credentials used to authenticate users 
10. Access control policy: data and programs responsible for user authorization (assigning access 
rights to authenticated users) 
11. Local logging: software responsible for logging selected events in accordance with the defined 
policy  
12. Local logs: repositories keeping the logged data 
13. Remote logging: software responsible for sending/receiving logging data to/from other devices 
(RTUs and the supervision system) 
14. Remote logs: repositories for logging data received from other devices 
1.3 Assumptions  
The following assumptions are assumed for the TOE environment.  
1. TOE is placed in a non-secured physical location. 
2. TOE is placed in a physical environment that meets the vendor's specifications for temperature, 
humidity, and other environmental factors.  
3. TOE will be provided with power that meets its required specifications.  
4. TOE is installed within the network enabling access to  all devices and systems it should 
communicate with.  
5. Users being authenticated via passwords or other means effectively secure their credentials against 
access by any unauthorized subjects.  
Remote Telecontrol Unit (RTU)
5. Operating system 
(kernel)
6. Firmware 7. Configuration
8. User authentication 
mechanism
9. User secrets
10. Access control 
policy
11. Local logging
12. Remote logging
13. Local logs
14. Remote logs
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2 Critical assets 
Following [ICCF] critical assets are the critical security characteristics of the parts of TOE. 
2.1 Security characteristics 
The required security characteristics of TOE are as follows: 
- Availability – property of ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information and 
functionality (IEC 62443-1-1) 
- Confidentiality – assurance that an information is not disclosed to unauthorized individuals, 
processes, or devices (IEC 62443-1-1) 
- Integrity – logical completeness of the hardware and software, consistency of the data structures 
and occurrence of the stored data (IEC 62443-1-1) 
- Authenticity - truthfulness of origins and attributes 
2.2 Critical assets of the environment 
In the following table, the critical assets are identified by the ‘x’ symbol in the entry of the table given 
below. 
Table 1. Critical assets of TOE environment 
             Security characteristic 
 
Part 
Availability Confidentiality Integrity Authenticity 
1. Control-command of the 
process interface x  x x 
2. Data exchange between 
the ToE and the 
supervision interface 
x x x x 
3. Data exchange between 
the ToE and other 
RTUs interface 
x x x x 
4. Engineering workstation flow 
interface   x x x 
 
Rationale: 
1. Control-command of the process interface: The Availability, Integrity and Authenticity of the  
actions performed through this interface must be protected.  
2. Data exchange between the TOE and the supervision interface: The Availability, Integrity and 
Authenticity of the data exchange between the TOE and the supervision must be protected.  
3. Data exchange between the TOE and other RTUs interface: The Availability, Integrity and 
Authenticity of the exchange between the TOE and other RTUs must be protected.  
4. Engineering workstation flow interface: The flow between the TOE and the engineering 
workstation must be protected concerning its  Integrity, Confidentiality and Authenticity. 
 
2.3 TOE critical assets 
In the following table, the critical assets are identified by the ‘x’ symbol in the entry of the table given 
below. 
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Table 2. Critical assets of TOE 
              Security characteristic 
 
Part 
Availability Confidentiality Integrity Authenticity 
5. Operating system (kernel)    x x 
6. Firmware  x x x 
7. Configuration  x x x 
8. User authentication mechanism     x x 
9. User secrets   x x   
10. Access control policy     x   
11. Local logging x       
12. Remote logging x       
13. Local logs     x x 
14. Remote logs     x x 
 
Rationale: 
5. Operating system (kernel): The OS must be protected concerning its Integrity and 
and Authenticity.  
6. Firmware: In order to work properly, the firmware must be protected concerning its Integrity, 
Availability and Authenticity.  
7. Configuration: The configuration of the TOE must be protected concerning its Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Authenticity. The attacker must not be able to discover the configuration of the TOE by 
other means than the ToE activity. Configuration includes also program logic.  
8. User authentication mechanism: This mechanism can be based on a local database or on a 
remote authentication server. In both cases, Integrity, Availability and Authenticity of the mechanism 
must be protected.  
9. User secrets: The user secrets can be passwords, certificates etc.. They can be stored in 
the TOE or stored in a remote authentication server. In all cases Integrity and Confidentiality of these 
credentials must be protected.  
10. Access control policy: The policy can be stored locally or remotely on an authentication server. In 
both cases, Integrity of the access control policy must be protected.  
11. Local logging: Once configured, the local logging must remain operational, i.e. its Availability must 
be protected 
12. Remote logging: The TOE is capable of remote logging. Once configured, the logging must remain 
operational, i.e. its Availability must be protected. 
13. Local logs: The Integrity of the local logs must be protected. 
14. Remote logs: Integrity and Authenticity of the remote logs entries submitted by the TOE must be 
protected. (for instance, a mechanism must be present to detect the absence of a message in 
a sequence of properly received messages). 
3 Threat Model 
3.1 Attackers  
The following attackers are considered:  
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1. Attacker on the supervision network: The attacker controls a device plugged to the supervision 
network of the TOE (Part 2. Data exchange between the TOE and the supervision interface). 
2. Attacker on the process network: The attacker controls a device plugged to the process network 
(Part 1. Control-command of the process interface). 
3. Evil user: The attacker has compromised an unprivileged account and tries to bypass the access 
control policy of the TOE.  
4. Attacker with physical access to the TOE: The attacker has physical access to the TOE. 
3.2 Threats  
The following threats have been identified: 
1. Denial of service: The attacker manages to generate a denial of service on the TOE by performing 
an unexpected action or by exploiting a vulnerability (sending a malformed request, using a corrupted 
configuration file). This denial of service can affect the whole TOE or only some of its functions.  
2. Operating system / firmware alteration: The attacker manages to inject and run a corrupted OS 
/ firmware on the TOE. The code injection may be temporary or permanent and this does include 
any unexpected or unauthorized code execution. A user may attempt to install an update on 
the TOE by legitimate means. Finally, the attacker manages to modify the version of the OS 
/ firmware installed on the TOE without having the privilege to do so.  
3. Configuration compromise: The attacker manages to obtain some parts of the TOE configuration 
by other means than the observation of the activity of the TOE.  
4. Configuration alteration: The attacker manages to modify, temporarily or permanently, 
the TOE configuration.  
5. Credentials theft: The attacker manages to steal user or other credentials.  
6. Authentication violation: The attacker manages to authenticate itself without credentials.  
7. Access control violation: The attacker manages to obtain permissions that he does not normally 
have.  
8. Local logs alteration: The attacker manages to delete or modify a local log entry without being 
authorized by the access control policy of the TOE.  
9. Remote logs alteration: The attacker manages to delete or modify a remote log entry without 
the receiver (the component hosting the log) being able to notice it.  
10. Parameters or command injection: The attacker manages to modify parameters in the TOE 
configuration or to transmit commands (through the Control-commandof the process interface) 
without being authorized. 
11. Flows alteration: The attacker manages to corrupt exchanges between the TOE and an external 
component without being detected.  
12. Flows compromise: In case of data flows requiring confidentiality, the attacker manages to fetch 
data by intercepting exchanges between the TOE and the supervision or other RTU. 
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4 Critical assets vs. threats 
The table below presents the relationship between the threats and the critical assets affected directly by 
these threats. Considering Security Profile for a specific device one should consider also indirect impact 
of threats on TOE parts. For example flow compromise may compromise confidentiality of user secrets. 
Table 3. Critical assets affected by the threats 
Parts 
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1. Denial of service  Av Av Av Av          Av Av     
2. Operating system 
/ firmware alteration          I, Au I, Au         
3. Configuration compromise              C             
4. Configuration alteration              I, Au             
5. Credentials theft              C           
6. Authentication violation               I, Au            
7. Access control violation                C I         
8. Local logs alteration                          I, Au   
9. Remote logs alteration                            I, Au 
10. Parameters or 
command injection  I, Au I, Au I, Au                   
11. Flows alteration  I, Au I, Au I, Au I, Au             
12. Flows compromise    C C C                
 Av: Availability, I: Integrity, C: Confidentiality, Au: Authenticity 
 
 
RTU Protection Profile Version 1.0 8 
5 Security functions  
Security functions are intended to protect critical assets against the threats. They correspond to 
Foundational Requirements (FR) of IEC 62443-4-2 specific to the type of critical assets and identified 
threats. 
The following security functions are considered: 
1. Malformed input management: The TOE has been developed in order to handle correctly 
malformed input, in particular malformed network traffic. The security function ensures that any 
malformed input will have minimal effect on availability of any other services or functions. 
a) This function corresponds to FR3 System integrity and FR7 Resource availability 
2. Secure storage of secrets: User and other secrets are securely stored in the TOE. In particular, 
the compromise of a file is not sufficient for retrieving them. 
a) This function corresponds to FR3 System integrity and FR4 Data confidentiality 
3. Secure authentication on administration interface: Required credentials ensure strong protection. 
Function prevents brute force attacks. The identity and the permissions of the user account are 
systematically checked before any privileged action. 
a) Note: secure authentication from remote devices depends on security function 8 “Secure 
communication” 
b) This function corresponds to FR1 Identification and authentication control and FR4 Data 
confidentiality 
4. Access control policy: The access control policy, based on RBAC (role-based access control) is 
strictly applied. In particular, the implementation guarantees the authenticity of privileged operations, 
i.e. operations that can alter identified critical assets.  
a) This function corresponds to FR2 Use control and FR3 System integrity 
5. Firmware signature: At each update of the firmware, the integrity and authenticity of the new 
firmware are checked before updating. The integrity and authenticity of the firmware are also 
checked at boot time. 
a) This function corresponds to FR3 System integrity and FR4 Data confidentiality 
6. Configuration access control: The access control prevents any unauthorized person to read or 
modify the configuration of the TOE.  
a) This function corresponds to FR2 Use control, FR3 System integrity and FR4 Data 
confidentiality 
7. Command authorization: The TOE must ensure that only authorized command can be executed 
by TOE.  
a) This function corresponds to FR2 Use control 
8. Secure communication: The TOE supports secured communication, protected in integrity and 
authenticity. If required, confidentiality is enforced with external components. Session tokens are 
protected against hijacking and replay. They have a short lifespan. 
a) This function corresponds to FR1 Identification and authentication control, FR4 Data 
confidentiality and FR5 Restricted data flow 
9. Logs integrity: The integrity of the generated local logs is ensured and only 
the superadministrator is permitted to modify them. 
a) This function corresponds to FR2 Use control 
10. Remote log protection: The TOE supports secure remote logging where authenticity and 
integrity are ensured. The transmission is also protected against replay and a mechanism 
is implemented for detecting missing logs. 
a) This function corresponds to FR4 Data confidentiality 
 
 
RTU Protection Profile Version 1.0 9 
6 Threats vs security functions rationale 
Table 4. Protection against threats provided by the security functions 
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1. Malformed input management  x                          x        
2. Secure storage of secrets              x                       
3. Secure authentication on 
administration interface           x  x  x  x                 
4. Access control policy     x                                
5. Firmware signature     x                                
6. Configuration access control        x  x                          
7. Command authorization                            x        
8. Secure communication            x         x  x  x  
9. Logs integrity                       x              
10. Remote log protection                         x           
       Symbol ‘x’ in the table entry identifies that the critical function protects against given threat).  
 
7 Component requirements 
Security functions have been mapped to corresponding IEC 62443-4-2 requirements. 
Note: satisfaction of IEC 62443-4-2 requirements does not mean that security functions objectives are 
met. 
Table 5. Security requirements 
Security function IEC 62443-4-2 requirement 
1. Malformed input 
management 
CR 3.5 Input validation 
CR 7.1 Denial of service protection 
CR 7.2 Resource management 
2. Secure storage of secrets 
CR 3.11 Physical tamper resistance and detection 
CR 4.1 Information confidentiality 
CR 4.3 Use of cryptography 
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Security function IEC 62443-4-2 requirement 
3. Secure authentication on 
administration interface 
CR 1.1 Human user identification and authentication 
CR 1.2 Software process and device identification and authentication 
CR 1.3 Account management 
CR 1.4 Identifier management 
CR 1.5 Authenticator management 
CR 1.7 Strength of password-based authentication 
CR 1.8 Public key infrastructure certificates 
CR 1.9 Strength of public key authentication 
CR 1.10 Authenticator feedback 
CR 1.11 Unsuccessful login attempts 
CR 1.12 System use notification 
CR 1.14 Strength of symmetric key authentication 
CR 4.3 Use of cryptography 
4. Access control policy 
 
CR 2.1 Authorization enforcement 
CR 2.5 Session lock 
CR 2.6 Remote session termination 
CR 2.7 Concurrent session control 
CR 3.9 Protection of audit information 
5. Firmware signature 
CR 3.4 Software and information integrity 
CR 3-10 Support for updates 
CR 3-14 Integrity of boot process 
CR 4.3 Use of cryptography 
6. Configuration access 
control 
CR 2.1 Authorization enforcement 
CR 3.4 Software and information integrity 
CR 4.1 Information confidentiality 
CR 4.3 Use of cryptography 
7. Command authorization 
CR 2.1 Authorization enforcement 
CR 2-5 Session lock 
CR 2.12 Non-repudiation 
8. Secure communication 
CR 1.1 Human user identification and authentication 
CR 1.2 Software process and device identification and authentication 
CR 3.1 Communication integrity 
CR 3.8 Session integrity 
CR 4.1 Information confidentiality 
CR 5.1 Network segmentation 
CR 4.3 Use of cryptography 
CR 7.6 Network and security configuration settings 
9. Logs integrity CR 2.1 Authorization enforcement 
10. Remote log check 
CR 4.1 Information confidentiality 
CR 4.3 Use of cryptography 
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Protection profile of fire detection and fire alarm systems (FDAS) – 
Control and indication equipment (CIE) in distributed architecture 
 
Version 1.0 
Polon-Alfa (NET-PL) 
20.03.2018 
About this document 
This Protection Profile (PP) specifies an implementation-independent set of security 
requirements associated with a family of products. In the whole document, the acronym FoP 
(Family of Products) designates the type of components that may be evaluated 
This PP is considered during experiments carried out by the Polish National Exercise Team 
(NET-PL) within Task 3: ICCF tests run by National Exercise Teams of the 2017-2018 ICCF 
Work Plan. For the details of the ICCF project see Introduction to the European IACS 
components Cybersecurity Certification Framework (ICCF) [ICCF]:  
(https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/JRC102550_introduction-to-
iccf_erncip-iacs-tg-onlineversion.pdf) 
1 Family of products description 
Family of products:   Control and indication equipment (CIE) 
Context of use:  Fire detection and fire alarm systems (FDAS) 
Component type:  Embedded device (following IEC 62443-4-2 classification) 
1.1 General description 
The addressable, interactive CIE fire alarm system is a set of latest technology equipment, 
designed for very fast detection and signaling of fire, precise indication of fire origin, control 
of fire protection safety devices, and information of appropriate intervention services or 
building guards about fire. It enables protection of mid-size, large and very large facilities, 
especially so called “intelligent” buildings with huge amount of fire protection safety devices. 
CIE can be easily integrated with many existing building management systems. Due to its 
specific features it enables to arrange perfect set of necessary devices, well-fitted to building 
conditions. 
All devices of the CIE meet requirements of EN 54 European Standard. 
1.2 Features 
The CIE includes the following features: 
§ Detectors and manual call points management: The CIE is able to read states 
detectors and manual call points. 
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§ Input/output management: The CIE is able to read local or remote inputs and to write 
local or remote outputs. The I/O can be digital or analog. These I/O allows the CIE 
controlling and commanding the fire protection equipment. 
§ User scenario execution in case of fire risk: The application in CIE runs a user 
scenario. This scenario processes the inputs and updates the outputs to fire protection 
devices. 
§ Communication with the supervision: The CIE communicate with the BMS (Building 
Management System) for transmitting process data. 
§ Administration functions: The CIE administration functions in order to configure CIE for 
proper operation according to a programmed fire scenario or program the other 
functionalities of the CIE. Several administration interfaces are possible: 
¾ Thick-clients (administration console, programming workstation …); 
¾ Removable devices (USB drives, SD memory cards, etc). 
§ Local logging: The CIE supports the configuration of a local logging policy. It is possible 
in particular, to log security and administration events and fire alarm system events. 
§ Remote logging: The CIE supports the configuration of a remote logging policy. It is 
possible in particular, to log security and administration events and fire alarm system 
events. 
1.3 Product usage 
The CIE can be used in diverse architecture.  
One of them is distributed architecture. It consists of many unified modules of various 
types, installed inside standardized cabinets. Cabinets can be arranged as separate units or 
combined in sets (so called nodes) and can be located in different places of protected 
building, even if those locations are distant. All modules within one node and nodes between 
themselves are connected with a common, doubled (redundancy) digital communication bus. 
Each control panel can be flexibly assembled with modules and nodes well-fitted to individual 
building requirements. Such solution enables the arrangement of the control panel 
equipment, installed in required locations. This provides maximum optimization of the 
system, reduction of cost of installation while the system is still extremely reliable and 
functional. All that is possible thanks to implementation of doubled main processor 
controllers,  communication buses and cable connections between nodes. Operator panels 
and modules are installed inside the cabinets with standard dimensions, which can be 
mechanically connected.  
The communication between nodes is provided by means of doubled cable connection (for 
example RS-485) or doubled fiber optic cables. Each node shall be equipped – depending on 
the size of node and expected current consumption – with one or more supply modules. 
Each node can contain line modules with connected detection lines, input-output modules for 
direct control or supervision of fire safety devices. In each external node the operator panel 
can be implemented, acting as the parallel operation panel. 
The model range detectors are the analogue detectors with programmable sensitivity (from 
the control panel level). This ability enables adjustment of fire detection response time to the 
phenomena occurring in detector vicinity. All detectors are equipped with automatic 
sensitivity self-compensation mechanism that maintains constant sensitivity during 
progressing dirt build-up in the measuring chamber and also during changes of air pressure 
and vapor condensation. The applied built-in microprocessor and the proper detector 
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software guarantee that the entire fire phenomenon within the vicinity of the detector will be 
analyzed quickly and false alarms will be eliminated. 
The CIE firmware updates and user configuration can, in general, be loaded on the CIE 
through the network, thanks to a serial bus or a removable device (SD memory cards, USB 
keys instance). 
This network should be physically isolated from other networks or, at least,  logically isolated. 
In practice, an engineering workstation is often plugged on the supervision network. This 
engineering workstation should not be permanently plugged but only when it is necessary. 
FDAS architecture and functionality is shown on figure 1. 
 
 
Key 
    1 detection and activation functions    G control function for fire protection system or equipment 
    2 control functions for actions    H fire protection system or equipment 
    3 local associated functions     J fault warning routing function 
    4 remote associated functions     K fault warning receiving function 
    A automatic fire detection function     L  power supply function 
    B control and indication function (CIE)     M  control and indication function for alarm annunciation 
    C fire alarm function     N  ancillary input or output function 
    D manual initiating function     O  ancillary management function 
    E  fire alarm routing function  exchange of information between functions 
    F  fire alarm receiving function  
      NOTE  The functions that are included within the FDAS are shown inside the dotted line. 
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Figure 1 — Fire detection and fire alarm system and associated systems, functions and 
equipment (source: EN 54-1) 
1.4 Users 
European Standard EN 54-2 defines access levels for the indications and controls relating to 
functions. In some cases alternatives are offered (e.g. AL1 or AL2). This is because either 
may be appropriate in different operational circumstances. The purpose of the different 
access levels is not specified in EN 54-2. However, in general they are expected to be used 
as follows:  
§ AL1: For use by members of the general public, or persons having a general 
responsibility for safety supervision, who might be expected to investigate and initially 
respond to a fire alarm or a fault warning. 
 
§ AL2: For use by persons having a specific responsibility for safety, and who are trained 
and authorized to operate the CIE in the:  
— quiescent condition;  
— fire alarm condition;  
— fault warning condition;  
— disabled condition;  
— test condition (when provided). 
 
§ AL3: For use by persons who are trained and authorized to:  
— re-configure the site-specific data held within the CIE or controlled by it (e.g. 
labelling, zoning, alarm organization);  
— maintain the CIE in accordance with the manufacturer's published instructions and 
data. 
 
§ AL4: For use by persons who are trained and authorized by the manufacturer either to 
repair the CIE, or to alter the electronic circuitry or the program, thereby changing its 
basic mode of operation. 
1.5 Assumptions 
Assumptions on the environment and the use case of the CIE are the following: 
 
§ Logs checking: We assume that administrators check regularly the local and remote 
logs produced by the CIE. 
 
§ Administrators: CIE administrators are competent, trained and trustworthy. 
 
§ Premises: The CIE is not necessarily in secured premises and the attacker can have 
access to all physical interfaces of the CIE. Similarly, the attacker can plug a trapped 
device (for instance, a USB drive or a SD card) on any physical port of the CIE. 
Conversely, the attacker cannot disassemble the CIE or perform physical attacks on it. 
Since identical products to the CIE may be purchased freely, the attacker may purchase 
one in order to research vulnerabilities by any possible mean. 
 
§ Unevaluated services disabled by default: Services of the CIE which are not covered 
by the security target are disabled in the default configuration (also named factory 
standard configuration). 
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§ Security documentation: The CIE is provided with a complete documentation for a 
secure usage. In particular, all secrets are listed in order to allow their customization. 
 
All recommendations included in this documentation are applied prior to the evaluation. 
2 Critical assets 
2.1 Critical assets of the environment 
The critical assets of the environment are the following: 
§ Control fire detection and fire alarm system process: The CIE controls a fire 
detection and fire alarm system process by reading states of detectors and manual call 
points. The availability and integrity of these actions must be protected. 
 
§ Control-command of the fire protection system process: The CIE controls and 
commands a fire protection equipment system process by reading inputs and sending 
commands to outputs. The availability and integrity of these actions must be protected. 
 
§ Data exchanges between the CIE and the supervision: The integrity and authenticity 
of the exchanges between the supervision and the CIE must be protected. 
 
§ Engineering workstation flows: The flows between the CIE and the engineering 
workstation must be protected in integrity, confidentiality and authenticity. 
 
§ Data exchanges between the CIE and another Control Indication Equipment:  For 
the communication between the CIE and another Control Indication Equipment, the use 
of dedicated I/O should be prefered. In the case where these exchanges should transit on 
a mutualized infrastructure, they must be protected in integrity and authenticity. 
 
The security requirements for the critical assets are the following: 
Asset Availability Confidentiality Integrity Authenticity 
Control fire detection and 
fire alarm system process X  X  
Control-command of the fire 
protection system process X  X  
Data exchanges between 
the CIE and the supervision   X X 
Engineering workstation 
flows  O X X 
Data exchanges between 
the CIE and another Control 
Indication Equipment 
  X X 
X: mandatory, O: optional 
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2.2 CIE critical assets 
The critical assets of the CIE are the following: 
§ Firmware: In order to work properly, the firmware must be protected both in integrity and 
authenticity. 
§ User scenario: The CIE runs a scenario written and loaded by the users. Its integrity, 
confidentiality and authenticity must be protected. 
§ Configuration: The configuration of the CIE must be protected in confidentiality and 
integrity. The attacker must not be able to discover the configuration of the CIE by other 
means than the CIE activity. 
§ Execution mode: The integrity and authenticity of the execution mode of the CIE must 
be protected. 
§ User authentication mechanism: This mechanism can be based on a local database or 
on a remote authentication server. In both cases, the CIE must ensure the integrity and 
authenticity of the mechanism. 
§ User secrets: The user secrets can be passwords, certificates, etc. They can be stored 
in the CIE or stored in a remote authentication server. In all cases, the CIE must ensure 
the integrity and confidentiality of these credentials. 
§ Access control policy: The policy can be stored locally or remotely on a authentication 
server. In both cases, the CIE must ensure the integrity of the access control policy. 
§ Local logging: Once configured, the local logging must remain operational. 
§ Remote logging: The CIE is capable of remote logging. Once configured, the logging 
must remain operational. 
§ Local logs: The integrity of the local logs must be ensured by the CIE. 
§ Remote logs: The remote logs generated by the CIE must be protected in integrity and 
authenticity. A mechanism must be present to detect the absence of a message in a 
sequence of properly received messages. 
The security requirements for the critical assets are the following: 
Asset Availability Confidentiality Integrity Authenticity 
Firmware   X X 
User scenario  O X X 
Configuration  O X  
Execution mode   X  
User authentication 
mechanism   X X 
User secrets  O X  
Access control policy   X  
Local logging X    
Remote logging X    
Local logs   X X 
Remote logs   X X 
X: mandatory, O: optional 
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3 Threat Model 
3.1 Attackers 
The following attackers are considered: 
§ Attacker on the supervision network: The attacker controls a device plugged on the 
supervision network of the CIE. 
§ Attacker on the process network (fire protection system): The attacker control a 
device plugged on the field fire protection system network. 
§ Evil user: The attacker has compromised an unprivileged account and tries to bypass 
the access control policy of the CIE. 
3.2 Threats 
The following threats are considered: 
§ Denial of service: The attacker manages to generate a denial of service on the CIE by 
performing an unexpected action or by exploiting a vulnerability. 
§ Firmware alteration: The attacker manages to inject and run a corrupted firmware on 
the CIE. The code injection may be temporary or permanent and this does include any 
unexpected or unauthorized code execution. A user may attempt to install that update on 
the CIE by legitimate means. Finally, the attacker manages to modify the version of the 
firmware installed on the CIE without having the privilege to do so. 
§ Execution mode alteration: The attacker manages to modify the execution mode of the 
CIE without being authorized. 
§ User scenario compromise: The attacker manages to obtain some parts of the scenario 
configuration of the CIE by other means than the observation of the activity of the CIE. 
§ User scenario alteration: The attacker manages to modify, temporarily or permanently, 
the user scenario. 
§ Configuration alteration: The attacker manages to modify, temporary or permanently, 
the CIE configuration. 
§ Configuration compromise: The attacker manages to illegally obtain some parts of the 
CIE configuration. 
§ Credentials theft: The attacker manages to steal user credentials. 
§ Authentication violation: The attacker succeeds in authenticating himself without 
credentials. 
§ Access control violation: The attacker manages to obtain permissions that he does not 
normally have. 
§ Local logs alteration: The attacker manages to delete or modify a local log entry without 
being authorized by the access control policy of the CIE. 
§ Remote logs alteration: The attacker manages to modify a remote log entry without the 
receiver being able to notice it. The attacker manages to delete a remote log message 
without the receiver being able to notice it. 
§ Parameters or command injection: The attacker manages to modify parameters in the 
CIE or to transmit commands without being authorized. 
§ Flows alteration: The attacker manages to corrupt exchanges between the CIE and an 
external component (detectors, manual call points, I/O devices) without being detected. 
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§ Flows compromise: In case of data flows requiring confidentiality, the attacker manages 
to fetch data by intercepting exchanges between the CIE and an external component 
(detectors, manual call points, I/O devices). 
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5 Security functions 
The following security functions are considered: 
§ Malformed detectors/manual call points management: The CIE has been developed 
in order to handle correctly malformed states of detectors and manual call points, in 
particular malformed network traffic. 
§ Malformed inputs management: The CIE has been developed in order to handle 
correctly malformed inputs, in particular malformed network traffic. 
§ Secure storage of secrets: User secrets are securely stored in the CIE. In particular, 
the compromise of a file is not sufficient for retrieving them. 
§ Secure authentication on administration interface: The identity and the permissions 
of the user account are systematically checked before any privileged action (AL1 – AL4). 
§ Access control policy: The access control policy is strictly applied. In particular, the 
implementation guarantees the authenticity of privileged operations, i.e. operations that 
can alter identified critical assets. 
§ Firmware signature: At each update of the firmware, the integrity and authenticity of the 
new firmware are checked before updating. The integrity and authenticity of the firmware 
are also checked at boot time. 
§ Configuration confidentiality and integrity: The access control prevents any 
unauthorized person to read or modify the configuration of the CIE. 
§ Integrity and authenticity of the user scenario configuration: The CIE ensure the 
integrity of the user scenario configuration. Only authorized users (AL3-AL4) can modify 
it. 
§ Confidentiality of the user scenario configuration: The CIE protects the confidentiality 
of the user scenario configuration. Only authorized users (AL3-AL4) can access it. 
§ Integrity and authenticity of commands to output: The CIE must ensure that the 
execution mode of the CIE can only be modified by authorized users. This implies, in 
particular, that they are authenticated. 
§ Secure communication: The CIE supports secured communication to BMS, protected in 
integrity and authenticity. If required, confidentiality is enforced with external components. 
§ Logs integrity: The integrity of the generated local logs is ensured and only the super 
administrator is permitted to modify them. 
§ Alarms integrity: The CIE supports secure remote logging where authenticity and 
integrity are ensured. The transmission is also protected against replay and a mechanism 
is implemented for detecting missing logs. 
Protection profile of fire detection and fire alarm systems – Control and indication equipment 
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6 Threats vs security functions 
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detectors/manual 
call points 
management 
X               
Malformed 
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management 
X               
Secure storage 
of secrets        X        
Secure 
authentication 
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administration 
interface 
     X X X X       
Access control 
policy          X      
Firmware 
signature X               
Configuration 
confidentiality 
and integrity 
     X X         
Integrity and 
authenticity of 
the user scenario 
configuration 
    X           
Confidentiality of 
the user scenario 
configuration 
   X            
Integrity and 
authenticity of 
commands to 
output 
  X             
Secure 
communication             X X X 
Logs integrity           X     
Alarms integrity            X    
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7 Component requirements 
Security functions have been mapped to corresponding IEC 62443-4-2 requirements. 
Note: satisfaction of IEC 62443-4-2 requirements does not mean that security functions 
objectives are met. 
Security function IEC 62443-4-2 requirement 
Malformed detectors/manual 
call points management 
CR 3.5 Input validation 
CR 3.6 Deterministic output 
CR 3.7 Error handling 
Malformed inputs 
management 
CR 3.5 Input validation 
CR 7.1 Denial of service protection 
CR 7.2 Resource management 
Secure storage of secrets 
CR 3.11 Physical tamper resistance and detection 
CR 4.1 Information confidentiality 
CR 4.3 Use of cryptography 
Secure authentication on 
administration interface 
CR 1.1 Human user identification and authentication 
CR 1.2 Software process and device identification and authentication 
CR 1.3 Account management 
CR 1.4 Identifier management 
CR 1.5 Authenticator management 
CR 1.7 Strength of password-based authentication 
CR 1.8 Public key infrastructure certificates 
CR 1.9 Strength of public key authentication 
CR 1.10 Authenticator feedback 
CR 1.11 Unsuccessful login attempts 
CR 1.12 System use notification 
CR 1.14 Strength of symmetric key authentication 
CR 4.3 Use of cryptography 
Access control policy 
 
 
CR 2.1 Authorization enforcement 
CR 2.5 Session lock 
CR 2.6 Remote session termination 
CR 2.7 Concurrent session control 
CR 3.9 Protection of audit information 
Firmware signature 
CR 3.4 Software and information integrity 
CR 3-10 Support for updates 
CR 3-14 Integrity of boot process 
CR 4.3 Use of cryptography 
Configuration confidentiality 
and integrity 
CR 2.1 Authorization enforcement 
CR 3.4 Software and information integrity 
CR 4.1 Information confidentiality 
CR 4.3 Use of cryptography 
Integrity and authenticity of 
the user scenario 
configuration 
CR 2.1 Authorization enforcement 
CR 2-5 Session lock 
CR 2.12 Non-repudiation 
Protection profile of fire detection and fire alarm systems – Control and indication equipment 
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Security function IEC 62443-4-2 requirement 
Confidentiality of the user 
scenario configuration 
CR 2.1 Authorization enforcement 
CR 3.4 Software and information integrity 
CR 4.1 Information confidentiality 
CR 4.3 Use of cryptography 
Integrity and authenticity of 
commands to output 
CR 2.1 Authorization enforcement 
CR 3.5 Input validation 
CR 3.6 Deterministic output 
CR 3.7 Error handling 
CR 7.2 Resource management 
CR 7.5 Emergency power 
CR 7.7 Least functionality 
Secure communication 
CR 1.1 Human user identification and authentication 
CR 1.2 Software process and device identification and authentication 
CR 3.1 Communication integrity 
CR 3.8 Session integrity 
CR 4.1 Information confidentiality 
CR 5.1 Network segmentation 
CR 4.3 Use of cryptography 
CR 7.6 Network and security configuration settings 
Logs integrity 
CR 2.1 Authorization enforcement 
CR 4.1 Information confidentiality 
CR 4.3 Use of cryptography 
Alarms integrity 
CR 3.1 Communication integrity 
CR 3.6 Deterministic output 
CR 3.7 Error handling 
CR 3.9 Protection of audit information 
CR 4.1 Information confidentiality 
CR 4.2 Information persistence 
CR 4.3 Use of cryptography 
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Appendix 3 of the Final Report by NET-PL 
 
Protection Profile 
of a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) 
Version 2.1 
NET-PL:  Mikronika, GUT  
17.10.2017 
About this document 
This Protection Profile (PP) specifies a family of products that may be considered a Target of Evaluation 
(TOE) during cyber-security evaluation.  
This PP is considered during experiments carried out by the Polish National Exercise Team (NET-PL) 
within Task 3: ICCF tests run by National Exercise Teams of the 2017-2018 ICCF Work Plan. For the 
details of the ICCF project see Introduction to the European IACS components Cybersecurity 
Certification Framework (ICCF): (https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ 
JRC102550_introduction-to-iccf_erncip-iacs-tg-onlineversion.pdf) 
The Protection Profile can be applied for conformance with any security standard however some parts of 
this document refer to the requirements of IEC 62443 series of standards. 
- sections 1 to 4 are independent from any security standard; 
- sections 5 and 6 refer to Foundational Requirements specified in IEC 62443-1-1; 
- section 7 refers to Component Requirements specified in IEC 62443-4-2. 
1 Family of products description  
Family of products:   Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) 
Component type:  Embedded device (following IEC 62443-4-2 classification) 
1.1 Main features 
RTU monitors and controls instruments in SCADA systems used in industrial and critical infrastructure 
processes, like oil and gas pipelines, electric power generation and transmission, chemical 
manufacturing, physical and technical security systems, water treatment and many others.  
RTU main functions: 
1. collecting measurements from sensors, 
2. execution of logic and control calculations,  
3. user program execution,  
4. issuing control commands that modify a process,  
5. communicating with external applications and other devices, 
6. administration functions to configure and/or program other functionalities of the RTU (several 
administration interfaces are possible): 
a) thick-client (sometimes also called an administration console), 
b) programming workstation, 
c) web-clients, 
d) removable devices (USB drives, SD memory cards, etc.), 
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7. local logging (in particular, to log security and administration events), 
8. remote logging (in particular, to log security and administration events). 
1.2 TOE parts 
RTU communicates with sensors and actuators to control the process and also communicates with the 
supervision system and other RTUs. 
 
Figure 1. TOE in its environment; the diagram shows TOE, its interfaces and other relevant objects. 
The parts interfacing RTU to its environment are the following: 
P1. Control-command of the process: the interface and process of TOE communication with the 
supervision system which can control TOE configuration (including modifications of user program 
logic) and update firmware.  
P2. Data exchange between the TOE and the supervision: the interface and process TOE controls 
and commands controlled processes by reading inputs and sending commands to actuators. 
P3. Data exchange between the TOE and other RTUs: the interface and process of connected RTUs 
to exchange data on the controlled processes or for remote logging. 
P4. Engineering workstation flow: the interface and process a user or administrator can connect 
directly to TOE to operate it, manage its configuration and update. 
 
TOE
Remote Telecontrol
Unit (RTU)
P1. Control-command
of the process
P2. Data exchange 
between the TOE
and the supervision
P3. Data exchange 
between the TOE
and other RTUs
P4. Engineering 
workstation flow
Supervision system
Other RTUs
Administrator
Controlled processes
User
 
RTU Protection Profile Version 2.1 3 
RTU consists of the following  firmware/software/data parts, as presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. RTU structure 
The parts are as follows: 
P5. Operating system (kernel): the software controlling the hardware of RTU and providing services 
for firmware 
P6. Firmware: the software layer that  manages RTU resources and provides runtime environment for 
users 
P7. Configuration: user programs and their data running on RTU 
P8. User authentication mechanism: the functionality (software) responsible for authentication of 
RTU users 
P9. User secrets: the credentials used to authenticate users 
P10. Access control policy: data and programs responsible for user authorization (assigning access 
rights to authenticated users) 
P11. Local logging: software responsible for logging selected events in accordance with the defined 
policy  
P12. Local logs: repositories keeping the logged data 
P13. Remote logging: software responsible for sending/receiving logging data to/from other devices 
(RTUs and the supervision system) 
P14. Remote logs: repositories for logging data received from other devices 
1.3 Assumptions  
The following assumptions are assumed for the TOE environment.  
1. TOE is placed in a non-secured physical location. 
2. TOE is placed in a physical environment that meets the vendor's specifications for temperature, 
humidity, and other environmental factors.  
3. TOE will be provided with power that meets its required specifications.  
4. TOE is installed within the network enabling access to  all devices and systems it should 
communicate with.  
Remote Telecontrol Unit (RTU)
P5. Operating system 
(kernel)
P6. Firmware P7. Configuration
P8. User 
authentication mech.
P9. User secrets
P10. Access control 
policy
P11. Local logging
P12. Remote logging
P13. Local logs
P14. Remote logs
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5. Users being authenticated via passwords or other means effectively secure their credentials against 
access by any unauthorized subjects.  
2 Critical assets 
Following [ICCF] critical assets are the critical security characteristics of the parts of TOE. 
2.1 Security characteristics 
The required security characteristics of TOE are as follows: 
- Availability – property of ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information and 
functionality (IEC 62443-1-1) 
- Confidentiality – assurance that an information is not disclosed to unauthorized individuals, 
processes, or devices (IEC 62443-1-1) 
- Integrity – logical completeness of the hardware and software, consistency of the data structures 
and occurrence of the stored data (IEC 62443-1-1) 
- Authenticity - truthfulness of origins and attributes 
2.2 Critical assets of the environment 
In the following table, the critical assets are identified by putting the ‘x’ symbol in the entry of the table 
given below. 
Table 1. Critical assets of TOE environment 
             Security characteristic 
 
Part 
Availability Confidentiality Integrity Authenticity 
P1. Control-command of the 
process interface x  x x 
P2. Data exchange between 
the TOE and the 
supervision interface 
x x x x 
P3. Data exchange between 
the TOE and other 
RTUs interface 
x x x x 
P4. Engineering workstation flow 
interface   x x x 
 
Rationale: 
P1. Control-command of the process interface: The Availability, Integrity and Authenticity of the  
actions performed through this interface must be protected.  
P2. Data exchange between the TOE and the supervision interface: The Availability, Integrity and 
Authenticity of the data exchange between the TOE and the supervision must be protected.  
P3. Data exchange between the TOE and other RTUs interface: The Availability, Integrity and 
Authenticity of the exchange between the TOE and other RTUs must be protected.  
P4. Engineering workstation flow interface: The flow between the TOE and the engineering 
workstation must be protected concerning its  Integrity, Confidentiality and Authenticity. 
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2.3 TOE critical assets 
In the following table, the critical assets are identified by putting the ‘x’ symbol in the entry of the table 
given below. 
Table 2. Critical assets of TOE 
              Security characteristic 
 
Part 
Availability Confidentiality Integrity Authenticity 
P5. Operating system (kernel)    x x 
P6. Firmware  x x x 
P7. Configuration  x x x 
P8. User authentication mechanism     x x 
P9. User secrets   x x   
P10. Access control policy     x   
P11. Local logging x       
P12. Remote logging x       
P13. Local logs     x x 
P14. Remote logs     x x 
 
Rationale: 
P5. Operating system (kernel): The OS must be protected concerning its Integrity and 
and Authenticity.  
P6. Firmware: In order to work properly, the firmware must be protected concerning its Integrity, 
Availability and Authenticity.  
P7. Configuration: The configuration of the TOE must be protected concerning its Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Authenticity. The attacker must not be able to discover the configuration of the TOE by 
other means than the TOE activity. Configuration includes also program logic.  
P8. User authentication mechanism: This mechanism can be based on a local database or on a 
remote authentication server. In both cases, Integrity, Availability and Authenticity of the mechanism 
must be protected.  
P9. User secrets: The user secrets can be passwords, certificates etc.. They can be stored in 
the TOE or stored in a remote authentication server. In all cases Integrity and Confidentiality of these 
credentials must be protected.  
P10. Access control policy: The policy can be stored locally or remotely on an authentication server. 
In both cases, Integrity of the access control policy must be protected.  
P11. Local logging: Once configured, the local logging must remain operational, i.e. its Availability 
must be protected 
P12. Remote logging: The TOE is capable of remote logging. Once configured, the logging must 
remain operational, i.e. its Availability must be protected. 
P13. Local logs: The Integrity of the local logs must be protected. 
P14. Remote logs: Integrity and Authenticity of the remote logs entries submitted by the TOE must be 
protected. (for instance, a mechanism must be present to detect the absence of a message in 
a sequence of properly received messages). 
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3 Threat Model 
3.1 Attackers  
The following attackers are considered:  
Attacker on the supervision network: The attacker controls a device plugged to the supervision 
network of the TOE (Part 2. Data exchange between the TOE and the supervision interface). 
Attacker on the process network: The attacker controls a device plugged to the process network 
(Part P1. Control-command of the process interface). 
Evil user: The attacker has compromised an unprivileged account and tries to bypass the access control 
policy of the TOE.  
Attacker with physical access to the TOE: The attacker has physical access to the TOE. 
3.2 Threats  
The following threats have been identified: 
T1. Denial of service: The attacker manages to generate a denial of service on the TOE by performing 
an unexpected action or by exploiting a vulnerability (sending a malformed request, using a 
corrupted configuration file). This denial of service can affect the whole TOE or only some of its 
functions.  
T2. Operating system / firmware alteration: The attacker manages to inject and run a corrupted OS 
/ firmware on the TOE. The code injection may be temporary or permanent and this does include 
any unexpected or unauthorized code execution. A user may attempt to install an update on 
the TOE by legitimate means. Finally, the attacker manages to modify the version of the OS 
/ firmware installed on the TOE without having the privilege to do so.  
T3. Configuration compromise: The attacker manages to obtain some parts of the TOE configuration 
by other means than the observation of the activity of the TOE.  
T4. Configuration alteration: The attacker manages to modify, temporarily or permanently, 
the TOE configuration.  
T5. Credentials theft: The attacker manages to steal user or other credentials.  
T6. Authentication violation: The attacker manages to authenticate itself without credentials.  
T7. Access control violation: The attacker manages to obtain permissions that he does not normally 
have.  
T8. Local logs alteration: The attacker manages to delete or modify a local log entry without being 
authorized by the access control policy of the TOE.  
T9. Remote logs alteration: The attacker manages to delete or modify a remote log entry without 
the receiver (the component hosting the log) being able to notice it.  
T10. Parameters or command injection: The attacker manages to modify parameters in the TOE 
configuration or to transmit commands (through the Control-commandof the process interface) 
without being authorized. 
T11. Flows alteration: The attacker manages to corrupt exchanges between the TOE and an external 
component without being detected.  
T12. Flows compromise: In case of data flows requiring confidentiality, the attacker manages to fetch 
data by intercepting exchanges between the TOE and the supervision or other RTU. 
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4 Critical assets vs. threats 
The table below presents the relationship between the threats and the critical assets that can be directly 
compromised by these threats (for instance, the critical asset Integrity of Firmware can be directly 
compromised by the Operating system/firmware alteration threat).  
Table 3. Critical assets affected by the threats 
Parts 
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T1. Denial of service  Av Av Av Av          Av Av     
T2. Operating system 
/ firmware alteration          I, Au I, Au         
T3. Configuration 
compromise              C             
T4. Configuration alteration              I, Au             
T5. Credentials theft              C           
T6. Authentication violation               I, Au            
T7. Access control violation                C I         
T8. Local logs alteration                          I, Au   
T9. Remote logs alteration                            I, Au 
T10. Parameters or 
command injection  I, Au I, Au I, Au                   
T11. Flows alteration  I, Au I, Au I, Au I, Au             
T12. Flows compromise    C C C                
 Av: Availability, I: Integrity, C: Confidentiality, Au: Authenticity 
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5 Security functions 
Security functions are intended to protect the component (its parts) against the threats presented in 
Section 3.. 
Security functions are determined by first selecting the Foundational Requirements (FR) of 
IEC 62443-4-2 that provide adequate protection of the identified critical assets and then assigning these 
requirements to the (groups of) parts of the component. 
5.1 Assigning Foundational Requirements 
Foundational Requirement, if satisfied, provide component capabilities to protect given security 
characteristics of critical assets against threats. The scope of Foundational Requirements is as follows 
(for a detailed specification see IEC 62443-4-2): 
FR1: Identification and authentication control (IAC): necessary capabilities to reliably identify and 
authenticate all users (humans, software processes and devices) attempting to access the ToE shall 
be provided. 
- satisfaction of FR1 is required to achieve authenticity of an asset 
FR2: Use control (UC): necessary  capabilities  to  enforce  the  assigned  privileges of  an 
authenticated user (human, software process or device) to perform the requested action on the 
system or assets and monitor the use of these privileges shall be provided. 
- satisfaction of FR2 is required to achieve authenticity of an asset 
FR3: System integrity (SI): necessary capabilities to ensure the integrity of the ToE to prevent 
unauthorized manipulation shall be provided.  
- satisfaction of FR3 is required to achieve integrity of an asset 
FR4: Data confidentiality (DC): necessary capabilities to ensure the confidentiality of information on 
communication channels and in data repositories to prevent unauthorized disclosure shall be 
provided. 
- satisfaction of FR4 is required to achieve confidentiality of an asset 
FR5: Restricted data flow (RDF): necessary capabilities to segment the control system via zones and 
conduits1 to limit the unnecessary flow of data shall be provided. 
- satisfaction of FR5 is required for components participating in separation of information flow 
restrictions between zones 
FR6: Timely response to events (TRE): necessary capabilities to respond to security violations by 
notifying the proper authority, reporting needed evidence of the violation and taking timely corrective 
action when incidents are discovered shall be provided. 
- satisfaction of FR6 is required for assets related to security events 
FR7: Resource availability (RA): necessary capabilities to ensure the availability of the control system 
against the degradation or denial of essential services shall be provided. 
- satisfaction of FR7 is required to achieve availability of an asset 
 
                                               
1 ‘conduit’ is an abstraction representing communication channels (internal and external)  of ToE 
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Table 4. Foundational Requirements assigned to protect critical assets 
Parts 
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FR4                
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5.2 Selecting Security Functions 
Foundational requirements identified in Section 5 to protect ToE assets have been grouped into a set of 
Security Functions. The requirements are classified to belong to one security function when they relate 
to the same type of component parts and it is expected the protection will be based on the same 
implementation mechanism. 
Security function Protected critical assets Foundational requirements Addressed Threats 
SF1. Protection of 
network 
communication 
confidentiality 
Confidentiality of: 
P2. Data exchange between the 
TOE and the supervision  interface 
P3. Data exchange between the 
TOE and other RTUs  interface 
P4. Engineering workstation flow 
interface 
FR 4 Data 
confidentiality 
T12. Flows compromise 
SF2. Network 
communication 
authenticity and 
integrity 
Authenticity and integrity of: 
P1. Control-command of the process  
interface 
P2. Data exchange between the 
TOE and the supervision  interface 
P3. Data exchange between the 
TOE and other RTUs  interface 
P4. Engineering workstation flow 
interface 
FR 1 Identification 
and authentication 
control 
 
FR 2 Use control 
 
FR 3 System 
integrity 
T10. Parameters or 
command injection  
T11. Flows alteration 
SF3. Protection of 
critical data 
confidentiality 
Confidentiality of: 
P7. Configuration 
P9. User secrets 
FR 4 Data 
confidentiality 
T3. Configuration 
compromise  
T5. Credentials theft  
T7. Access control violation 
SF4. User authorization 
in TOE functions 
Authenticity of: 
P5. Operating system (kernel) 
P6. Firmware 
P7. Configuration 
P8. User authentication mechanism 
P13. Local logs 
P14. Remote logs 
FR 1 Identification 
and authentication 
control 
 
FR 2 Use control 
T2. Operating system / 
firmware alteration  
T4. Configuration alteration  
T6. Authentication violation  
T8. Local logs alteration  
T9. Remote logs alteration 
SF5. TOE functions 
integrity 
Integrity of: 
P5. Operating system (kernel) 
P6. Firmware 
P7. Configuration 
P8. User authentication mechanism 
P10. Access control policy 
P13. Local logs 
P14. Remote logs 
FR 3 System 
integrity 
 
FR 6 – Timely 
response to events 
T2. Operating system / 
firmware alteration  
T4. Configuration alteration  
T6. Authentication violation  
T7. Access control violation  
T8. Local logs alteration  
T9. Remote logs alteration 
SF6. Protection of 
Resource 
Availability 
Availability of: 
P1. Control-command of the process  
interface 
P2. Data exchange between the 
TOE and the supervision  interface 
P3. Data exchange between the 
TOE and other RTUs  interface 
P4. Engineering workstation flow 
interface 
P11. Local logging 
P12. Remote logging 
FR 6 – Timely 
response to events 
 
FR 7 Resource 
availability 
1. Denial of service 
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6 Component requirements 
Security functions have been mapped to corresponding IEC 62443-4-2 requirements. For each security 
function component requirements (CRs) related for FRs specified in Table 4 have been examined. If a 
given CR is not relevant for satisfaction of the security function’s FRs, it can be excluded (marked with 
grey color) and a rationale provided. 
Table 5. Security requirements 
Security function IEC 62443-4-2 requirements Rationale 
SF1. Protection of network 
communication 
confidentiality 
CR 4.1 – Information confidentiality 
CR 4.2 – Information persistence 
CR 4.3 – Use of cryptography 
CR 4.2 excluded as it 
doesn’t apply for 
networks 
SF2. Network communication 
authenticity and integrity 
CR 1.1 – Human user identification and authentication 
CR 1.2 – Software process and device identification and 
authentication 
CR 1.3 – Account management 
CR 1.4 – Identifier management 
CR 1.5 – Authenticator management 
CR 1.6 – Wireless access management 
CR 1.7 – Strength of password-based authentication 
CR 1.8 – Public key infrastructure certificates 
CR 1.9 – Strength of public key authentication 
CR 1.10 – Authenticator feedback 
CR 1.11 – Unsuccessful login attempts 
CR 1.12 – System use notification 
CR 1.13 – Access via untrusted networks 
CR 1.14 – Strength of symmetric key authentication 
 
CR 2.1 – Authorization enforcement 
CR 2.2 – Wireless use control 
CR 2.3 – Use control for portable and mobile devices 
CR 2.4 – Mobile code 
CR 2.5 – Session lock 
CR 2.6 – Remote session termination 
CR 2.7 – Concurrent session control 
CR 2.8 – Auditable events 
CR 2.9 – Audit storage capacity 
CR 2.10 – Response to audit processing failures 
CR 2.11 – Timestamps 
CR 2.12 – Non-repudiation 
CR 2.13 – Use of physical diagnostic and test interfaces 
 
CR 3.1 – Communication integrity 
CR 3.2 – Protection from malicious code  
CR 3.3 – Security functionality verification 
CR 3.4 – Software and information integrity 
CR 3.5 – Input validation 
CR 3.6 – Deterministic output 
CR 3.7 – Error handling 
CR 3.8 – Session integrity 
CR 3.9 – Protection of audit information 
CR 3.10 – Support for updates 
CR 3.11 – Physical tamper resistance and detection 
CR 3.12 – Provisioning product supplier roots of trust 
CR 3.13 – Provisioning asset owner roots of trust 
CR 3.14 – Integrity of the boot process 
CR 1.1 excluded as 
human user 
identification is a 
higher level of 
service then the 
network services. 
 
… 
 
Rationale why CRs in 
grey are excluded 
from the scope of the 
security function 
SF3. Protection of critical data 
confidentiality 
CR 4.1 – Information confidentiality 
CR 4.2 – Information persistence 
CR 4.3 – Use of cryptography 
Rationale why CRs in 
grey are excluded 
from the scope of the 
security function 
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Security function IEC 62443-4-2 requirements Rationale 
SF4. User authorization in TOE 
functions 
CR 1.1 – Human user identification and authentication 
CR 1.2 – Software process and device identification and 
authentication 
CR 1.3 – Account management 
CR 1.4 – Identifier management 
CR 1.5 – Authenticator management 
CR 1.6 – Wireless access management 
CR 1.7 – Strength of password-based authentication 
CR 1.8 – Public key infrastructure certificates 
CR 1.9 – Strength of public key authentication 
CR 1.10 – Authenticator feedback 
CR 1.11 – Unsuccessful login attempts 
CR 1.12 – System use notification 
CR 1.13 – Access via untrusted networks 
CR 1.14 – Strength of symmetric key authentication 
 
CR 2.1 – Authorization enforcement 
CR 2.2 – Wireless use control 
CR 2.3 – Use control for portable and mobile devices 
CR 2.4 – Mobile code 
CR 2.5 – Session lock 
CR 2.6 – Remote session termination 
CR 2.7 – Concurrent session control 
CR 2.8 – Auditable events 
CR 2.9 – Audit storage capacity 
CR 2.10 – Response to audit processing failures 
CR 2.11 – Timestamps 
CR 2.12 – Non-repudiation 
CR 2.13 – Use of physical diagnostic and test interfaces 
Rationale why CRs in 
grey are excluded 
from the scope of the 
security function 
SF5. TOE functions integrity CR 3.1 – Communication integrity 
CR 3.2 – Protection from malicious code  
CR 3.3 – Security functionality verification 
CR 3.4 – Software and information integrity 
CR 3.5 – Input validation 
CR 3.6 – Deterministic output 
CR 3.7 – Error handling 
CR 3.8 – Session integrity 
CR 3.9 – Protection of audit information 
CR 3.10 – Support for updates 
CR 3.11 – Physical tamper resistance and detection 
CR 3.12 – Provisioning product supplier roots of trust 
CR 3.13 – Provisioning asset owner roots of trust 
CR 3.14 – Integrity of the boot process 
 
CR 6.1 – Audit log accessibility 
CR 6.2 – Continuous monitoring 
Rationale why CRs in 
grey are excluded 
from the scope of the 
security function 
SF6. Protection of Resource 
Availability 
CR 6.1 – Audit log accessibility 
CR 6.2 – Continuous monitoring 
 
CR 7.1 – Denial of service protection 
CR 7.2 – Resource management 
CR 7.3 – Control system backup 
CR 7.4 – Control system recovery and reconstitution 
CR 7.5 – Emergency power 
CR 7.6 – Network and security configuration settings 
CR 7.7 – Least functionality 
CR 7.8 – Control system component inventory 
Rationale why CRs in 
grey are excluded 
from the scope of the 
security function 
 
ANNEX III – SPANISH National Exercise Team 
The Spanish NET annex contains the following document: Spanish NET report on E1 to E3 ICCF tests. 
• This report includes the following contents: 
o Exercises 1, 2 and 3 goals, assumptions, principles, methodology and results: this document 
presents the overall process of the exercise (composition of the NET, methodology of the 
elaboration of the security profile, methodology of the compliance and cyber resilience 
evaluation of the product and conclusions for each exercise). 
o Security profile for the SIMATIC RTU3030C — V2.0.20 (Annex A): this document presents the 
ToE and its usage, the associated critical assets, the corresponding threat model, the security 
objectives and how these elements may relate to one another. 
ICCF cyber resilience evaluation technical report for the SIMATIC RTU3030C — V2.0.20 (Annex B): this report 
includes an example of the contents that a cyber resilience evaluation technical report could deliver. 
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DOCUMENT VERSION CONTROL 
  
Version Date Description 
0.1 30/10/2017 Initial draft 
0.2 16/11/2017 Applus+ Revision 
0.3 21/11/2017 Revision after the Friday 17th NET meeting at Siemens. 
0.4 23/11/2017 Revision of the E3 test methodology 
0.5 28/11/2017 Feedback from Siemens 
1.0 (draft) 30/11/2017 Initial draft release – Some modifications are expected 
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1 COMPOSITION OF THE SPANISH NET 
The Spanish NET is composed of the following members: 
Role Organization/Company 
National cybersecurity agency CCN 
Vendor Siemens 
Evaluation Laboratory Applus+ Laboratories 
Certification Body CCN 
Industry User UPCT 
Industrial Organization CCI 
 
2 SPANISH NET MEETING PROJECT MILESTONES 
Date Meeting Topic 
13-07-2017 F2F KO Meeting 
06-09-2017 Follow-up Conference call 
22-09-2017 Nets Meeting in Brussels 
31-10-2017 First Results Discussion Meeting  
03-11-2017 First revision of the Security Profile 
17-11-2017 NET meeting in the Madrid SIEMENS HQ, to showcase the selected product, review the 
NET report and activities, simulate the exercises and coordinate further testing efforts. 
24-11-2017 End of commenting period 
30-11-2017 Deliver of draft report to ERNCIP after NET review 
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3 TESTS PERFORMED 
The Spanish NET has performed the ICCF component tests E1+E2+E3, defined as: 
• E1 – Elaborate a protection profile and a security profile and report on its level of 
difficulty.1 
• E2 – Simulate a product compliance assessment, document and report on its level 
of difficulty. 
• E3 – Simulate a product cyber resilience test, document and report on its level of 
difficulty. 
4 BASELINE USE CASE 
The product chosen for executing the E1+E2+E3 tests is: SIMATIC RTU3030C2. 
A remote terminal unit (RTU) is a microprocessor-controlled electronic device that 
interfaces objects in the physical world to a distributed control system or SCADA 
(supervisory control and data acquisition) system by transmitting telemetry data to a 
master system, and by using messages from the master supervisory system to control 
connected objects. 
 
                                                           
1 Only the security profile has been elaborated 
2 http://w3.siemens.com/mcms/industrial-communication/en/industrial-remote-
communication/telecontrol/remote-terminal-unit/pages/rtu-3030c.aspx  
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The TOE includes the following features: 
• User program execution: the TOE runs a simple controller program. This program 
processes the inputs via program blocks. 
• Input/output management: the TOE is able to read 8 digital and 4 analog local 
inputs, and write 4 digital local outputs. These I/O allows the TOE to control and 
command the industrial process. 
• Administration functions: the TOE includes administration functions in order to 
configure or program the other functionalities of the TOE. One administration 
interface is possible: 
o web-client, via WBM (Web Based Management) 
• Local logging: the TOE supports the configuration of an optional local logging policy, 
in a local SD card. 
• Control room communication: the TOE supports the definition of a remote 
communications partner. The following protocols are available: 
o TeleControl Basic (without VPN possible) 
o DNP3 
o IEC 60870-5-104 
o ST7 via TIM 1531 nodestation and WinCC with additional plugin. 
• Mobile network connection: The TOE will be able to connect to a UMTS / GSM 
network, by including a SIM card inside the appliance. 
• Other communication mechanisms: the TOE supports additional communication 
protocols 
o SMS (inbound and outbound) for wake-up 
o Secure Email (outbound) 
o Secure FTP Client to send e.g. log files 
o OpenVPN client (legacy or via SINEMA RC with auto enrollment) 
o HTTP and HTTPS 
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5 EXERCISE 1 - ELABORATE A SECURITY PROFILE AND REPORT ON ITS LEVEL 
OF DIFFICULTY 
5.1 GOALS, ASSUMPTIONS & PRINCIPLES OF THE TEST: E1 (ONLY SECURITY PROFILE) 
The objective of this test was to elaborate a security profile for the baseline product, 
SIMATIC RTU3030C.  
CSPN has been chosen as the reference methodology to develop the security profile. A CSPN 
security target consists on (see section 3.2 of [CRITERIA]): 
• Product’s commercial name and unique references, to clearly identify the product 
and version under evaluation. 
• An overview containing 
o The product expected usage 
o Typical users of the product 
o Product usage environment 
• Security Problem 
o Assumptions 
o Assets 
o Threats 
o Environment security measures 
• Product’s security functions/mechanisms 
That information should be enough to give the final customer a clear understanding of the 
product’s purpose, its threat model and the security mechanisms used as countermeasures 
to those threats. 
As stated on the CSPN, the security functions/mechanism must be at least informally 
specified in natural language.  
5.2 METHODOLOGY OF THE TEST E1 (ONLY SECURITY PROFILE) 
Writing a security profile is a task to be done by the developer. In order to do it, the 
developer has to keep in mind the expected content of the security profile (see section 5). 
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The security profile first two points identify and briefly overview the product. It is important 
to clearly indicate the environment where the product will be used and the components 
that the product will need to work which are not under evaluation (e.g. system 
requirements, third party applications…). This will help potential clients to understand the 
scope of the evaluation. 
Going forward, the following point consists of a short threat model of the product under 
evaluation. The developer must identify the assets, threats to those assets and 
assumptions. Besides that, the developer will have to describe the security measures 
derived from the environment. This section will determine the scope of the evaluation. The 
security profile last point consists of describing the product’s security functions to mitigate 
previous threats. A detailed description is not necessary, it should only be clear enough to 
let the evaluator understand how the security functions cover the entire threat model. 
5.3 FINDINGS: KEY RESULTS, CONFIDENCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ICCF 
IMPROVEMENTS 
The assessment related to this exercise has been focused on the feasibility of writing a 
security profile for someone that has not previous background in certification. 
The final conclusion of the NET is that following the approach of CSPN, the effort required 
to write a Security Profile is acceptable. Therefore, the NET considers that the approach is 
the right one. 
  
Spanish NET report on E1 to E3 ICCF tests 
                                                                             Page 9/45 
6 EXERCISE 2 - SIMULATE A PRODUCT COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT, 
DOCUMENT AND REPORT ON ITS LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY 
6.1 GOALS, ASSUMPTIONS & PRINCIPLES OF THE TEST: E2 
The objective of this test was to determine which documentation analysis should be done 
to demonstrate on paper (compliance assessment) that requirements specified on the 
Security Profile have been addressed by appropriate measures. 
The developer will have to provide the laboratory with the Security Profile and a document 
based on the requirements described on the methodology (see section 6.2). 
The description of the security requirements, as well as the developer documentation, will 
not have to be written in semiformal language, as done in IEC 62443-4-2, Common Criteria 
or NIST SP800-82. 
Instead, a natural language approach, similar to how the security functions are defined on 
the CPSN, will be used. Of course any standard/methodology such as the mentioned above 
can be used by the developer to have a starting point for elaborating the documentation. 
6.2 METHODOLOGY OF THE TEST E2 
The first evaluator activity will be to verify that the security functions in the Security Profile 
are consistent with the security problem definition (assumptions, threats and security 
measures of the environment). This activity will determine whether the developer has to 
include, delete or modify any of the security functions. Evaluator’s tasks related to this can 
be found at section 4.1 [CRITERIA]. 
Once this activity has been successfully completed, the evaluator will have to verify the 
documentation delivered by the developer. This documentation should contain a rationale 
written by the developer describing how each security function is addressed by the 
product’s measures. 
In order to do so, the developer will have a supporting guide developed by the certification 
scheme describing expected requirements for each security measure. A similar approach as 
that used in FIPS or FIDO. 
Below is an example of a fragment of a potential evaluation methodology: 
“For instance, secure storage of secrets, firmware signature and secure communication are 
three security functions (see Annex 1) which are implemented using cryptographic 
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mechanisms. The supporting guide should contain a section describing the requirements for 
cryptographic mechanism: 
• Use of approved algorithms by SOG-IS 
• Key length 
• Key generation method 
• Key protection measures 
Another example could be a security function based on password authentication, the 
supporting guide should describe requirements for password protection: 
• Minimum bit length 
• Lifespan 
The evaluator’s activity will consist on verifying that the developer rationale is based on 
supporting guide requirements. It can be the case where a security function uses a 
mechanism not included on the supporting guide. The evaluator should provide a rationale 
justifying the effectiveness of that measure.” 
The output of these activities should be a compliance assessment matrix of the security 
functions and the justification rationale if required. 
6.3 FINDINGS: KEY RESULTS, CONFIDENCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ICCF 
IMPROVEMENTS 
After the simulation, it was concluded that the existence of a precise evaluation 
methodology for the conformance assessment was crucial to ensure the repeatability of the 
results among different labs/certification bodies. 
The decision of allowing the developer to write the security requirements as specified in 
CPSN instead of following formal security standards (Common Criteria or IEC 62443-4-2) is 
to make the certification process easier for the developers. Based on our experience, this 
requires that the developer has some knowledge on those standards, but that will not be 
necessary if those requirements can be expressed through natural language.  
This will probably require more work on the laboratory’s side, because each developer 
could describe the same mechanism using different descriptions, but we think one of the 
goals of this new certification process must be to make things easier for developers. 
Moreover, the Compliance assessment as a stand-alone documentation evaluation cannot 
be considered a solid compliance evaluation. Our proposal is an approach closer to what is 
required at CSPN including functional testing. 
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A minimum amount of functional testing should be required in order to avoid awkward 
situations, for instance: the TOE has been assessed before the TOE version has been frozen 
or with some functionality not included in the final release.  
In conclusion, it should be confirmed that the security functionality stated in the 
documentation is actually implemented in the TOE.  
It is important to perform a minimum documentation and functional testing. This evaluation 
task not be done in depth, but will be enough to, at least, verify the correctness of the 
information provided by the developer.  
Our proposal, stated below, is aligned with the Collaborative Protection Profile as described 
in CC and the certification approach of the National Information Assurance Partnership 
(NIAP): documental revision and functional testing. 
6.3.1 PROPOSAL FOR METHODOLOGY FOR THE COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT 
The proposal is based on CSPN methodology [CRITERIA]. 
For this evaluation activity, the developer must send to the evaluator, at least, the security 
profile, installation guide and the necessary documentation to understand the design of the 
product. These documents can be written informally in natural language but they should be 
clear enough to let the evaluator perform the required analysis. 
This activity will comprise the following phases (as stated in [CRITERIA]): 
o Phase 1 – Security Profile analysis (following the methodology described on 
[CRITERIA]) 
o Phase 2 – Product installation 
o Sub-Phase - Ease of use analysis (insecure use/configuration analysis) 
o Phase 3 – Documentation analysis (following the methodology explained in the E2 
exercise) 
o Phase 5 – Product testing (functional testing) 
The output of this activity should be a report where the evaluator describes: 
1. The correctness of the documentation 
2. Non-conformities encountered during the evaluation  
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7 EXERCISE 3 - SIMULATE A PRODUCT CYBER RESILIENCE TEST, DOCUMENT 
AND REPORT ON ITS LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY 
7.1  GOALS, ASSUMPTIONS & PRINCIPLES OF THE TEST: E3 
The objective of this test has been to determine which activities should be performed by 
the evaluator to demonstrate the effectiveness of an IACS product’s cybersecurity and 
cyber-defense mechanisms. This test should be considered complimentary to the E2 test: 
on E2, the evaluator has to perform functional testing (in our approach) while on E3, they 
must perform security testing. 
A simulation of these activities was performed over the baseline product SIMATIC 
RTU3030C (see Annex B). Some modifications have been introduced into CSPN 
methodology, to define the evaluator guideline for those activities. 
7.2 METHODOLOGY OF THE TEST E3 
Testing the cybersecurity and cyber defense mechanisms of the evaluated product should 
be the main activity of the certification process. This task corresponds to Phases 6 and 7 of 
the CSPN [CRITERIA], with some heavy modifications, based on IEC 62443 and CC. 
The proposed testing comprises three main tasks 
1. A rationale of the resistance of the security mechanisms (Similar to the CSPN) 
2. A tiered vulnerability analysis 
3. A tiered penetration testing 
The proposed tiered methodology is a bottom-up approach: 
First the focus is on the physical aspects of the TOE and the applied physical 
security3. This tier comprises every aspect related to the tangible TOE and properties. 
Special attention should be given to the physical interfaces of the TOE. Pure software-based 
TOEs would omit this analysis, but would specify the necessary hardware features. 
The next tier is the TOE logical layer. This layer relates to all the software in the TOE, 
including the undelaying Operative System, as well as third party components. Special 
attention should be given to the external communication interfaces of the TOE. 
                                                           
3 If relevant, always taking into account the evaluation scope. If the TOE assumptions clearly state that the 
physical perimeter is out of the evaluation, as the TOE should be located in secure premises, it would be a 
clear case for the omission of physical security measures. (Such as Anti-vandalism / Tamper-proofing / etc.) 
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The following two tiers are dependent on the evaluated TOE, and therefore could be 
omitted altogether. 
The third tier comprises the TOE operation environment. This tier is limited to TOEs 
where the environment plays a critical role on the protection of the Assets, or if the TOE is 
conformed of several elements, tightly integrated with their environment as well. As a 
reference, specialized equipment for critical infrastructure (or the control software) would 
need to include this tier. 
The fourth tier (Additional System Interactions, ASI) is related to highly 
interconnected TOEs, such as SCADA mainframes/servers, plant management, fire panels 
and such. The TOE itself does not contribute to a production process, but instead it controls 
several subsystems. These specially critical elements should have the interactions with 
subsystems properly tested. Network-managed security solutions should be reviewed in 
this tier as well. 
 
Security analysis and testing tiers 
An example of a Cyber Resilience Testing Report is provided in Annex B, with proposed 
sections and contents, as a “simulated” TOE evaluation, for the same equipment as for the 
E1 test. 
7.2.1 RESISTANCE OF THE SECURITY MECHANISMS 
The rationale of the resistance of the security mechanisms consists of Phase 6 of [CRITERIA] 
where the evaluator has to identify the security mechanisms and provide a rationale of its 
resistance based on a scoring table (copied from the CSPN below). Once each security 
mechanism is ranked, the resistance could be scored as Basic/Elementary, 
Medium/Average or High.  
ASI
Enviromental
Logical 
(Communications)
Physical (Interfaces)
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The CSPN table is included for reference: 
Factor Interval 
Value for 
identification of a 
vulnerability 
Value for 
exploitation of a 
vulnerability 
Time taken for 
< 0,5 hours 0 0 
< 1 day 2 3 
< 1 month 3 5 
> 1 month 5 8 
Impracticable * (High) * (High) 
Attacker expertise 
Layman 0 0 
Proficient 2 2 
Expert 5 4 
Knowledge necessary 
for the attacker 
Any 0 0 
Public information 2 2 
Sensitive information 5 4 
TOE access by the 
attacker 
< 0.5 hours  0 0 
< 1 day 2 4 
< 1 month 3 6 
> 1 month 4 9 
Impracticable * (High) * (High) 
Type of equipment 
necessary 
None 0 0 
Standard 1 2 
Specialized 3 4 
Specific 5 6 
If a * (High) element is found, the final score instantly is graded High. 
Sum of values Resistant to an attacker having 
an attack potential 
Level of functions resistance 
0 to 9 No ranking 
10 to 17 Low Basic / Elementary 
18 to 24 Moderate Medium / Average 
> 24 High High 
Taking into consideration the importance of the products under evaluation, the proposed 
minimum function resistance level should be Medium/Moderate (18 to 24 points)4. 
7.2.2 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
                                                           
4 Normally, the CSPN methodology requires a Basic/Low (10 to 17 points) function resistance level. 
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CSPN Tasks 1 & 2 already are basic testing activities in other certification programs related 
with IACS products like the ISASecure IEC 62443 Certification (Vulnerability Identification 
Test (VIT)) 
One important modification of our methodology compared with the CSPN is the inclusion 
of the design analysis task. The CSPN methodology main evaluation activities consist of 
different testing approaches over the product under evaluation. We believe that is an 
important phase of a cybersecurity evaluation but it is not enough. 
Design analysis has been proven very valuable when doing the security assessment of many 
solutions. For instance, the recent WPA2 attack (KRACK) is based on a re-evaluation of the 
four-way handshake protocol. 
As previously related, it should not be mandatory to ask the developer for detailed and 
formal documentation (as in a CC evaluation). The documentation should be clear enough 
to provide a good understanding of internal details which in turn will allow the evaluator to 
develop a solid rationale about the security of the product. Meetings between the 
evaluation actors may be used to gain this knowledge. 
Otherwise, we cannot ensure that the security analysis is sufficiently complete. 
For all possible vulnerabilities encountered in this phase, an attack potential calculation 
should be made, according to the Common Criteria [CEM (B.4.2.3 Calculation of attack 
potential)] guidance. This applies to all the tiers. 
7.2.2.1 PHYSICAL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS (PHY-VA) 
The first tier analysis consists of physical interfaces (ports, buttons…) search and analysis, 
detailing which of them affect the operation of the device (power, management, 
communications, debug…). 
When all the physical properties have been established, the operating physical perimeter is 
analyzed to finally determine if the physical security solution is sufficient. A list of the 
physical protections available in the TOE, such as security labeling, internal sensors, screw 
types, enclosure sealing… should be described, if the physical perimeter is relevant for the 
security of the assets. 
Finally, the physical tier analysis should review the major components that compose the 
logic board(s). The developer should provide diagrams or pictures of these boards; clearly 
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labeling the debug and other interface ports; as well as port pinouts5 to uncover possible 
undocumented interfaces in the Penetration testing phase. 
 
 
7.2.2.2 LOGICAL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS (LOG-VA) 
The second tier consists on the analysis of the software and its logical interfaces like 
communication, file operations... For this purpose, the developer should provide a list of: 
• The used communication protocols and Operative System in use by the TOE (if 
applicable). 
• A description of the cryptographic primitives in use, if any, including their 
configuration parameters, if any. 
• A list of the TOE files and configuration files, including the logical location in the TOE 
filesystem. 
• A list of the third party components being used to compile/link/assemble the TOE, 
with their exact version detailed. 
The evaluator will analyze this information in order to try to detect vulnerabilities, by 
reviewing public sources for publicly known vulnerabilities, taking previous design analysis 
flaws and documenting them in the report, and elaborate other possible attack strategies. 
To complement this information, and in order to detect other latent vulnerabilities, the 
evaluator will execute a source code audit (CSPN Task 3). This audit might be subsampled 
only to the sections where security functionality is being implemented, so complete access 
to the vendor IP is not needed. 
The security assurance of an evaluation without a source code audit is limited. Black box 
evaluations are important but cannot give a full understanding of what is really 
happening inside the device. This is the reasoning behind the reason why some sort of 
source code audit must be mandatory. 
7.2.2.3 ENVIRONMENTAL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS (ENV-VA) 
If the product security is tightly interconnected with its environment, this analysis tier 
should be executed. 
                                                           
5 Especially for proprietary connectors. 
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The evaluator shall devise potential threats to the environment, specifically to the aspects 
that would affect the TOE security. The evaluator should also elaborate a list of minimum 
environmental security requirements for the TOE. 
The expected result would be some kind of checklist or guidance, which would have to be 
followed by the final client to ascertain that the expected environmental protections are 
set in place. 
 
7.2.2.4 ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS INTERACTIONS VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS (ASI-VA) 
If the TOE is mainly a networking product, or its functionality is dependent on external 
elements, such as sensors, this analysis tier should be executed. This would specifically 
apply to plant management solutions, i.e., SCADA software. 
The evaluator shall analyze the protocols used by the elements, and present attack 
scenarios, such as the malicious substitution of the elements. This analysis will aid itself on 
the design analysis, in order to detect poor design choices (such as not verifying the integrity 
of communication from remote elements, or allowing configuration changes from any 
element in a supposedly secure local network, such as LON or CAN). 
This tier might only be executed in ICCS-A evaluations, please refer to the conclusions. 
7.2.3 PENETRATION TESTING 
The penetration testing by the evaluator shall try to exploit the previously identified 
potential vulnerabilities from the Vulnerability Analysis, if the attack potential needed for 
the attack (calculated from the CC CEM attack potential) less than High. 
The potential vulnerabilities with an attack potential of High or beyond will not need to be 
tested (although they may be tested if it deemed interesting by the developer or the 
Certification Body). These vulnerabilities will be deemed as “Residual”. 
The evaluation tiers will be the same as in the Vulnerability Analysis phase. For each of the 
tiers, a final verdict will be emitted. If the tier was not executed, a “Not Executed (Pass)” 
grade will be given. If a tier contains residual vulnerabilities, it will be graded as “Residual 
(Pass)”. 
Networked appliances should execute the ISA 62443 Communication Robustness Testing 
(CRT). 
For documental brevity, the ICCAR functional tests may be included in the Penetration 
Testing. 
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7.2.4 EVALUATOR OUTPUT AND FOLLOW-UP VENDOR ACTIONS 
A sample document is included as a reference of the resulting ETR (ICCF Cyber Resilience 
Evaluation Technical Report) 
The resulting ETR includes all the elements described in the methodology. This live 
document should contain all the information related to the security  
After penetration testing, all vulnerabilities must be resolved by the developer, with the 
exception of those whose punctuation is higher than 24 points (the Medium/Average level). 
In that case, the vulnerability will be named a “residual vulnerability” and the developer will 
not be forced to solve it. 
If a product after the evaluation contains residual vulnerabilities, these should be clearly 
stated on the certification report. 
7.3 FINDINGS: KEY RESULTS, CONFIDENCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ICCF 
IMPROVEMENTS 
The main conclusion obtained through the NET simulation testing exercise is that the 
evaluation period must have an upper boundary on the testing effort. The evaluation should 
be concluded in 20 to 40 days, not including the 10 days used for the functional testing and 
documental compliance devised in the E2 test of this document. 
The amount of days should be adjusted and reviewed after a real testing effort of a product, 
but the maximum boundary should be kept in place, in order to limit the cost for all the 
parties involved in the evaluation. 
The approach to be followed is slightly different to the CSPN [CRITERIA]. Two main phases 
have been defined: Vulnerability Analysis and Penetration Testing. Guidance on how to 
conduct this methodology has been provided. 
The vendor seemed concerned about the source code analysis. Whole source code will not 
be provided but critical parts/portions of the code (e.g. integrity protection mechanism). 
Although, this would need further discussion about how to do it. 
As previously mentioned, the laboratory proposal is to carry out the review in the vendor 
facilities, by sending the evaluators equipped with the appropriate tools (static code 
analyzers, code analysis tools, fuzzing frameworks, etc.) during a week (suggested), to 
collaboratively work with the vendor in the evaluation. 
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Another approach could be to have an optional source code review, as CSPN, but indicating 
on the product certification stamp whether the evaluation involved source code review. 
The reason is to be transparent with the final user. 
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ANNEX A: SECURITY PROFILE 
    
ICCF Security Profile 
FOR ERNCIP TEST E1 USAGE ONLY    
SIMATIC RTU3030C – 
V2.0.20  
  
Version: 1.0 (draft) 
Date: 2017-11-30 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 CONTEXT OF THIS DOCUMENT 
This document is written for the ICCF scheme certification for the product “SIMATIC RTU3030C”. 
The product is implemented by Siemens. 
1.2 PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION 
Editor SIEMENS AG 
Industry Sector – Drive Technologies Division 
Gleiwitzerstr. 555 
90325 Nürnberg 
GERMANY 
Link http://www.siemens.com 
Product SIMATIC RTU3030C (Order number 6NH3112-3BA00-0XX0) 
Firmware 
version 
V2.0.20 
Four versions of this firmware exist, for the 4 supported network protocols: 
DNP3, IEC60870-5,TeleControl Basic and SINAUT ST7 
Firmware 
link 
Authorized credentials are needed to download the firmware files 
General Site: 
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/109751600/sales-release-of-simatic-
rtu3010c-and-firmware-version-2-0-for-simatic-rtu30x0c?lc=en-US&pnid=21767 
DNP3: 
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/attachments/109751600/RTU1123BA00_V2.0.20_D
NP3_OSS.zip 
SHA512 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
IEC60870-5-104: 
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/attachments/109751600/RTU1123BA00_V2.0.20_I8
70_OSS.zip 
SHA512 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
TeleControl Basic: 
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/attachments/109751600/RTU1123BA00_V2.0.20_W
DCP_OSS_.zip 
SHA512 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
SINAUT ST7: 
- Not yet available - 
SHA512 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
Product 
usage 
manual 
C79000-G8976-C382-04 
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/attachments/109750942/BA_RTU3030C_76.pdf 
SHA512 
d4d13080e20bfb5d5deb2a6f2e6b3723f6c5409d402feab08d56447a6daccfa2fa733a
60ceb808707b78e33cd516f313b4035ef9e7a500b78c87b4606b03acf6 
Product 
category 
Industrial Remote Communications Terminal 
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2 PRODUCT DESCRIPTION 
2.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
A remote terminal unit (RTU) is a microprocessor-controlled electronic device that interfaces objects 
in the physical world to a distributed control system or SCADA (supervisory control and data 
acquisition) system by transmitting telemetry data to a master system, and by using messages from 
the master supervisory system to control connected objects. 
 
 
2.2 FEATURES 
The TOE includes the following features: 
• User program execution: the TOE runs a simple controller program. This program processes 
the inputs via program blocks. 
• Input/output management: the TOE is able to read 8 digital and 4 analog local inputs and 
write 4 digital local outputs. These I/O allow the TOE to control and command the industrial 
process. 
• Administration functions: the TOE includes administration functions in order to configure or 
program the other functionalities of the TOE. One administration interface is possible: 
o web-client, via WBM (Web Based Management) 
The considered target of evaluation (TOE) is the SIMATIC RTU3030C developed by Siemens. 
The TOE is managed with SINAUT ST7cc // WinCC OA // SIMATIC PCS 7 TeleControl and 
SIMATIC WinCC/TeleControl. 
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• Local logging: the TOE supports the configuration of an optional local logging policy, in a 
local SD card. 
• Control room communication: the TOE supports the definition of a remote communications 
partner. The following protocols are available: 
o TeleControl Basic (without VPN possible) 
o DNP3 
o IEC 60870-5-104 
o ST7 via TIM 1531 nodestation and WinCC with additional plugin. 
• Mobile network connection: The TOE will be able to connect to a UMTS / GSM network, by 
including a SIM card inside the appliance. 
• Other communication mechanisms: the TOE supports additional communication protocols 
o SMS (inbound and outbound) for wake-up 
o Secure Email (outbound) 
o Secure FTP Client to send e.g. log files 
o OpenVPN client (legacy or via SINEMA RC with auto enrollment) 
o HTTP and HTTPS 
2.3 PRODUCT USAGE 
An RTU can be used to monitor connected inputs and emit outputs as programmed by local 
controller programs 
The RTU is managed with a local or remote engineering workstation. Firmware updates and user 
programs can be loaded on the RTU though the network or locally, thanks to the WBM 
administration. 
A basic architecture is depicted on the figure below, using the IEC 60870-5-104 protocol. 
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3 SECURITY PERIMETER 
3.1 USERS 
The users that may interact with the TOE are the following: 
• Administrator: This user has maximum privileges. He can change all the other user accounts 
stored in the system. 
Remark: All WBM users are administrators. 
3.2 ASSUMPTIONS 
Assumptions on the environment and the use case of the TOE are the following: 
• Premises: The TOE is located in secure premises with a restricted access limited to 
trustworthy people. In particular, the attacker does not have access to the physical ports of 
the TOE.  
• Backup and configuration files: The user has to store the files in a secure way. Since 
products identical to the TOE may be purchased freely, the attacker may purchase one in 
order to research vulnerabilities by any possible mean. 
• Administrators: The administrators are competent, trained and trustworthy. 
• Logging: It is assumed that local and remote logging are operational and that local logs are 
not corrupted 
• Availability of GMS/UMTS interface: It is intended for the control function to work 
independently on the GSM connection. The device stores measurement values and controls 
the process also if the GSM interface is not available. 
• Security documentation: the TOE is provided with a complete documentation for a secure 
usage. In particular, all secrets are listed in order to allow their customization. These 
documents are as follows: 
o https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/109479322 
o https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/109481154 
o https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/109481299 
All recommendations included in this documentation are applied prior to the evaluation. 
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4 CRITICAL ASSETS 
4.1 ENVIRONMENT CRITICAL ASSETS 
The environment critical assets are the following: 
• Command and Control of the monitored industrial process: the TOE monitors and 
commands sensors related to industrial processes, by reading inputs and sending 
commands to actuators. The availability and integrity of these actions must be protected. 
• Management flows: The data flow between the TOE and the management system must be 
protected in integrity, confidentiality and authenticity. Additional availability is provided by 
alternative communication means. 
• Wireless contract and network: The TOE must have a SIM card with an active contract 
inserted. The TOE must be located inside the coverage of the contracted wireless network 
of the carrier. 
• OpenVPN: The TOE should be connected to the TeleControl master via OpenVPN. The 
OpenVPN server must fulfill, at least, SL 2 requirements according to the IEC 62443. 
The security requirements for the critical assets are the following: 
Assets 
Availability 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Authenticity 
Control-command of the industrial process X X X X 
Engineering workstation flows  X X X 
OpenVPN  X X X 
 
Note: Environmental Critical Assets are not required by CSPN. They are included to provide more 
information of the environment 
4.2 TOE CRITICAL ASSETS 
The critical assets of the TOE are the following: 
• Firmware: The firmware must be protected in both integrity and authenticity. 
• User controller programs: The TOE runs a program designed by the users. Its integrity, 
confidentiality and authenticity must be protected. 
• Configuration: The TOE configuration and policies must be protected in confidentiality and 
integrity. The attacker must not be able to discover the configuration of the TOE by any 
other means than by observing the TOE activity. 
• User authentication mechanism: The TOE must ensure the availability, integrity and 
authenticity of the authentication mechanism. 
Spanish NET report on E1 to E3 ICCF tests 
                                                                             Page 27/45 
• User secrets: The user passwords must be stored in the TOE, and the TOE must ensure the 
integrity and confidentiality of these credentials. 
• SIM card PIN: The TOE must store the SIM card PIN, and must ensure the integrity and 
confidentiality of the PIN. 
• Authorized users information: The TOE must store the Information about authorized 
telephone numbers and e-mail address, and ensure the integrity and confidentiality of this 
information. 
Assets 
Availability 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Authenticity 
Firmware   X X 
User controller programs  X X X 
Configuration  X X  
User authentication mechanism X  X X 
User secrets  X X  
SIM card PIN  X X  
Authorized users information  X X X 
 
  
Spanish NET report on E1 to E3 ICCF tests 
                                                                             Page 28/45 
5 THREAT MODEL 
5.1 ATTACKERS 
The following attackers are considered: 
• Attacker on the communications network: The attacker can connect to the TOE carrier 
network, but does not know the OpenVPN or TeleControl keys. 
5.2 THREATS 
The following threats are considered: 
• Denial of service: the attacked manages to generate a denial of service on the TOE by 
performing an unexpected action or by exploiting a vulnerability. This denial of service can 
affect the whole TOE or some of its functions. 
• Firmware modification: the attacker manages to inject and run a corrupted firmware on 
the TOE. The code injection may be temporary or permanent and this does include any 
unexpected or unauthorized code execution. A user may attempt to install that update on 
the TOE by legitimate means. Finally, the attacker manages to modify the version of the 
firmware installed on the TOE without having the privilege to do so. 
• Controller program compromise: the attacker manages to obtain some parts of the 
configuration of the TOE by means other than the observation of the activity of the TOE. 
• Controller program alteration: the attacker manages to modify, temporarily or 
permanently, the controller program. 
• Configuration alteration: the attacker manages to modify, temporary or permanently, the 
TOE configuration. 
• Configuration compromise: the attacker manages to illegitimately obtain some parts of the 
TOE configuration. 
• Credentials theft: the attacker manages to steal user credentials. 
• Authentication violation: the attacker succeeds in authenticating himself without 
credentials. 
• Flows alteration: the attacker manages to corrupt exchanges between the TOE and an 
external component without being detected. 
• Flows compromise: in case of data flows requiring confidentiality, the attacker manages to 
fetch data by intercepting exchanges between the TOE and an external component. 
5.3 SECURITY FUNCTIONS 
The following security objectives are considered: 
• Malformed input management: The TOE has been developed in order to correctly handle 
malformed input, in particular malformed network traffic. 
• Secure storage of secrets: User secrets are securely stored in the TOE. In particular, the 
compromise of a file is not sufficient for retrieving them. 
• Secure authentication on administration interface: Session tokens are protected against 
hijack and replay. They have a short lifespan. The identity and the permissions of the user 
account are systematically checked before any privileged action session. 
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• Firmware signature: At each update of the firmware, the integrity and authenticity of the 
new firmware are checked before updating. The integrity and authenticity of the firmware 
are also checked at boot time. 
• Configuration confidentiality and integrity: The access control prevents any unauthorized 
person from reading or modifying the configuration of the TOE. 
• Integrity and authenticity of the controller program: The TOE ensures the integrity of the 
controller program. Only authorized users can modify it. 
• Confidentiality of the controller program: The TOE protects the confidentiality of the 
controller program. Only authorized users can access it. 
• Secure communication: The TOE supports secured communication, protected in integrity, 
confidentiality and authenticity. 
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ANNEX B: CYBER RESILIENCE TEST SIMULATION AND EFFORT REPORT 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This report is shown as an example of content that a Cyber Resilience Evaluation Technical Report 
could contain. None of the contents related to the TOE should be considered as valid, as this is just 
a sample report. 
Moreover, some of the sections have not been completed. It may be used as a draft document. 
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1.1 PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION 
Editor SIEMENS AG 
Industry Sector – Drive Technologies Division 
Gleiwitzerstr. 555 
90325 Nürnberg 
GERMANY 
Link http://www.siemens.com 
Product SIMATIC RTU3030C (Order number 6NH3112-3BA00-0XX0) 
Firmware version V2.0.20 
Four versions of this firmware exist, for the 4 supported network protocols: 
DNP3, IEC60870-5,TeleControl Basic and SINAUT ST7 
 
1.2 CERTIFICATION IDENTIFICATION 
 
Certification Scheme ICCS-B 
ICCF Protection Profile (PP) Conformity No PP is being used. 
Product category Industrial Remote Communications Terminal 
Evaluation Laboratory LGAI Technological Center S.A. (A-63207492) 
Campus UAB–Ronda de la Font del Carme, s/n 
08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona (Spain) 
Tel: +34 93 567 20 00 
www.applus.com 
Certification Body/ National Information 
Security Agency 
Organismo de Certificación (Centro Criptológico Nacional) 
C/Argentona 30 
28023, Madrid (Spain) 
Project Identification Code ICCS-ES-2017-1 
 
 
1.3 EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT IDENTIFICATION 
ETR Reviewer Reviewer Name 
ETR Approver Technical Leader Name 
Security Profile (SP) Version 0.5 – 2017-11-27 
 
1.4 PENETRATION TESTING RESULTS OVERVIEW 
Physical security (PHY-PT) Pass 
Logical security (LOG-PT) Residual (Pass) 
Environmental security (ENV-PT) Not tested (Pass) 
Additional systems interaction (ASI-PT) Not tested (Pass) 
Final evaluation score Pass 
 
1.5 RELATED DOCUMENTS 
Product usage manual 09/2017 
C79000-G8976-C382-04 
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2 SECURITY MECHANISM SCORING 
This section includes the CSPN Phase 6 Security Mechanism scoring, as related in the section “7.2.1. 
Resistance of the Security Mechanisms”. 
2.1 FIRMWARE SIGNATURE (NAME OF THE SECURITY MECHANISM) 
A description of the security mechanism should be included here, explaining possible attack vectors, 
and a brief scoring rationale. This is based on the CSPN evaluation of security mechanisms. 
FOR EXAMPLE: The TOE implements a digital signature check in order to validate the authenticity of 
the incoming firmware file. This file is being signed under the Microsoft Authenticode Standard 
[AUTHENTICODE], and contains a digital PKCS #7 signature. 
In order for an attacker to forge this signature, access to the private signing key is required. No other 
specialized access is required. 
Factor Interval Value 
Elapsed Time > a month 5 
Expertise Expert 5 
Knowledge of TOE Sensitive information 5 
Window of Opportunity <1 day 2 
Equipment Standard 1 
 Total Value 18 (High) 
 Is the resistance High? YES 
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3 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
3.1 PHYSICAL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS (PHY-VA) 
3.1.1 PHYSICAL EXTERNAL OVERVIEW 
 
Readily available interfaces SMA Antenna Socket (4) 
RJ-45 Socket (15) 
Service Interface (8) 
Power ON / Reset Button (7) 
SIM Receptacle (13) 
Slot for signal boards (17) 
Power loss protection Internal Battery 
External Battery (19) 
Physical communication interfaces 
(Analyzed in the Logical Security) 
SMA Antenna Socket (4) | GPRS 
RJ-45 Socket (15) | Ethernet 
Service Interface (8) | Proprietary 
Slot for signal boards (17) | Proprietary 
Other readily available interfaces SD card slot (5) 
Actuators 4 digital outputs (2) 
Inputs 8 digital inputs (2) 
4 analog inputs (14) 
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3.1.2 PHYSICAL ENCLOSURE PROTECTIONS 
The following physical enclosure protections can be found in the device: 
• The real measures are unknown. (I.E.:  
• TORX screws, lock, glued/sealed screws, ultrasonically sealed plastic enclosure… 
• Additional security is provided by a tamper-proof labeling for each of the screw holes) 
3.1.3 INTERNAL BOARDS OVERVIEW 
[INCLUDE INTERNAL BOARDS PHOTOGRAPHS / DIAGRAMS. These should clearly reflect where the 
external interfaces meet with the board.] 
Internally available interfaces UNKNOWN (I.E.:  
UART, JTAG, I2C/TWI, TTL) 
Processor UNKNOWN (IE: 
NXP MVF51NN152CMK50 BGA) 
NV Storage UNKNOWN (IE: 
JMICRON NAND512W3A2SNXE TSOP) 
RAM UNKNOWN (IE: 
JMICRON MT41K128M8DA-107:J BGA – NOTE: Epoxy covered) 
GPRS Modem UNKNOWN (IE: 
SIMCOM SIM5218 BGA) 
Additional security UNKNOWN (IE: 
Case open sensor, MEMS magnetic sensor, internal PIR sensor) 
 
3.1.4 PORT PINOUTS 
[INCLUDE PORT PINOUTS. For proprietary interfaces, the pinouts should also be provided. This 
shall allow the evaluator to determine if additional testing is needed for an interface.] 
 
3.1.5 POTENTIAL PHYSICAL VULNERABILITIES 
This section will include a list of the detected potential physical vulnerabilities. For a sample 
vulnerability, please refer to the Potential Logical Vulnerabilities section below.] 
No apparent physical vulnerabilities have been found. 
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3.2 LOGICAL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS (LOG-VA) 
3.2.1 COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS OVERVIEW 
The communication protocols and related cryptography support available in the product are the 
following: 
Control system 
communication 
protocols 
TeleControl Basic [Proprietary] 
SINAUT ST7 [Proprietary] 
OpenVPN 2.3.4 
 
Inside a mandatory OpenVPN tunnel, the following traffic can be found: 
DNP3 [DNP3 SPECIFICATION Version 2.x (2007/2009)] 
IEC 60870-5 [IEC 60870-5 Part 104 (2006)] 
 
Note: the TeleControl Basic scheme uses its own cryptography and 
authentication control, and it is not based on OpenVPN. 
Internal protocols HTTP 
SMS (GPRS) 
Cryptography support Inside OpenVPN: 
• TLS v1.0 up to v1.2 
• AES-256-CBC 
• DES-168-CBC (DES-EDE3) 
• BF-CBC (Blowfish) 
• SHA1, SHA2(224,256) 
[REVIEW CSPN 3.3 – Specification of cryptographic mechanisms] 
The cryptography keys are stored in the /etc/ssl/ folder 
TOE Operative System Linux 3.16.50 
 
3.2.2 THIRD PARTY COMPONENTS 
The product includes the following third party libraries 
Name Version  
OpenVPN 2.3.4 
To be Completed To be Completed  
3.2.3 PUBLIC VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
A PUBLIC VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS SHALL BE CONDUCTED, BY ANALYZING THE THIRD PARTY 
COMPONENTS USED, AND CHECKING THAT THEY ARE NOT AFFECTED BY PUBLICLY KNOWN 
VULNERABILITIES. 
3.2.3.1 VULN-001 – OpenVPN denial of service (CVE-2014-8104) 
The OpenVPN version in use by the developer is vulnerable to the vulnerability identified as CVE-
2014-8104 
OpenVPN 2.x before 2.0.11, 2.1.x, 2.2.x before 2.2.3, and 2.3.x before 2.3.6 allows remote 
authenticated users to cause a denial of service (server crash) via a small control channel packet. 
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https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-8104 
 
3.2.4 SOURCE CODE AUDIT 
THE CSPN DEFINES THE FOLLOWING METHODOLOGY: 
Give an expert opinion on the readability and structuring of the source code (examples of criteria: 
existence of comments, division into modules, typing of data, portability, etc.), specifying the 
modules that were viewed. It is possible to proceed by sampling. 
USE OF AUTOMATED STATIC CODE ANALYSIS TOOLS MAY BE USEFUL IN THIS SECTION. 
The audit can be limited to only the modules where security functionality has been implemented 
TO BE COMPLETED 
 
3.2.5 POTENTIAL LOGICAL VULNERABILITIES 
Some potential vulnerabilities have been detected. 
The vulnerability description should include information about how the vulnerability will 
compromise assets of the TOE. It should also clearly state where the vulnerability was identified. 
 
3.2.5.1 VULN-001 – OpenVPN denial of service (CVE-2014-8104) 
Origin: Third party components public vulnerability review 
OpenVPN 2.x before 2.0.11, 2.1.x, 2.2.x before 2.2.3, and 2.3.x before 2.3.6 allows remote 
authenticated users to cause a denial of service (server crash) via a small control channel packet. 
3.2.5.2 VULN-002 – SS7 impersonation 
Origin: Design review 
The TOE makes use of an internal phone book to keep track of which phone numbers are authorized 
to enable the administrative interface. 
An attacker connected to the SS7 network of the telco provider would be able to examine the 
incoming connections to the base station, reading the SMS messages to be delivered to the TOE. 
Once the attacker knows one authorized number, an attack can be carried out to force the TOE to 
constantly be in the “Active” operation mode, draining the system faster than intended, and 
therefore affecting the availability of the TOE. 
Factor Interval Value 
Elapsed Time > 6 months 19 
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Expertise Expert 6 
Knowledge of TOE Public 0 
Window of Opportunity Unnecessary 0 
Equipment Specialized 4 
 Total Value 29 
 Attack Potential Required Beyond High 
 Vulnerability Type Residual 
 
3.2.5.3 VULN-003 – Communication denial / base station impersonation 
Origin: Design review 
Tightly related to VULN-002, the attacker could instead of attacking the SS7 network, impersonate 
a base station, to either block the communications with the TOE, articulate a Man-in-the-Middle 
attack, or saturate the TOE with SMS’s. 
An attacker could set up a malicious base station to intercept, forge or block TOE communications 
Factor Interval Value 
Elapsed Time > 6 months 19 
Expertise Expert 6 
Knowledge of TOE Public 0 
Window of Opportunity Unnecessary 0 
Equipment Specialized 4 
 Total Value 29 
 Attack Potential Required Beyond High 
 Vulnerability Type Residual 
 
3.2.5.4 VULN-004 – Log indiscernibility 
Origin: Design review 
An attacker could connect to the administration panel while this is being accessed by another 
administrator. The origin of the changes would be undistinguishable between the sessions. 
Factor Interval Value 
Elapsed Time > 6 months 19 
Expertise Layman 0 
Knowledge of TOE Sensitive 7 
Window of Opportunity Difficult 10 
Equipment Standard 0 
 Total Value 36 
 Attack Potential Required Beyond High 
 Vulnerability Type Residual 
3.3 ENVIRONMENTAL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS (ENV-VA) 
No environmental analysis is to be executed under the TOE, as it is not dependent on its operating 
environment. 
Spanish NET report on E1 to E3 ICCF tests 
                                                                             Page 40/45 
Therefore, as long as the environmental security assumptions are maintained (in particular, the 
Premises Security Profile assumption), the product should be secure. 
 
3.4 ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS INTERACTION VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS (ASI-VA) 
The interaction with other systems and components is only considered for ICCS-A evaluations. 
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4 PENETRATION TESTING 
4.1 ICCAR TESTING 
[A TEST BATTERY BASED ON THE IEC- 62443-4-2 SHOULD BE USED. THE SL-C LEVEL 3 IS 
RECOMMENDED AS A STARTING POINT. HOWEVER; THE TESTS SHOULD BE SPECIFIED BY THE 
PROTECTION PROFILE 
PLEASE REVIEW THE NET DRAFT FOR MORE INFORMATION ON THE E2 TEST, AND THE 
CONCUSSIONS ON FUNCTIONAL TESTING. 
How the TOE was set up should be included here. If special considerations or configurations have 
been made in a test, it should be included inside the test itself. 
4.1.1 IAC – IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION CONTROL 
4.1.2 CR 1.1 HUMAN USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 
Operations to be carried out Expected Results Observed results 
The TOE will be configured with a 
single user account. An attacker 
will try to enumerate the 
registered users, to try to disclose 
sensitive information 
The TOE will not disclose 
information about the valid users. 
The evaluator was unable to 
enumerate the TOE users by a 
brute force attack, or information 
leakage in the error messages. 
Conclusions 
The TOE does not disclose unwanted information about the registered users. 
Verdict Pass 
 
4.1.3 CR 1.1 RE 1 UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 
Test Case to be defined. 
 
4.1.4 CR 1.1 RE 2 MULTIFACTOR AUTHENTICATION FOR UNTRUSTED INTERFACE 
Test Case to be defined. 
 
4.2 PHYSICAL PENETRATION TESTING (PHY-PT) 
4.2.1 ENCLOSURE SECURITY REVIEW, COMMENTS AND VERDICT 
The physical enclosure protections have been found to be sufficient taking into consideration the 
following operational environments: 
• No physical access to the product is to be guaranteed to maintain the security properties. 
Some kind of external alarm system should be used to ensure this property. 
Therefore, the physical enclosure protections verdict is Pass. 
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4.2.2 INTERNAL BOARD SECURITY REVIEW, COMMENTS AND VERDICT 
No additional interfaces have been discovered during the TOE inspection 
Furthermore, the operational environments and the enclosure security guarantee that no 
undetected board access will be available to an adversary. 
Additional security measures are described, I.E.: 
The RAM is protected by an epoxy layer, further increasing the difficulty of a local attack. An open 
case sensor activates a remote alarm if triggered. 
TO BE COMPLETED 
Therefore, the internal board security verdict is Pass. 
4.2.3 EXPLOITED PHYSICAL VULNERABILITIES 
No physical exploitation of any interface was achieved during the TOE physical penetration testing. 
TO BE COMPLETED 
As no outstanding physical vulnerability remains, the physical vulnerabilities verdict is Pass. 
4.2.4 PHYSICAL SECURITY EVALUATION VERDICT 
The following table provides an overview of the results of the physical security evaluation: 
Physical enclosure protections Pass 
Internal board security Pass 
Physical vulnerabilities None (Pass) 
The system includes sufficient security to assure physical security, taking into account its operating 
environment, physical enclosure protections and internal board security. 
Therefore, the physical penetration test verdict is Pass. 
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4.3 LOGICAL PENETRATION TESTING (LOG-PT) 
4.3.1 NETWORK STRESS TESTING 
[AS THE DEVICE IS A NETWORKED APPLIANCE, THE ISA SSA (System Security Assurance) NST 
(Network Stress Test) SHOULD BE MANDATORY, to try to guarantee operation, even under 
extraneous loads or messaging] 
This tests should include network (OSI levels 3/4 and level 6 protocol) fuzzing, and load testing. 
TO BE COMPLETED 
4.3.2 PENETRATION TESTING 
ADDITIONAL PEN-TESTING ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE CONDUCTED. THE RESULTS SHALL BE RECORDED 
IN THIS SECTION. This activities should focus on the seemingly most vulnerable protocols and 
physical interfaces. 
TO BE COMPLETED 
No exploits were identified during the penetration testing of the TOE. 
Therefore, the penetration testing verdict is Pass. 
4.3.3 POTENTIAL LOGICAL VULNERABILITIES 
This section will contain the logical vulnerabilities, identified in the vulnerability analysis. 
TO BE COMPLETED 
4.3.3.1 VULN-001 – OpenVPN denial of service (CVE-2014-8104) 
As the vulnerability known as CVE-2014-8104 only affects the Server portion of the OpenVPN 
software, and the TOE only makes use of the client portion and does not allow exposing an OpenVPN 
server, this vulnerability is Not Exploitable. 
More information is available in https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-8104 
4.3.3.2 VULN-002 – SS7 impersonation 
The developer has acknowledged the vulnerability as residual. As such, it will be included in the 
certification report. 
4.3.3.3 VULN-003 – Communication denial / base station impersonation 
The developer has acknowledged the vulnerability as residual. As such, it will be included in the 
certification report. 
4.3.3.4 VULN-004 – Log indiscernibility 
The developer has acknowledged the vulnerability as residual. As such, it will be included in the 
certification report. 
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4.3.4 RESIDUAL LOGICAL VULNERABILITIES VERDICT 
No exploitable vulnerabilities exist in the TOE. All of the residual vulnerabilities have been 
acknowledged by the developer, or have been solved. 
Therefore, the residual logical vulnerabilities is Pass. 
4.3.5 LOGICAL PENETRATION TEST VERDICT 
The following table provides an overview of the results of the logical security evaluation: 
ICCAR testing Pass 
Network stress testing Pass 
Penetration testing Pass 
Exploited logical vulnerabilities None (Pass) 
Residual logical vulnerabilities Residual (Pass) 
As all the sub steps for the logical security evaluation have passed, the logical security penetration 
test verdict is Pass. 
4.4 ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY PENETRATION TEST (ENV-PT) 
As no environmental vulnerability analysis has been done, there is no penetration test for this tier. 
Therefore, the environmental security penetration test verdict is Not tested (Pass). 
4.5 ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS INTERACTION (ASI-PT) 
As no environmental vulnerability analysis has been done, there is no penetration test for this tier. 
Therefore, the additional systems interaction security penetration test verdict is Not tested (Pass). 
 
  
Spanish NET report on E1 to E3 ICCF tests 
           Page 45/45 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
[CRITERIA] Evaluation Criteria for the First Level Security Certification, ANSSI, 2014 
[METHODOLOGY] Methodology for Evaluation for a First Level Security Certification, ANSSI, 2014 
GLOSSARY 
Acronym Description 
CSPN (FR) Certification de Sécurité de Premier Niveau 
(EN) First Leven Security Certification 
ICCF IACS component Cybersecurity Certification Framework 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards 
FIDO Fast IDentity Online 
SOG-IS Senior Officers Group for Information Systems Security 
RTU Remote Terminal Unit 
TOE Target Of Evaluation 
DNP3 Distributed Network Protocol 
VIT Vulnerability Identification Test 
CRT Communication Robustness Test 
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation 
ICCAR IACS Common Cybersecurity Assessment Requirements 
ETR Evaluation Technical Report 
CC Common Criteria 
KRACK Key Reinstallation Attacks 
ASI Additional Systems Interactions 
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers 
to your questions about the European Union. 
Freephone number (*): 
00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you). 
More information on the European Union is available on the internet (http://europa.eu).
HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS 
Free publications: 
• one copy:
via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu);
• more than one copy or posters/maps:
from the European Union’s representations (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm);
from the delegations in non-EU countries (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm); 
by contacting the Europe Direct service (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) or
calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*). 
(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you).
Priced publications: 
• via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu).
ERNCIP Thematic Group: European IACS Cybersecurity Certification 
IACS Cybersecurity Certification Framework (ICCF): Lessons from the 2017 study of the state of the art 
doi:10.2760/856808 
ISBN 978-92-79-85968-7 
K
J-N
A
-2
9
2
3
7
-EN
-N
